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Last Term, in Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt,1 the 
Supreme Court ruled that States have sovereign immunity from suit in the 
courts of another State.  Attention has focused both on the merits of such 
immunity and on the fact that Hyatt overruled a prior precedent.2  Although 
these issues are significant, the nature of the analysis the Court used to 
reach its decision has broader implications for our understanding of 
constitutional federalism.  The Court explicitly invoked principles drawn 
from the law of nations—today known as public international law—to 
determine the sovereign rights of the States under the Constitution.  Justice 
Thomas began his opinion for the Court by observing that “[a]fter 
independence, the States considered themselves fully sovereign nations,”3 
and as such were “‘exemp[t] . . . from all [foreign] jurisdiction.’”4  The 
Court relied on “[t]he Constitution’s use of the term, ‘States’” to support the 
States’ retention of this traditional aspect of sovereignty.5  The Court 
reasoned that the States continued to possess this immunity unless they 
affirmatively surrendered it in the Constitution.  Although the Court 
acknowledged that the States surrendered some of their sovereign immunity 
(by authorizing certain suits against them in federal court), it concluded that 
nothing in the Constitution sufficed to surrender their immunity from suits 
in state court. 
The Hyatt Court’s analysis has significance far beyond the immunity 
of one State in the courts of another.6  The original public meaning of the 
term “States” has important implications for several of the Court’s most 
prominent federalism doctrines.  These doctrines have been controversial 
both on and off the Court because critics charge that they lack an adequate 
basis in the constitutional text.  The framework employed by the Court in 
Hyatt answers these criticisms by grounding the doctrines in the meaning of 
the term “States” as used in the Constitution.  The term “States” was a term 
of art drawn from the law of nations and signified a sovereign nation with a 
set of widely recognized sovereign rights.  Under the law of nations, a 
“State” could only relinquish its sovereign rights by a clear and express 
 
1 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019). 
2 See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979). 
3 Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. at 1493. 
4 Id. at 1494 (quoting E. DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 108, at 486). 
5 Id.  
6 For example, the Hyatt Court’s approach is directly relevant to understanding the proper scope of state 
sovereign immunity and Congress’s power to abrogate such immunity under its enumerated powers—questions 
that will come before the Court this Term.  See Allen v. Cooper, 895 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. granted 139 
S. Ct. 2664 (2019). 
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surrender in a binding legal instrument (such as the Constitution).  If, as 
Hyatt stated, the American States possessed full sovereignty at the 
founding, then many of the Court’s most controversial federalism decisions 
have a forgotten basis in the original public meaning of the term “State” as 
understood against background principles of the law of nations. 
Over the last three decades, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a 
renewed commitment to constitutional federalism.  In addition to enforcing 
the limits of Congress’s commerce power,7 the Court has upheld three 
important constitutional immunities possessed by the States.  First, the 
Court has reaffirmed that States have sovereign immunity from suits 
brought by individuals, and that Congress generally lacks authority to 
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I, Section 8 
powers.8  Second, the Court has recognized that Congress has no 
constitutional power to commandeer the legislative and executive 
departments of the States.9  Third, the Court has reiterated that the States 
possess equal sovereignty under the Constitution, and that Congress has 
limited power to override such sovereignty.10  The Court’s recognition of 
these three immunities has allowed the States greater freedom to operate as 
distinct sovereigns within a federal system.  At the same time, these 
developments have sparked controversy both on and off the Court.  Critics 
contend that these immunities lack adequate support in the Constitution and 
that the Court has therefore overreached in recognizing and enforcing them.  
Some of this criticism has come from an unexpected quarter—proponents 
of textualism in constitutional interpretation.  Because the text of the 
Constitution does not affirmatively confer these state immunities, textualists 
claim that these judicial doctrines are inconsistent with fidelity to the 
constitutional text and the compromises that it embodies.11   
As Hyatt suggests, this apparent tension between textualism and 
federalism can be resolved by resort to a surprising source—international 
law.  Most observers regard the proper understanding of federalism under 
the U.S. Constitution as a pure question of domestic law.  It is impossible, 
however, to understand American federalism without consulting 
background principles of the law of nations invoked by the Declaration of 
 
7 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); cf. Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 519 (2012) (upholding the individual mandate under the Affordable Care 
Act as a tax even though it exceeded the scope of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce). 
8 See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  The 
Court has recognized a narrow exception when Congress abrogates state sovereign immunity pursuant to its 
bankruptcy power.  See Central Va. Comm. College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
9 See Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018); Printz v. United States, 
532 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
10 See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
11 See, e.g., John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 2003 (2009). 
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Independence and reflected in both the Articles of Confederation and the 
Constitution.  These principles help to resolve the apparent tension between 
textualism and several important federalism doctrines by clarifying the 
Constitution’s delegation of powers to the federal government, its 
reservation of powers to the States, and the proper approach to interpreting 
the provisions allocating these respective powers.  The term “States” was a 
term of art drawn directly from the law of nations, and the founders 
presumably understood the term by reference to such law.  Accordingly, the 
law of nations provides crucial background context for understanding both 
the original sovereign rights enjoyed by States and the extent to which they 
relinquished such rights by adopting the Constitution.  Read in light of the 
law of nations, the Constitution provides a firm textual basis for many of 
the Court’s most prominent—and controversial—federalism doctrines. 
Several commentators have argued that the Supreme Court’s 
renewed commitment to federalism is incompatible with its embrace of 
textualism.  Textualism seeks to ascertain the meaning of a legal provision 
by asking how a reasonably skilled user of language would have understood 
the text in its original context.12  The Court has used textualism to interpret 
both statutes and, to a lesser extent, the Constitution.  Federalism refers to 
the Constitution’s division of governmental authority between the federal 
government and the States.  In the decades following the New Deal, the 
Court interpreted the Constitution to impose few, if any, constraints on 
federal power vis-à-vis the States.  In a series of decisions over the past 
three decades, however, the Court has renewed its commitment to 
federalism by upholding the governance prerogatives of the States against 
various forms of unwarranted federal regulation.  The Court’s simultaneous 
embrace of federalism and textualism is among the most striking features of 
the Court’s jurisprudence in recent decades. 
Critics charge that the Supreme Court’s federalism doctrines are 
incompatible with textualism.  For example, John Manning has argued that 
the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering and sovereign immunity 
doctrines “lack any discernable textual source” in the Constitution.13  In his 
view, these “new federalism” decisions are problematic because they rest on 
nothing more than “freestanding federalism.”14  Freestanding federalism, as 
he uses the phrase, “seeks the founders’ decisions not in the meaning of any 
discrete clause, but in the overall system of government they adopted in the 
 
12 See John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 420 (2005) (stating that “in 
practice [textualism] is associated with the basic proposition that judges must seek and abide by the public 
meaning of the enacted text, understood in context”). 
13 Id. at 2009. 
14 Id. at 2005, 2040. 
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document.”15  The problem he sees with this approach is that it focuses not 
on the specific meaning of the constitutional text but instead on the broad 
general purpose—federalism—underlying the text.16  Dean Manning 
regards the Court’s reliance on freestanding federalism as incompatible with 
textualism because such reliance disregards hard-fought compromises built 
into the constitutional text.17 
In an important early article on this topic, Mike Rappaport sought to 
reconcile textualism and federalism by arguing that “the textual basis for the 
immunities against being commandeered, taxed, and regulated is not the 
Tenth Amendment or the structure of the Constitution, but instead is the 
term ‘State.’”18  In his view, “[b]y calling the local governments ‘States,’ 
the Framers intended that these governments possess some of the traditional 
immunities that states enjoyed.”19  He reasoned as follows.  “In 1789, the 
principal meaning of the term [‘State’] in this context was an independent 
nation or country that had complete sovereignty.”20  He did not contend, 
however, that the Constitution used the term “State” in this pure sense 
because “the states did not retain all the powers of independent countries.”21  
Rather, he argued that the term “should be interpreted as an entity that has 
some, but not all, of the sovereign powers of an independent country.”22  In 
reaching this conclusion, Professor Rappaport relied on the Constitution’s 
“structure, purpose, and history.”23  Although he acknowledged that “this 
interpretation does depart from the ordinary meaning” of the term “State,” 
he argued that such departures are “common and entirely appropriate.”24  In 
the end, he concluded that the term “State” should be read to confer at least 
three state immunities against the federal government—immunities against 
being “commandeered, taxed, and regulated.”25  In his view, these 
 
15 Id. at 2006. 
16 Id. at 2047. 
17 Id. at 2040.  See also Thomas B. Colby, Originalism and Structural Argument, 113 N.W.U. L. REV. 1297, 
1299 (2019) (observing that the Supreme Court’s anti-commandeering and state sovereign immunity decisions 
“are grounded in abstract notions of constitutional structure, rather than the original meaning of the constitutional 
text”).  For a defense of freestanding federalism, see Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Legitimacy of 
Freestanding Federalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 98, 99 (2009) (maintaining that “Manning's argument is far more 
destabilizing to existing doctrines and long-established practices of constitutional interpretation than he 
acknowledges”). 
18 Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme 
Court’s Tenth and Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819, 821 (1999). 
19 Id. at 821. 
20 Id. at 830. 
21 Id. at 831. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 837. 
24 Id. at 836. 
25 Id. at 821.  Professor Rappaport also argues that state sovereign immunity in both federal and state court 
can be traced to the Article III judicial power and the Constitution’s use of the term “States.”  See id. at 869-74. 
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immunities “are necessary to ensure that the states retain at least some 
sovereignty and that they can perform their constitutional functions.”26 
Although Professor Rappaport’s approach starts with the 
constitutional text, his conclusion that the term “States” had a narrower—
yet unspecified—meaning has led prominent scholars to doubt that his 
approach is capable of reconciling textualism with the Court’s federalism 
decisions.  For example, Dean Manning observes that “[i]f the Constitution 
mixed and matched powers that had traditionally belonged indivisibly to 
sovereign ‘states,’ then the traditional meaning of sovereignty cannot 
meaningfully inform the question of what residual powers remained in 
distinctly American ‘states’ after the ratification of the Constitution.”27  
Similarly, Ernie Young questions “whether the term ‘state’ itself is really 
doing any of the interpretive work in his analysis.”28  Professor Young 
argues that because Rappaport “concedes that we cannot simply adopt the 
eighteenth-century definition of ‘state’ as a fully sovereign power,” his 
approach ultimately turns on “structural questions, not textual ones.”29  
Finally, Will Baude notes that Rappaport’s “theory has the virtue of 
pointing to an actual textual provision, but it still requires packing a single 
word with an awful lot of freight.”30 
In our view, it is possible to resolve the apparent conflict between 
federalism and textualism by looking to crucial background context 
provided by international law.  Professor Rappaport properly emphasized 
the use of the word “State” in the Constitution, but he was too quick to 
dismiss the original public meaning of the term—drawn from the law of 
nations—in favor of a novel meaning informed by his understanding of the 
Constitution’s “structure, purpose, and history.”  In drafting and ratifying 
the Constitution, the founders would have understood the term “State” to 
refer to a separate sovereign possessing all of the rights traditionally 
recognized by the law of nations.  The term “State” was a term of art drawn 
straight from the law of nations and is still used today to refer to 
independent nation-states with full sovereignty.  Accordingly, the crucial 
inquiry is not whether “State” meant “State” in the Constitution (it did), but 
the extent to which the American States affirmatively relinquished portions 
of their sovereignty in the Constitution.  This latter inquiry can be answered 
only by consulting additional principles supplied by the law of nations to 
govern the surrender of sovereign rights. 
 
26 Id. at 838.  
27 Manning, supra note 11, at 2061 n.255. 
28 Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1601, 
1625 (2000). 
29 Id. at 1626. 
30 William Baude, Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (2017). 
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Using international law both to define the meaning of the term 
“State” and to identify the extent to which the American States surrendered 
key aspects of their sovereignty in the Constitution reconciles many of the 
Supreme Court’s most significant federalism doctrines with textualism.  
Under this textual and historical approach to federalism, courts should 
determine the scope of state sovereignty under the Constitution by starting 
with the baseline assumption that “States” possessed full sovereignty at the 
founding, and then ascertaining the extent to which they surrendered aspects 
of their sovereignty in the constitutional text.  To be sure, in adopting the 
Constitution, the States surrendered many important aspects of traditional 
sovereignty, such as their rights to make treaties, engage in war, and govern 
exclusively within their own territories.  But they also did not surrender—
and thus retained—many of the sovereign rights traditionally recognized by 
the law of nations.  One need not rely on general concepts of “freestanding 
federalism,” “structure,” or “purpose” to identify these areas of residual 
state sovereignty under the Constitution.  Rather, one can ascertain such 
sovereignty with precision by examining the constitutional text in light of 
background principles of the law of nations.  Such examination reveals with 
surprising precision which aspects of sovereignty the States partially or 
fully surrendered to the federal government in the Constitution. 
This approach to federalism suggests that courts and commentators 
frequently ask the wrong question regarding the scope of the States’ 
residual sovereignty under the Constitution.  Instead of inquiring whether 
the Constitution contains an express provision affirmatively conferring or 
preserving a particular aspect of state sovereignty, they should be asking 
whether the Constitution contains a provision affirmatively withdrawing or 
restricting a particular aspect of state sovereignty.  Under principles of the 
law of nations well known to the founders, the States necessarily retained 
their preexisting sovereign rights unless they clearly and expressly 
surrendered them.  For this reason, constitutional silence on a question of 
federalism signifies retention—rather than surrender—of the States’ pre-
existing sovereignty.31 
This background context provided by the law of nations reveals a 
forgotten constitutional basis for many of the Supreme Court’s most 
significant federalism doctrines, including state sovereign immunity, the 
rule against federal commandeering of state legislative and executive 
departments, and the sovereign equality of the States.  Critics insist that 
these immunities lack a firm basis in the constitutional text and are 
necessarily the result of improper judicial activism.  But this criticism has 
 
31 This approach to constitutional interpretation is different than a “strict construction” approach, as that 
approach is typically understood.  See infra note 176, and accompanying text. 
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things backwards.  There was no need for the Constitution to spell out the 
rights of sovereign States in the text because—under the law of nations—
States retained all rights that they did not affirmatively surrender.  The 
American States could have compromised their sovereign rights—including 
sovereign immunity, immunity from commandeering, and equal 
sovereignty—only by adopting constitutional provisions that expressly 
altered or surrendered them.  Thus, unless the Constitution expressly 
overrides the States’ pre-existing sovereign rights, the “States” necessarily 
retained them.  This understanding of state sovereignty is based on the 
original public meaning of the constitutional text taken in historical context 
rather than on freestanding federalism or judicial activism. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part I examines the sovereign 
rights of the American “States” under the law of nations following the 
Declaration of Independence.  The law of nations not only defined the rights 
and immunities of “free and independent States,” but also provided rules 
governing their surrender.  Part II discusses the sovereignty of the States 
under the Articles of Confederation, and explains why this short-lived 
arrangement failed.  Part III reviews the drafting and ratification of the 
Constitution and the precise ways in which the States did—and did not—
surrender portions of their sovereignty by adopting the Constitution.  
Finally, Part IV considers the implications of our understanding of the term 
“States” for three of the Supreme Court’s most prominent federalism 
doctrines—state sovereign immunity, the anti-commandeering doctrine, and 
the equal sovereignty of the States.  The Article concludes that reading the 
term “States” against background principles of the law of nations provides 
substantial textual and historical support for each of these doctrines. 
I.  STATE SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE LAW OF NATIONS 
It is common ground that the Constitution established a federal 
system of government by dividing power between the individual States and 
an overarching federal government.  Perhaps surprisingly, significant 
features of this system remain contested more than two centuries after its 
adoption.  Disagreements about the system stem in part from differences 
over the proper method of constitutional interpretation.  Some observers 
believe that courts should sometimes downplay or ignore the text and 
understand federalism by reference to general conceptions of the federal-
state balance reflected in the history, structure, and purpose of the 
Constitution.32  This camp tends to favor more robust federalism 
 
32 In several important cases, the Supreme Court has relied on history and structure to resolve federalism 
issues, see, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (“Because there is no constitutional text 
speaking to this precise question, the answer to the CLEOs’ challenge must be sought in historical understanding 
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doctrines.33  Other observers insist that federalism—like separation of 
powers—does not exist in the abstract but must be defined by precise 
provisions of the constitutional text.34  This camp tends to favor less robust 
federalism doctrines.  Beyond this divide, there are many other contested 
approaches to constitutional federalism.35 
One need not endorse one particular approach over the others, 
however, in order to conclude that the constitutional text—properly 
understood in historical context—supports several of the Supreme Court’s 
most significant federalism doctrines.  The original public meaning of the 
term “States” in the Constitution supports the Court’s adherence to these 
doctrines.  “States” was a term of art drawn from the law of nations, and its 
meaning was well known to the founders.  The law of nations not only 
defined the rights of States, but also provided rules governing how States 
surrendered their rights.  As discussed in Part III, both aspects of the law of 
 
and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”); Alden v. Maine, 527 
U.S. 706, 733 (1999) (“Although the sovereign immunity of the States derives at least in part from the common-
law tradition, the structure and history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by 
constitutional design.”); as well as recited purposes of the federal structure established by the Constitution, see, 
e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (“This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the 
people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the diverse 
needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it 
allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes government more responsive by 
putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”); Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 221 (2011) (“The 
Framers concluded that allocation of powers between the National Government and the States enhances freedom, 
first by protecting the integrity of the governments themselves, and second by protecting the people, from whom 
all governmental powers are derived.”).   
33 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FIDELITY & CONSTRAINT: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS READ THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 75-94 (2019); Calvin Massey, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 431 (2002); 
Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 S. Ct. Rev. 125; Michael W. McConnell, 
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987). 
34 See Manning, supra note 11. 
35  In resolving constitutional federalism questions, the Supreme Court has largely embraced a theory of dual 
sovereignty federalism.  See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457 (“As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution 
establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Government. This Court also has 
recognized this fundamental principle.”).  Other scholars have debated the merits of cooperative federalism, “a 
vision of independent governments working together to implement federal policy.”  Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The 
Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” 
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 815 (1998).  See, e.g., Philip Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for 
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663 (2001); Joshua Sarnoff, Cooperative Federalism, the Delegation of 
Federal Power, and the Constitution, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 205 (1997).  Still other scholars have described the U.S. 
federal system as one of “dynamic federalism,” a system in which “federal and state governments function as 
alternative centers of power and any matter is presumptively within the authority of both the federal and state 
governments.”  J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REV. 59, 103 (2010).  For discussions of dynamic 
federalism, see Kirsten Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY 
L.J. 159 (2006); Robert Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005).  For 
arguments that federalism debates should not be framed in terms of dual sovereignty but that there are nonetheless 
benefits to decentralization, see Heather Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1695 (2017); Abbe Gluck, 
Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014); Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 1077, 1119 (2014); ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR WITHIN (2011).  Some scholars even 
contend that federalism is an outdated artifact and should be generally disregarded.  See Edward L. Rubin & 
Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). 
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nations are relevant to a proper understanding of state sovereignty under the 
Constitution. 
The founding generation initially employed the term “States” in the 
Declaration of Independence more than a decade before they used it in the 
Constitution.  The original Thirteen Colonies in North America were 
established as part of the British Empire in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  Dissatisfied with British rule, the Colonies declared their 
independence from Great Britain and proceeded to win their independence 
on the battlefield.  In declaring their independence, the United Colonies 
declared themselves to be “free and independent States” with “full power to 
levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to all 
other acts and things which independent states may of right do.”36  The law 
of nations defined the rights and obligations of independent states vis-à-vis 
one another, and the Declaration of Independence clearly claimed these 
rights for the American States. 
Because the sovereign rights of independent states would have been 
well known to members of the Continental Congress (who were waging a 
war to secure them), they had no need to spell out all such rights in the 
Declaration.  It was sufficient to refer to several prominent rights along with 
“all other acts and things which independent states may of right do.”  All 
who read the Declaration—including Great Britain—understood that the 
Colonies were claiming for themselves all of the rights of free and 
independent states under the law of nations.  After the War of 
Independence, Great Britain formally recognized the independence of the 
Colonies in terms that echoed the Declaration of Independence.  Article I of 
the provisional peace treaty provided that “His Britannic Majesty 
acknowledges the said United States . . . to be free, sovereign and 
independent States.”37  By recognizing the United States as “free, sovereign 
and independent States,” Great Britain was acknowledging both the 
independence of the States from Great Britain and their possession of 
sovereign rights under the law of nations. 
After achieving their independence, the American States voluntarily 
surrendered some of their sovereign rights first in the Articles of 
Confederation and then in the Constitution.  Before considering the precise 
effect of these instruments on state sovereignty, it is useful to identify the 
rights that the States secured for themselves through the Declaration of 
Independence and the War of Independence.  These rights were not mere 
platitudes but defined what it meant to be a “State.”  This Part provides an 
overview of the rights of free and independent states under the law of 
 
36 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 32 (U.S. 1776). 
37 Provisional Articles, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. I, Nov. 30, 1782, 8 Stat. 54. 
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nations, and then discusses several specific rights of sovereign states that 
have particular relevance to the Constitution’s allocation of sovereignty 
between the federal government and the States.  This Part also describes the 
rules that governed how sovereign states could surrender portions of their 
sovereignty under the law of nations.  After identifying the baseline of 
sovereignty that “free and independent States” enjoyed under the law of 
nations, we turn in Parts II and III to identify the rights that the States 
surrendered—and retained—by adopting first the Articles of Confederation, 
and later the Constitution. 
A. Overview of Sovereign Rights under the Law of Nations 
The American States secured a broad array of important sovereign 
rights recognized by the law of nations when they achieved the status of 
“free and independent States.”  As stated in the Declaration of 
Independence, these rights included “full power to levy war, conclude 
peace, contract alliances, [and] establish commerce.”  The Declaration also 
referred to “all other acts and things which independent states may of right 
do.”  This reference was to the full body of rights enjoyed by sovereign 
states under the law of nations. 
Sovereign “states”—also known as “nations”—possessed numerous 
important rights under the law of nations, including rights of self-
governance, territorial sovereignty, and equal sovereignty.  The Law of 
Nations by Emmerich de Vattel38 was the most influential treatise on the 
law of nations in England and America during the founding period.39  In 
this work, Vattel described the established rights of sovereign states under 
the law of nations.  A “sovereign state,” Vattel explained, is any “nation 
that governs itself . . . without any dependence on a foreign power.”40  The 
rights that sovereign states enjoyed under the law of nations provide a 
crucial backdrop for understanding which rights the States surrendered and 
which rights they retained by adopting the Constitution.41 
 
38 1 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (London, J. Newberry et al. eds., 1760) [hereinafter 1 
VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS]; 2 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS (London, J. Coote ed., 1759) 
[hereinafter 2 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS]. 
39 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 15-16 (2009); Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law as Sword or Shield? Early American Foreign 
Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 67 (1999) (explaining that in decisions of 
American courts, “in all, in the 1780s and 1790s, there were nine citations to Pufendorf, sixteen to Grotius, 
twenty-five to Bynkershoek, and staggering ninety-two to Vattel”); David Gray Adler, The President’s 
Recognition Power, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 133, 137 (David 
Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (“During the Founding period and well beyond, Vattel was, in the 
United States, the unsurpassed publicist on international law.”). 
40 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. I, § 4, at 10. 
41 See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813 (2012). 
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Nations had numerous specific and well-recognized rights under the 
law of nations.  First and foremost, states enjoyed rights to self-government 
and territorial sovereignty.42  In addition, nations enjoyed the right to self-
protection and preservation,43 including the right to be free from harm to 
one’s citizens or subjects by another nation.44   Nations had the right to 
pursue, and establish the terms of, commerce with other nations,45 including 
the right to free and equal use of the high seas.  Inherent in all of these 
rights was the right to maintain sovereign dignity and equality with and 
among other nations,46 such as the right to have one’s judgments respected 
by other nations.47  To uphold these rights, each nation enjoyed a “right to 
security”—“a right not to suffer any other to obstruct its preservation, its 
perfection, and happiness, that is, to preserve itself from all injuries.”48   
The law of nations also recognized the means by which nations 
could enforce and adjust their rights vis-à-vis other nations.  Nations had the 
right to conduct diplomatic relations with each other.  “It is necessary that 
nations should treat with each other for the good of their affairs, for 
avoiding reciprocal damages, and for adjusting and terminating their 
differences.”49  Accordingly, each nation enjoyed the right of embassy—to 
send and receive ambassadors and other public ministers.50  Ambassadors 
and other public ministers enjoyed important rights to security, “for if their 
person be not defended from violence of every kind, the right of embassies 
becomes precarious, and the success very uncertain.”51  Thus, “[w]ho ever 
offers any violence to an ambassador, or any other public minister, not only 
injures the sovereign whom this minister represents, but he also hurts the 
common safety and well-being of nations.”52 
In conducting diplomacy, nations enjoyed the right to make treaties 
and enter into other public conventions with each other53 in accordance with 
the procedural requirements of domestic law.54  Nations used treaties both 
to adjust and to enforce their rights under the law of nations.  When 
diplomacy failed to redress one nation’s violation of another’s rights under 
the law of nations, the offended nation enjoyed the right to pursue various 
 
42 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, §§ 79-98, at 146-52. 
43 Id., bk. II, § 1-20, at 120-27. 
44 Id., bk. II, §§ 71-78, at 144-46. 
45 Id., bk. II, §§ 21-34, at 128-32. 
46 Id., bk. II, §§ 35-48, at 133-37. 
47 Id., bk. II, § 84, at 147-48. 
48 Id., bk. II, §§ 49, at 137. 
49 2 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. IV, § 55, at 132. 
50 Id., bk. IV, § 55-79, at 132-41. 
51 Id., bk. IV, § 81, at 142. 
52 Id. 
53 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, §§152-217, at 171-202. 
54 Id., bk. II, § 154, at 171 (“In the fundamental laws of each state, we must see what is the power capable of 
contracting with validity in the name of the state.”). 
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means of redress, including retortion and reprisals.55  Ultimately, if a 
sovereign was unable to obtain satisfaction for a violation of its rights 
through diplomacy or retaliatory measures, the state had the right to wage 
war against the offender.  Vattel extensively addressed the rights of nations 
to declare war, conduct war, and maintain neutrality in the wars of others.56  
As discussed in Part III, the American States gave up some, but not all, of 
their sovereign rights in the Constitution. 
B. The Right to Self-Government and Independence 
Two rights of states under the law of nations have particular 
relevance to contested federalism doctrines under the Constitution.  As 
Vattel explained, free and independent states enjoyed the right to self-
government and independence, and the right to equality with other nations.  
These rights are crucial to evaluating several of the Supreme Court’s most 
prominent federalism doctrines, including state sovereign immunity, the 
anti-commandeering doctrine, and the equal sovereignty of the States—as 
Part IV discusses. 
A basic right of sovereign states under the law of nations was the 
right of self-governance.  This right prohibited any state from controlling 
how another state governed itself.  For Vattel, the right to self-government 
was essential to the very meaning of a sovereign state.  “Every nation that 
governs itself,” Vattel wrote, “under what form soever, without any 
dependence on a foreign power, is a sovereign state.  Its rights are naturally 
the same as those of any other state.”57  Because each sovereign state 
enjoyed the right to self-government, no state could interfere in the 
government of another.  “It is a manifest consequence of the liberty and 
independence of nations,” Vattel explained, “that all have a right to be 
governed as they think proper, and that none have the least authority to 
interfere in the government of another state.”58  Given this right, “[i]t does 
not . . . belong to any foreign power to take cognizance of the 
administration of this sovereign, to set himself up for a judge of his conduct, 
and to oblige him to alter it.”59  Vattel characterized a state’s right to non-
interference in its governance as its “most precious” right.  “Of all the rights 
that can belong to a nation, sovereignty is, doubtless, the most precious, and 
that which others ought the most scrupulously to respect, if they would not 
do it an injury.”60 
 
55 Id., bk. II, §§ 341-42, at 249. 
56 2 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. III. 
57 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. I, § 4, at 10. 
58 2 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 54, at 138. 
59 Id., bk. II, § 55, at 138. 
60 Id. 
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 For Vattel, the purpose of a state’s right to govern itself was to 
enable its citizens or subjects to “procure their mutual safety and advantage 
by means of their union.”61   Accordingly, he described various objects 
subject to regulation by a sovereign’s governing authority, free from 
interference by other nations.  Overall, “[t]he society is established with the 
view of procuring to those who are its members, the necessities, 
conveniences, and even accommodations of life; and in general, every thing 
necessary to their felicity; to take such measures that each may peacefully 
enjoy his own property, and obtain justice with safety; and, in short, to 
defend the whole from all violence from without.”62  In sum, a state had 
authority, free from interference by other nations, (1) to provide for the 
necessities of the nation,63 (2) to ensure its happiness,64 and (3) to fortify 
itself against external attacks.65 
Because the right of self-governance was foundational, a sovereign 
state had the right to oppose any interference with this right through 
whatever means necessary.  For this reason, Vattel characterized the right to 
self-government as a “perfect right,” the violation of which gave the 
offended nation just cause to protect the right through the use of force.  
Because “foreign nations have no right to intrude themselves into the 
government of an independent state,” an offended state “has a right of 
refusing to suffer it.  To govern itself according to its pleasure, is a 
necessary part of its independence.”66 
As discussed in Part IV, the right of sovereign states to govern 
themselves provides crucial background for understanding the constitutional 
 
61 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, intro., § 1, at 1. 
62 Id., bk. I, § 72, at 35. 
63 First, “[t]he nation, or its conductor, should . . . apply to the business of providing for all the wants of the 
people, and producing a happy plenty of all the necessaries of life, with its conveniences and innocent and 
laudable enjoyments.”  Id.  Vattel described many ways in which a nation should secure “the necessaries of life” 
for the people.  These ways included ensuring that land was used productively for agriculture, id., bk. I, §§ 77-82, 
at 36-38; regulating domestic commerce and deciding how to engage in foreign commerce, id. bk. I, §§ 83-99, at 
38-44; providing a proper infrastructure, id. bk. I, §§ 100-104, at 44-45; and coining money, id. bk. I, §§ 105-109, 
at 45-47. 
64 The second object of government, as described by Vattel, is to ensure the happiness of the people.  “[T]he 
conductors of the nation . . . are to labour after its felicity, to watch continually over it, and to advance it to the 
utmost of their power.”  Id., bk. I, § 110, at 47.  Toward this end, Vattel explained, the government should provide 
for the education of youth, id., bk. I, § 112, at 48; promote the arts and sciences, id., bk. I, § 113, at 48-49; ensure 
the freedom of philosophical discussion, id., bk. I, § 114, at 49-50; promote virtue and deter vice, id., bk. I, § 115, 
at 50; inspire love of country, id., bk I, § 119, at 52; resolve matters of religion; id., bk. I, § 125-57, at 54-71; and 
establish and enforce good laws in service of justice, id., bk. I, § 158-76, 71-79—among other objects. 
65 The third object of government described by Vattel was fortify itself from external attacks.  “One of the 
ends of political society is to defend itself, by means of its union from all insults or violence from without.”  Id., 
bk. I, § 177, at 79.  To serve this object, Vattel explained, a sovereign state may take measures to increase its 
population, assemble and train armed forces, and develop public and private wealth.  Id., bk. I, §§ 177-82, at 79-
82.  “The nation ought to put itself in such a state as to be able to repel and humble an unjust enemy; this is an 
important duty, which the care of its perfection, and even preservation itself, imposes both on the state and its 
conductor.”  Id., bk. I, § 177, at 79. 
66 Id. bk. II, § 57, at 140. 
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basis for the Supreme Court’s decisions recognizing the States’ sovereign 
immunity and their right not to be commandeered by the federal 
government.  When the American States became “free and independent 
States,” they secured the right to govern themselves free of these kinds of 
outside interference.  Unless they clearly and expressly surrendered this 
right in the Constitution, the “States” referred to in the Constitution 
necessarily retained it.  Judicial doctrines recognizing state sovereign 
immunity and prohibiting federal commandeering of the States uphold this 
basic aspect of state sovereignty. 
C. The Right to Equal Sovereignty 
 Another important right of free and independent states was the right 
to equal sovereignty with other states.  Although there is some dispute as to 
when this principle first emerged,67 there is no doubt that it was well 
established prior to the founding.  Vattel described the equality of nations as 
a fundamental principle of the law of nations.  The rationale for the equality 
of nations, Vattel explained, was the equality of the persons who comprise 
them: 
Since men are naturally equal, and their rights and 
obligations are the same, as equally proceeding from nature, 
nations composed of men considered as so many free 
persons, living together in a state of nature, are naturally 
equal, and receive from nature the same obligations and 
rights.  Power or weakness does not in this respect produce 
any difference. . . . [A] small republic is as much a sovereign 
state as the most powerful kingdom.68 
As a result of their natural equality, nations enjoyed the same rights under 
the law of nations: 
 
67 Compare Hidemi Suganami, Grotius and International Equality, in HUGO GROTIUS AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS (Bull et al., eds 1992) (arguing that Grotius’ work is consistent with the equality of states); with 
Benedict Kingsbury, A Groatian Tradition of Theory and Practice?: Grotius, Law, and Moral Skepticism in the 
Thought of Hedley Bull, 17 QUINNIPAC L. REV. 3, 15 (1997) (observing that “Grotius had no general doctrine of 
the equality of sovereign entities”). 
68 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, intro., § 18, at 6.  Burlamaqui provided the same 
rationale for the equal rights of sovereigns under the law of nations.  The society of nations, he wrote, is 
a state of equality and independence, which establishes a parity of right between them; and 
engages them to have the same regard and respect for one another.  Hence the general 
principle of the law of nations is nothing more than the general law of sociability, which 
obliges all nations that have any intercourse with one another, to practise those duties to 
which individuals are naturally subject. 
1 J.J. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 175 (Nugent trans., Boston, Joseph 
Bumstead, 4th ed. rev. and corrected 1792) (1747 & 1751). 
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 From a necessary consequence of this equality, what 
is permitted to one nation is permitted to all; and what is not 
permitted to one is not permitted to any other. . . . 
 Nations being free, independent and equal, and 
having a right to judge according to the dictates of 
conscience, of what is to be done in order to fulfil its duties; 
the effect of all this is, the producing, at least externally, and 
among men, a perfect equality of rights between nations, in 
the administration of their affairs, and the pursuit of their 
pretensions, without regard to the intrinsic justice of their 
conduct, of which others have no right to form a definitive 
judgment; so that what is permitted in one, is also permitted 
in the other, and they ought to be considered in human 
society as having an equal right.69 
In short, “nature has established a perfect equality of rights between 
independent nations.  Consequently none can naturally pretend to 
prerogative: their right to freedom and sovereignty renders them equals.”70  
One nation would violate another’s equality of right by claiming a 
superiority of rights or a “pre-eminence of rank” over it71 or refusing to 
show appropriate respect for its rights.72  
 The founding generation was well versed in the law of nations and 
understood that free and independent states were entitled to equal 
sovereignty.  Thus, in declaring the Colonies to be “free and independent 
States,” the founders were declaring the newly-independent American 
States to be the equals not only of each other, but of all sovereign states.  
Under the law of nations, states could surrender this aspect of their 
sovereignty only by a clear surrender in a binding legal instrument.  By 
employing the term of art “States,” the Constitution necessarily recognized 
the equal sovereignty of the American States.  Thus, as discussed in Part IV, 
the relevant inquiry is not whether the Constitution contains a provision 
expressly conferring equal sovereignty on the States, but whether the 
Constitution contains any provision expressly compromising the equal 
sovereignty of the States. 
 
69 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, intro., §§ 19-20, at 6. 
70 Id., bk. II, § 36, at 133. 
71 Id., bk. II, § 37, at 133. 
72 Id., bk. II, § 47, at 136. 
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D. Rules Governing the Surrender of Sovereign Rights 
Although states enjoyed a broad range of sovereign rights, the law 
of nations recognized that a state could voluntarily modify or surrender its 
rights in a treaty, convention, act, or other appropriate legal instrument.  
Surrender or modification of sovereign rights was a momentous act.  If a 
legal instrument were misinterpreted to deny a state its rights under the law 
of nations, the offended state might retaliate for any violation of its rights, 
including by waging war.  To avoid such misunderstandings, the law of 
nations recognized a set of rules to govern the interpretation of documents 
purporting to alienate sovereign rights.  These rules provide important 
background context for understanding the sovereign rights of American 
States—and the extent to which they relinquished such rights—in the 
Constitution. 
Typically, states used treaties to adjust their rights under the law of 
nations.  For this reason, Vattel devoted an entire chapter of his treatise to 
rules for interpreting treaties.  As he explained, however, most of the rules 
were not limited to treaties, but rather applied to “concessions, conventions, 
and treaties, and . . . all contracts as well as . . . laws.”73  Vattel recognized 
that established rules of interpretation were necessary to prevent a party 
from taking advantage of the imperfections of language.74  He identified 
two key rules of interpretation: (1) legal provisions expressed in clear and 
precise terms should be interpreted according to their natural meaning 
(unless they lead to absurd results), and (2) indeterminate legal provisions 
should not be interpreted to alter sovereign rights in favor of one party at 
the expense of the other if at all possible.  These rules enabled states to 
enter into agreements adjusting their sovereign rights while reducing the 
chance of misunderstandings regarding such rights.  The founders were well 
versed in the law of nations and reasonably would have expected these rules 
to govern the surrender of sovereign rights by the American “States” in the 
Constitution. 
 
73 Id. bk. II, § 262, at 215. 
74 In any of these written legal forms, “it is impossible,” he observed, “to foresee and point out, all the 
particular cases, that may arise.”  Id.  Because “fraud seeks to take advantage even of the imperfection of 
language; that mean designedly throw obscurity and ambiguity into their treaties, to obtain a pretence for eluding 
them upon occasion,” it is “necessary to establish rules founded on reason, and authorized by the law of nature, 
capable of diffusing light over what is obscure, of determining what is uncertain, and of frustrating the attempts of 
a contracting power void of good faith.”  74 Id., bk. II, § 262, at 215-16. 
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1. The Natural Meaning of Clear and Precise Provisions 
Vattel’s first rule interpretation was that a legal act expressed in 
clear and precise terms should be interpreted in accordance with its natural 
meaning at the time it was adopted: 
The first general maxim of interpretation is, that it is not 
permitted to interpret what has no need of interpretation.  
When an act is conceived in clear and precise terms, when 
the sense is manifest and leads to nothing absurd, there can 
be no reason to refuse the sense which this treaty naturally 
presents.75 
Vattel enumerated various related maxims of interpretation, 
designed to prevent fraud.  “The interpretation of every act, and of every 
treaty, ought then to be made according to certain rules proper to determine 
the sense of them, such as the parties must naturally have understood, when 
the act was prepared and accepted.”76  One such rule was that language 
generally should be understood in its common usage.  “In the interpretation 
of treaties, pacts, and promises, we ought not to deviate from the common 
use of the language, at least, if we have not very strong reasons for it.”77  
Words, he explained, are “spoken according to custom.”78 
The custom of which we are speaking is, that of the time in 
which the treaty, or the act in general, was concluded and 
drawn up.  Languages vary incessantly, and the signification 
and the force of words change with time.  When an ancient 
act is to be interpreted, we should then know the common 
use of the terms, at the time when it was written.79 
Vattel described several other specific rules of interpretation, including that 
technical rules should receive their technical meaning,80 that figurative 
 
75 Id., bk. II, § 263, at 216. 
76 Id., bk. II, § 268, at 217 (emphasis omitted). 
77 Id., bk. II, § 271, at 219 (emphasis omitted).  See also 2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET 
GENTIUM LIBRI OCTO bk. V, ch. 12, § 3, at 794 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., Clarendon ed. 1934) 
(1688) (“About words the rule is as follows: If there is no sufficient conjecture which leads in any other direction, 
words are to be understood in their proper and so-called accepted meaning, one that has been imposed upon them, 
not so much by their intrinsic force and grammatical analogy as by popular usage, which is the final authority and 
is the law and norm of speech.”); HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 353 (London, W. Innys, et al. 
1738) (“If no Conjecture guides us otherwise, the Words are to be understood according to their Propriety, not the 
grammatical one . . . but what is vulgar and most in Use . . . .). 
78 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 271, at 219. 
79 Id., bk. II, § 272, at 219. 
80 Id., bk. II, § 276, at 220.  See also PUFENDORF, supra note 77, at 795 (“As to terms used in the arts, which 
the common sort scarcely comprehend, it should be observed that they are explained in accordance with the 
definitions of those who are skilled in the art.); GROTIUS, supra note 77, at 353 (“Terms of Art, which the 
common People are very little acquainted with, should be understood as explained by them who are most 
experienced in that Art . . . .”). 
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expressions should receive their figurative sense,81 and that interpretations 
that lead to absurdity should be rejected.82   
The goal of these interpretative rules was to find and implement the 
natural, customary meaning of clear and precise terms used by sovereign 
states.  These rules enabled sovereign states to make treaties and take other 
legal actions against a backdrop of shared interpretive rules, and thus to 
adjust their sovereign rights while minimizing the chances of 
misunderstanding and conflict. 
2. Surrendering or Divesting Sovereign Rights 
In keeping with the goal of avoiding conflict, Vattel laid out 
correlative rules to prevent the inadvertent surrender or divesting of 
sovereign rights.  As explained, if one sovereign expressly surrendered its 
rights under the law of nations in clear and precise terms, the parties were 
expected to give effect to the natural meaning of those terms.  On the other 
hand, if a provision was ambiguous or vague with respect to the alteration 
of a state’s sovereign rights, then the parties were not to interpret it as a 
surrender of such rights.  For example, a nation could never surrender any 
aspect of its right to self-government unless it did so in clear and express 
terms.  As Vattel explained: 
A sovereign state cannot be constrained in this respect, 
except it be from a particular right which the state itself has 
given to others by treaties; and even in this case, in a subject 
of such importance as that of government, this right cannot 
be extended beyond the clear and express terms of the 
treaties.  Without this circumstance a sovereign has a right to 
treat as enemies those who endeavour to interfere, otherwise 
than by their good offices, in his domestic affairs.83 
In other words, a state was incapable of alienating or compromising its right 
to self-government by implication; any surrender of this right had to be 
clear and explicit. 
 Accordingly, Vattel distinguished those provisions of legal 
instruments that were plain, clear, and determinate from those that were 
vague, unclear, or indeterminate.  Vattel reiterated that “when the 
dispositions of a law or a convention are plain, clear, determinate, and 
applied with certainty, and without difficulty, there is no room for any 
 
81 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 276, at 220. 
82 Id., bk. II, § 282, at 222. 
83 Id., bk. II, § 57, at 140. 
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interpretation, or any comment.”84  He observed, however, that “ideas” and 
“language” are not always “exactly determined.”85  When the expressions of 
the legislature, or of the contracting powers . . . are 
indeterminate, vague, or susceptible of a more or less 
expansive sense; if this precise point of their intention in the 
particular case in question, cannot be observed and fixed, by 
other rules of interpretation, it should be presumed, 
according to the laws of reason and equity: and for this 
purpose, it is necessary to pay attention to the nature of the 
things to which it relates.86 
In this regard, Vattel drew a sharp distinction between indeterminate 
provisions relating to things that are “favorable” and indeterminate 
provisions relating to things that are “odious.”87  Vattel did not use these 
terms in the sense of good or bad in the abstract.  Rather, he used 
“favorable” to refer to things that are favorable to all interested parties, and 
“odious” to refer to things that are potentially favorable to one party, and 
unfavorable to the other.  A “favorable” thing “tends to the common 
advantage in conventions, or that has a tendency to place the contracting 
powers on an equality.”88  An “odious” thing is one that “contains a 
penalty,” “tends to render an act null, and without effect, either in whole or 
in part, and consequently every thing that introduces any change in the 
things agreed upon,” or “tends to change the present state of things.”89 
 In Vattel’s view, when an indeterminate provision of an act or treaty 
relates to “favorable” things, “we ought to give the terms all the extent they 
are capable of in common use.”90  On the other hand, when an 
indeterminate provision of an act or treaty relates to “odious” things, “we 
should . . . take the term in the most confined sense . . ., without going 
directly contrary to the tenour of the writing, and without doing violence to 
the terms.”91 
 
84 Id., bk. II, § 300, at 232. 
85 Id., bk. II, § 299, at 231. 
86 Id., bk. II, § 300, at 232 (emphasis added). 
87 Id. 
88 Id., bk. II, § 301, at 232. 
89 Id.  The distinction between “favorable” and “odious” terms had long use among writers on the law of 
nations.  See PUFENDORF, supra note 77, bk. 5, ch. 12, at 806 (explaining that “odious” provisions are those 
“which burden one party only, or one more than the other; also such as carry with them punishments, and which 
make certain acts void, or effect some alteration in previous conclusions, as well as such as uproot friendship and 
society”); GROTIUS, supra note 77, at 357 (providing as examples of “odious” provisions “those that lay the 
Charge and Burden on one Party only, or on one more than another; and those which carry a Penalty along with 
them, which invalidate some Acts and alter others”). 
90 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 307, at 234 (emphasis omitted). 
91 Id., bk. II, § 308, at 235.  Pufendorf and Grotius had described these same rules of interpretation.  Drawing 
upon Grotius, Pufendorf wrote, “In cases not odious words are to be taken in accordance with their exact 
significance in popular usage.”  PUFENDORF, supra note 77, bk. 5, ch. 12, at 806.  On the other hand, in odious 
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 Of particular relevance to the rights of the American States under 
the Constitution, a provision of a treaty or other legal act was considered 
“odious” if it changed the status quo by surrendering or divesting sovereign 
rights previously possessed by one of the parties.  Unless a legal instrument 
surrendered such a right in clear and precise terms, it was to be interpreted 
not to alter the pre-exisiting right.  As Vattel explained: 
[T]he proprietor can only lose so much of his right as he has 
ceded of it; and in a case of doubt, the presumption is in 
favour of the possessor.  It is less contrary to equity, not to 
give to a proprietor what he has lost the possession of by his 
negligence, than to strip the just possessor of what lawfully 
belongs to him.  The interpretation then is that we ought 
rather to hazard the first inconvenience, than the last.  We 
might apply here, to many cases, the rule . . . that the cause 
of him who seeks to avoid a loss, is more favourable than 
that of him who desires to acquire gain.92 
 In modern parlance, Vattel was describing a clear statement rule 
designed to preserve pre-existing sovereign rights.  In short, a legal 
instrument would not be interpreted to divest a sovereign right under the 
law of nations unless the instrument expressly divested that right in clear 
and precise terms.  This rule ensured both that states knowingly and 
voluntarily surrendered their sovereign rights, and that ambiguous 
provisions would not trigger disagreements that could lead to conflict, or 
even war. 
II.  STATE SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
State sovereignty in America began with the Declaration of 
Independence.  Because of their growing dissatisfaction with British rule, 
the Thirteen Colonies in North America issued the Declaration on July 4, 
1776.  In declaring themselves to be “free and independent States,” the 
Colonies chose a term of art drawn from the law of nations with an 
established meaning on both sides of the Atlantic.  The newly declared 
“States” proceeded to fight and win a War of Independence with Great 
Britain, securing their independence and sovereignty along with all of the 
rights that accompanied that status under the law of nations. 
 
cases, including those “connected with a diminution of the sovereign power,” an indeterminate provision should 
be interpreted to avoid the hardship.  Id. at 809.  Grotius had written that “in Cases not odious must understand the 
Words in their full Extent, as they are generally taken”; on the other hand, “in an odious Matter, even a figurative 
Speech is allowed to avoid a Grievance.”  GROTIUS, supra note 77, at 357-58. 
92 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 305, at 233-34. 
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During the war, the States unanimously signed onto the Articles of 
Confederation.  This document was essentially a treaty among the newly 
free and independent States to enhance their collective strength and 
security.  When the war ended, the States increasingly found the Articles to 
be ineffective to meet their economic and security needs, in part because the 
member States retained too much sovereignty and often ignored Congress’s 
commands with impunity.  Accordingly, by 1789, twelve of the original 
thirteen States had abandoned the Articles of Confederation by ratifying an 
entirely new Constitution to replace them, and Rhode Island did the same 
by 1790.  This Part examines the sovereignty enjoyed by the “States” under 
the Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation, and Part 
III will examine their sovereignty under the Constitution. 
A. The Declaration of Independence 
After reciting “a history of repeated injuries and usurpations” by 
King George III against the colonies,93 the Declaration of Independence 
asserted that the colonies were “free and independent states”: 
these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, Free and 
Independent States; that they are absolved from all 
allegiance to the British crown, and all political connection 
between them and the state of Great Britain is, and ought to 
be, totally dissolved; and that, as free and independent states, 
they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract 
alliances, establish commerce, and to all other acts and 
things which independent states may of right do.94 
This document asserted that the American States, being free and 
independent, enjoyed all of the sovereign rights recognized by the law of 
nations.   
The powers claimed by the States in the Declaration of 
Independence—“to levy war, contract alliance, establish commerce”—were 
drawn directly from the law of nations.  As we have explained elsewhere: 
The use of the phrase, “Free and Independent States,” was a 
clear reference to the law of nations. If these “United States” 
achieved this status, then other nations would have to respect 
their rights to prevent and vindicate injuries by other nations 
(“Power to levy War” and “conclude Peace”), make treaties 
(“contract Alliances” and “establish Commerce”), enjoy 
 
93 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
94 Id. para. 32. 
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neutral use of the high seas (“establish Commerce”), and 
exercise territorial sovereignty and diplomatic rights (“all 
other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right 
do”).95 
In short, when the “United Colonies” asserted their independence from 
Great Britain, they declared themselves to be free and independent States 
entitled to exercise all of the rights of sovereign states under the law of 
nations.    
There has been disagreement about whether the American States 
became “free and independent States” individually or collectively when 
they originally broke free from Great Britain.96  In other words, there has 
been disagreement about whether the States were merely free and 
independent of Great Britain collectively, or free and independent of each 
other as well.  This is an interesting theoretical question, and there have 
been thoughtful arguments on both sides.97  Actual events, however, 
indicate that the States understood themselves to possess individual 
sovereignty following the Declaration of Independence.  First, the 
Continental Congress assumed that the individual States would possess full 
sovereignty following the Declaration and could unite for their common 
defense only by giving their individual consent.  Accordingly, just one day 
after appointing a commission to draft the Declaration of Independence, the 
Continental Congress set up a separate commission to draft the Articles of 
Confederation.  The States regarded a treaty or compact surrendering 
portions of their individual sovereignty to a central authority to be necessary 
 
95 Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 
729, 754 (2012) [hereinafter “The Law of Nations as Constitutional Law”].  Mike Rappaport observed that “[i]n 
1789, the principal meaning of the term [“state”] in this context was an independent nation or country that had 
complete sovereignty.”  Rappaport, supra note 18, at 830 (1999).  In contrast, Jack Rakove has contended that 
“[t]he word [“state”] itself was multivalent, and its various meanings shaded into one another in confusing and 
even ironic ways.”  JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 166 (1996).  In the context of the Declaration of Independence, it seems clear that the word “state” 
referred to a free and independent nation that enjoyed sovereign rights under the law of nations. 
96 Compare 1 DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 56-57 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 
1888) (hereinafter “ELLIOT’S DEBATES”) (“It was argued by Wilson, Robert R. Livingston, E. Rutledge, 
Dickinson, and others,—. . . That, if the delegates of any particular colony had no power to declare such colony 
independent, certain they were, the others could not declare it for them; the colonies being as yet perfectly 
independent of each other . . . .”); with Jack N. Rakove, American Federalism: Was There an Original 
Understanding, in THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 107, 110 (Mark R. Killenbeck, ed. 2002) 
(“[T]he most persuasive story we can tell is one that emphasizes the simultaneity with which concepts of both 
statehood and union emerged in the revolutionary crucible of the mid-1770s.”). 
97 See Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1559, 
1576 (2002) (stating that when the United States broke free from Great Britain, “the individual states were not 
exactly thirteen separate countries”); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction in 
State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 584 (1994) (“During the period that preceded the framing, the states 
regarded themselves and one another as sovereign states within the meaning of the law of nations . . . .”); cf. 
Thomas H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1027, 1040 (2002) (stating that “the founding generation . . . perceived the States as nation-states in some 
respects and accordingly drafted constitutional text to incorporate certain useful international law rules”). 
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to secure their mutual security and independence, but neither the 
instrument’s precise content nor its successful adoption was a foregone 
conclusion.  In debating and adopting the Articles of Confederation, the 
States understood each other to be separate sovereigns with complete 
authority to accept or reject the plan under consideration.  Moreover, the 
States assumed that any State that did not ratify the Articles would not be 
bound thereby.98 
Second, because of concerns about how much sovereignty each 
State would surrender by uniting under the Articles of Confederation, the 
compact took over a year to draft and ultimately included a provision 
specifying that “[e]ach state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this 
Confederation expressly delegated.”99  This provision made clear, if it was 
not before, that each State was a separate sovereign.  As discussed in the 
next section, any ambiguity over whether the States possessed individual or 
collective sovereignty following the Declaration of Independence was 
settled by the Articles of Confederation.   
B. The Articles of Confederation 
The States realized immediately that they needed to join together in 
some capacity for their mutual defense and survival.  The Continental 
Congress established a commission to draft the Articles of Confederation in 
June 1776.  In November 1777, Congress approved the proposed Articles 
and sent them to the individual States for ratification.  The Articles took 
effect in 1781 when Maryland—the last State to act—approved them.  The 
instrument, as understood at the time, was a compact among thirteen “free 
and independent States.”100  By adopting the Articles, each State expressly 
 
98 The same assumption carried through to the drafting and ratification of the Constitution.  The States sent 
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention of 1787 and each State had one vote at the Convention.  Following the 
Philadelphia Convention, each State held a convention of its own to decide whether the State would ratify the new 
plan.  Under Article VII, only those States that ratified the Constitution were bound thereby.  Thus, both before 
and after the adoption of the Constitution, each State possessed individual sovereignty including the power to 
accept or reject proposals to form a federal union.  See McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 
(1819) (“No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of breaking down the lines which separate the states, 
and of compounding the American people into one common mass.”). 
99  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. II. 
100 For examples of contemporaneous understandings of the Articles of Confederation as a confederation 
among individual states see 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 96, at 75 (Statement of Dr. Witherspoon) (“That the 
colonies should, in fact, be considered as individuals; and that, as such, in all disputes they should have an equal 
vote; that they are now collected as individuals making a bargain with each other, and, of course, had a right to 
vote as individuals.”); id. at 76 (Statement of John Adams) (“It has been said we are independent individuals, 
making a bargain together.  The question is not what we are now, but what we ought to be when our bargain shall 
be made.  The confederacy is to make us one individual only; it is to form us, like separate parcels of metal, into 
one common mass.  We shall no longer retain our separate individuality, but become a single individual, as to all 
questions submitted to the confederacy.”).  Even the more nationally minded James Wilson characterized the 
Articles of Confederation as allowing consolidated action only with respect to those matters that the States 
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surrendered some of its sovereign rights, but retained all of its remaining 
sovereignty. 
In keeping with Vattel’s rules governing the surrender of sovereign 
rights, each State retained all the sovereign rights that it did not clearly and 
expressly surrender in the Articles of Confederation.  The document 
memorialized this understanding in the provision declaring that “[e]ach 
state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, 
Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this Confederation expressly 
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”101  The Articles’ 
reference to “each state” in this provision confirms that the States 
understood the Articles to be a compact among thirteen separate and 
independent States.  Other indications of the States’ separate sovereignty 
included the fact that each State appointed its own delegates to Congress, 
and each State had one vote in that body (consistent with each State’s right 
to sovereign equality with all others under the law of nations).  
In light of these circumstances, Gordon Wood has characterized the 
States as separate sovereigns who entered into a treaty of confederation for 
their mutual benefit and protection: 
Given the Americans’ long experience with parceling power 
from the bottom up and their deeply rooted sense of each 
colony’s autonomy, forming the Articles of Confederation 
posed no great theoretical problems.  Thirteen Independent 
and sovereign states came together to form a treaty that 
created a “firm league of friendship,” a collectivity not all 
that different from the present-day European Union. . . .  
[T]he Confederation Congress was merely a replacement for 
the Crown.  It possessed the Crown’s former prerogative 
powers, but it could not tax or regulate commerce, as the 
Crown had not had the authority to do these things either.102 
 
referred to Congress.  See id. at 78 (Statement of James Wilson) (“It is strange that annexing the name of ‘state’ to 
ten thousand men, should give them an equal right with forty thousand.  This must be the effect of magic, not of 
reason.  As to those matters which are referred to Congress, we are not so many states; we are one large state.”). 
101 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. II. 
102 Gordon S. Wood, Federalism from the Bottom Up, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 705, 724-25 (2011).  On the other 
hand, Jack Rakove has argued that “[l]ittle in the surviving records of debate and deliberation suggests that its 
congressional drafters were much troubled by questions about the location of sovereignty or the nature of the 
federal system.”  RAKOVE, supra note 95, at 167.  In his view: 
Rather than agonize over the location of sovereignty in a federal system, the drafters of the 
articles moved instead to adopt a fairly pragmatic and largely noncontroversial division of 
powers between Congress and the states.  There was broad agreement that Congress would 
exercise exclusive control over the great affairs of state, war, and foreign relations, while 
the states would retain exclusive control over the entire realm of ‘internal police’—the 
matters of governance that involved all the ordinary aspects of domestic or municipal 
legislation.”   
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The individual sovereignty of the original thirteen States is 
confirmed by the fact that the Articles would bind only those States that 
adopted them.  Had one of the States declined to ratify the Articles, no one 
suggested that it would have been bound by the Articles or that its 
sovereignty would have been otherwise compromised.  Because each State 
ratified the Articles, each State surrendered some of its sovereignty but 
retained all aspects of sovereignty not expressly surrendered. 
The Articles empowered Congress to act primarily in matters of war 
and foreign relations and imposed certain corresponding limitations on the 
States.  For example, the Articles gave Congress “the sole and exclusive 
right and power of determining on peace and war,” “of sending and 
receiving ambassadors,” and “entering into treaties and alliances”103—all 
recognized sovereign powers in “external” relations under the law of 
nations.104  The Articles also gave Congress limited powers over matters of 
“internal” governance, such as “the sole and exclusive right and power of 
regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by 
that of the respective states,” and “fixing the standards of weights and 
measures throughout the United States.”105   
The Articles also authorized Congress to requisition or command 
each State to provide money to fund the government, and supply troops for 
the armed forces in proportion to its population.106  Such requisitions were 
the only means Congress had under the Articles to raise revenue and supply 
the military.  The Articles obligated each State to comply with these 
commands by declaring that “[e]very State shall abide by the determination 
of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this 
confederation are submitted to them.”107  In practice, however, the States 
frequently violated this provision by failing to comply fully with Congress’s 
directives, and the Articles gave Congress no means of enforcing its 
commands. 
Not surprisingly, the Articles of Confederation quickly proved to be 
inadequate.  First, the Confederation Congress lacked certain substantive 
powers necessary to secure the peace and harmony of the United States, 
including the power to uphold and enforce the law of nations and treaties of 
the United States,108 the power to foster and protect commerce with other 
 
Rakove, supra note 96, at  111.  Regardless of whether the founders agonized over the location of sovereignty in a 
federal system, it is beyond question that the Articles delegated limited powers to the Confederation Congress and 
took care to reserve to the states any powers not expressly delegated.   
103 Id. art. IX. 
104 See supra notes 42-56, and accompanying text.  
105 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. IX. 
106 Id.  
107 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. XIII. 
108 At the start of the Federal Convention, Edmund Randolph enumerated defects in the Articles of 
Confederation, including “that the confederation produced no security agai[nst] foreign invasion; congress not 
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nations,109 and the power to resolve disputes between and among the 
States.110  Second, as noted, Congress lacked the power to enforce even its 
limited substantive powers because it had no means of enforcing its 
commands against the States.  Thus, during the War of Independence, 
States violated the Articles by failing to supply all of the men and revenue 
requisitioned by Congress.  After the War, States complied even less 
frequently with requisitions, effectively leaving the central government with 
no source of funds.111   
As Hamilton explained in The Federalist, a “palpable defect of the 
subsisting Confederation, is the total want of a sanction to its laws. The 
United States, as now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or 
punish disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a 
suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other constitutional 
mode.”112  Thus, he concluded, under the Articles of Confederation, “the 
United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government destitute 
even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its 
own laws.”113 
Prior to the Constitutional Convention, James Madison served on 
several commissions charged with proposing amendments to make the 
Articles more effective.  Madison consistently favored amending the 
Articles to authorize Congress to use military force to coerce States to 
comply with its commands.  Congress, however, never sent this proposal to 
the States.  Instead, on February 21, 1787, the Confederation Congress 
passed a resolution calling for a convention to revise the Articles of 
Confederation.  The resolution stated: 
It is expedient that on the second Monday in May next a 
Convention of delegates who shall have been appointed by 
the several States be held at Philadelphia for the sole and 
 
being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by th[eir] own authority—Of this he cited many examples; most 
of whi[ch] tended to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be 
punished.”  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter 
FARRAND’S RECORDS]. 
109 Randolph further observed at the start of the Convention that there were many advantages, which the U.S. 
might acquire, which were not attainable under the confederation—such as a productive impost—counteraction of 
the commercial regulations of other nations—pushing of commerce ad libitum . . . .”  Id. 
110 Under the Articles, Randolph observed, “the federal government could not check the quarrels between 
states, nor a rebellion in any not have constitutional power.”  Id. 
111 See Vices of the Political System of the United States (Apr. 1787), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 361, 364 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900) (stating that because acts of Congress depend “for their 
execution on the will of the State legislatures,” they are “nominally authoritative, [but] in fact recommendatory 
only”) [hereinafter MADISON WRITINGS].  
112 THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 129 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
113 Id.  In part, this defect resulted from the lack of a judiciary of the United States.  See THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 22, supra note 112, at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (“A circumstance, which crowns the defects of the 
confederation, remains yet to be mentioned—the want of a judiciary power.  Laws are a dead letter without courts 
to expound and define their true meaning and operation.”). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471860 
28 
 
express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation 
and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures such 
alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in 
Congress and confirmed by the states render the federal 
constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the 
preservation of the Union.114 
The Philadelphia Convention began in May 1787 as planned, but the 
delegates quickly abandoned the original goal of merely revising the 
Articles of Confederation.  Instead, the Convention undertook to draft and 
propose an entirely new constitution that would serve as a comprehensive 
replacement of the Articles. 
III.  STATE SOVEREIGNTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
The Constitutional Convention crafted a plan of government that 
took a different approach than the Articles of Confederation to federal 
power and state sovereignty.  In the Constitution, the States surrendered 
both more sovereignty overall than they had in the Articles, but they also 
chose to retain certain rights they had previously surrendered in the 
Articles.  They surrendered more of their sovereignty by giving the United 
States government more regulatory powers than the Confederation 
Congress had enjoyed, including by providing the federal government with 
new means to exercise those powers effectively.  At the same time, the 
States surrendered less of their sovereignty by withholding power from 
Congress to command the States themselves.  Rather than authorizing 
Congress to order the States to take certain actions (as the Articles had), the 
Constitution gave Congress direct power to regulate individuals—a power 
withheld under the Articles.115  This change enabled Congress itself to raise 
revenue and supply the armed forces without relying on the States to carry 
out its commands.  In addition, this change eliminated the need to adopt 
more controversial measures, such as empowering Congress to use military 
force to coerce state compliance with federal commands.   
The fundamental shift from congressional regulation of States under 
the Articles to congressional regulation of individuals under the 
Constitution enabled the United States to exercise its powers more 
effectively than it had under the Articles.116  The Constitution’s success in 
 
114  Resolution of Confederation Congress (February 21, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 185, 187 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009) [hereinafter DHRC]. 
115 The only arguable exceptions were the Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III, discussed in Part 
IV. 
116 Of course, the Constitution contains several built-in political and procedural safeguards of federalism that 
frequently render the federal government incapable of exercising its enumerated powers over individuals.  See 
Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001). 
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this regard, however, did not rest on the wholesale abolition of state 
sovereignty.  To be sure, the States surrendered significant aspects of their 
sovereignty by conferring on the federal government new regulatory powers 
and new means for exercising and enforcing those powers.117  Under 
background principles of the law of nations governing the surrender of 
sovereign rights, however, the States necessarily retained all sovereign 
rights that they did not clearly and expressly surrender in the Constitution. 
A. Abandoning the Articles of Confederation 
Congress charged the Philadelphia Convention with revising the 
Articles of Confederation, and it is commonly acknowledged that the 
Convention exceeded its mandate by abandoning the Articles in favor of an 
entirely new Constitution.  Indeed, some maintain that the States’ adoption 
of the Constitution actually violated the Articles, which were styled the 
“Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union.”  The Articles provided 
that they “shall be inviolably observed by every State, and the Union shall 
be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of 
them; unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, 
and be afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every State.”118  The 
States arguably violated this provision both by using a convention to 
propose that the Constitution be adopted in place of the Articles, and by 
adopting this change through state ratifying conventions rather than state 
legislatures.   
Scholars have long debated whether the States’ adoption of the 
Constitution violated the Articles of Confederation,119 but the answer is of 
little practical importance.  Because all thirteen States ratified the 
Constitution, each State exercised its sovereign prerogative to abandon the 
Articles in favor the Constitution.120  Arguably, all States were free to 
disregard the Articles by 1787 because many, if not all, States had violated 
its terms by failing to comply with all of Congress’s commands.  Under the 
law of nations, when one State violated a compact or treaty, the other 
 
117 See Peter J. Smith, States as Nations: Dignity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1 (2003). 
118 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. XIII. 
119 Compare Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 475 (1995) 
(arguing that the States’ ratification of the Constitution was “illegal”), with Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia 
Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) (arguing that the States 
had a legal right to adopt the Constitution because of repeated violations of the Articles). 
120 It is true that the States altered their compact through state ratifying conventions (rather than state 
legislatures as specified in the Articles), but the founders widely understood state legislatures merely to be 
exercising powers delegated by the people—the ultimate source of state sovereignty.  In any event, the States’ 
repeated violations of the Articles released them from their obligation to comply with that instrument.  See infra 
notes 121–122, and accompanying text. 
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participating States were released from their obligations and free to 
withdraw.121  As Akhil Amar has explained: 
[T]he Articles of Confederation were a mere treaty among 
thirteen otherwise free and independent nations. That treaty 
had been notoriously, repeatedly, and flagrantly violated on 
every side by 1787. Under standard principles of 
international law, these material breaches of a treaty freed 
each party—that is, each of the thirteen states—to disregard 
the pact, if it so chose. Thus, if in 1787 nine (or more) states 
wanted, in effect, to secede from the Articles of 
Confederation and form a new system, that was their legal 
right, Article XIII notwithstanding.122 
This background helps to explain why the Convention’s proposal to 
abandon the Articles did not face greater opposition either at the 
Convention or during the ratification debates.  It also explains why each 
State considered itself free to accept or reject the proposed constitution, and 
why it was entirely possible that some States would decline to ratify it.  
Article VII of the Constitution reflected these realities by specifying that 
“[t]he Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for 
the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the 
Same.”123  Under this provision, the Constitution would take effect only if 
at least nine States ratified it, and no State would be bound by the 
Constitution unless it expressly consented through ratification.  Had the 
States not considered themselves to possess individual sovereignty during 
the ratification era, then this provision would have made no sense.  Thus, 
Article VII supports the conclusion that the founders understood each State 
to possess full sovereignty both to abandon the Articles and to accept or 
reject the new Constitution.124   
This background dispels the notion that the States had somehow 
irrevocably compromised their individual sovereignty by 1787.  Once it 
became clear that the Articles of Confederation could no longer serve their 
intended function, the States considered themselves free to consider 
alternative proposals as independent sovereigns.  The Convention’s debate 
over whether the States should have equal suffrage in the Senate reflects 
this understanding.  The large States urged proportional representation in 
the Senate, while the small States insisted upon equal suffrage.  In this 
 
121  See 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 200, at 214 (explaining that the breach of 
a treaty gives the offended party the option to cancel the treaty). 
122 Amar, supra note 119, at 1048 (footnotes omitted). 
123 U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
124 See supra note 98. 
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debate, the large and small states alike considered themselves at liberty to 
form new alliances with each other or even with foreign states.  For 
example, Gunning Bedford, representing Delaware, went so far as to 
declare that if the large States dared to dissolve the confederation, “the 
small ones will find some foreign ally of more honor and good faith, who 
will take them by the hand and do them justice.”125  In danger of 
disbanding, the Convention appointed a Grand Committee to break the 
deadlock over the proper basis of representation in the Senate.  The 
Committee returned with two proposals—first, that “all Bills for raising or 
appropriating money” shall originate in the House, and second, that “each 
State shall have an equal Vote” in the Senate.126  Large-State delegates 
James Madison (Virginia),127 Gouveneur Morris (Pennsylvania),128 and 
James Wilson (Pennsylvania)129 strongly opposed this proposal as involving 
no real compromise.  Luther Martin, representing Maryland, responded that 
“[h]e was for letting a separation take place if [the large States] desired it.  
He had rather there should be two Confederacies, than one founded on any 
other principle than an equality of votes in the 2d branch at least.”130  The 
small States ultimately prevailed with the Convention voting five States to 
four in favor of the proposals.131   
This episode reveals that the individual States at the Convention 
considered themselves free to pursue a wide range of options, such as 
disbanding without an agreement, forming two (or more) distinct 
confederacies, or even entering into alliances with foreign states if they 
could not reach an acceptable arrangement with other States.  That the 
delegates openly discussed these options without objection indicates that the 
individual States understood themselves to possess full sovereignty 
unimpeded by their previous commitments under the Articles of 
Confederation.  If the “States” that met in Philadelphia lacked full 
sovereignty to pursue all options, then these discussions made no sense.  
The Articles prohibited the States, without the consent of Congress, from 
either entering into “any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty” with any 
foreign state, or entering into “any treaty, confederation or alliance” with 
 
125 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 29, 1787), in 1 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 492 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND'S RECORDS]. 
126 See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 2, 1787), in 1 FARRAND'S RECORDS, 
supra note 125, at 524. 
127 Id. at 527. 
128 Id. at 551. 
129 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 14, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, 
supra note 125, at 4. 
130 Id.  
131 See James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (July 16, 1787), in 2 FARRAND'S RECORDS, 
supra note 125, at 15. 
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any other American State.132  The debate over equal suffrage reveals that 
the States at the Convention did not consider themselves bound by these—
or any other—restrictions on their individual sovereignty.   
Indeed, Article VII underscores this understanding by providing that 
the Constitution would be binding only upon those “States so ratifying the 
Same.”133  Article VII’s reference to “States” thus referred to States with 
full sovereignty to accept or reject the proposed Constitution.  Because the 
proposed Constitution used the identical term “States” without qualification 
throughout the document, Article VII confirms that the Constitution used 
the term to describe free and independent States with full sovereignty.  Of 
course, the proposed Constitution also contained numerous clear and 
express surrenders of sovereign rights that would necessarily diminish the 
sovereignty of those States that elected to ratify it, but those surrenders 
occurred by virtue of ratification rather than any pre-ratification surrender.  
As explained, a sovereign could not surrender its rights under the law of 
nations without adopting clear and express terms to that effect in a treaty or 
other legal instrument.  By ratifying the Constitution, each State voluntarily 
surrendered some—but not all—of its pre-existing sovereignty.134  Thus, 
following ratification, each “State” possessed the rights of free and 
independent States minus only those rights that it had clearly and expressly 
given up in the Constitution. 
This conclusion is not contradicted by the founders’ understanding 
that ultimate sovereignty rested with the people.  As the Preamble states, the 
Constitution was ordained and established by “We the People of the United 
States.”135  At first glance, popular sovereignty might seem inconsistent 
with the sovereignty of the individual States.  If “the People of the United 
States” ordained and established the Constitution, then why did Article VII 
permit each State to opt out by failing to ratify the instrument?  Any 
apparent conflict between the Preamble and Article VII disappears once one 
recalls that prior to the Civil War “Americans understood ‘the United 
States’ to be a plural noun and used it to refer collectively to the several 
 
132 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. VI. 
133 U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
134 This approach to sovereignty was consistent with Vattel’s writings.  See ALISON L. LECROIX, THE 
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 79 (2010) (“Vattel’s theories provided a normative vision of 
multiplicity, positing that a ‘republic of republics’ could be capable of operating as a ‘sovereign among 
sovereigns.’”). 
135 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
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states.”136  Thus, at the founding, “the United States” were a “they,” not an 
“it.”137   
James Madison shared this view.  In The Federalist No. 39, Madison 
reconciled any tension between the relevant provisions as follows: 
it appears, on one hand, that the Constitution is to be founded 
on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given 
by deputies elected for the special purpose; but, on the other, 
that this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, 
not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as 
composing the distinct and independent States to which they 
respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of 
the several States, derived from the supreme authority in 
each State, the authority of the people themselves.138 
Madison made clear that “the people of the United States” referred not to 
one undifferentiated mass, but to the people of each independent State 
ratifying the Constitution.  As he explained, “the act of the people, as 
forming so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, 
is obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither from the 
decision of a majority of the people of the Union, nor from that of a 
majority of the States.”139  Rather, “[e]ach State, in ratifying the 
Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body, independent of all others, 
and only to be bound by its own voluntary act.”140  The actual ratification 
process confirmed Madison’s understanding.  Rather than participating in a 
national convention, each State convened a distinct convention (as required 
by Article VII) for the purpose of ratifying or rejecting the proposed 
Constitution on its own behalf.141 
 
136 Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Why Federal Courts Apply the Law of Nations Even Though it 
is Not the Supreme Law of the Land, 106 GEO. L.J. 1915, 1929 (2018).   
137 This usage persisted at least through the Civil War Amendments.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 
(“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been 
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)). 
138 THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 112, at 253-54 (James Madison) 
139 Id. at 254. 
140 Id.  Even if one believed (counterfactually) that the Constitution was adopted by the undifferentiated 
“people of the United States,” the Constitution would still be subject to the same rule of interpretation—namely, 
the instrument could alienate the pre-existing sovereign rights of the States only through clear and express terms.  
Under the law of nations, no legal instrument would be read to interfere with the sovereign rights of a state unless 
the instrument sought to do so in clear and express terms.  The same rules of interpretation applied to an 
involuntary divestiture of sovereign rights as applied to a voluntary one, and thus the same rules would apply to 
the interpretation of the Constitution even if it had been forced upon the States by an undifferentiated popular 
majority of the United States. 
141 Like Article VII, Article V of the Constitution permits each State to decide for itself whether to ratify new 
constitutional proposals.  Unlike Article VII, however, Article V permits a supermajority of States to bind 
nonconsenting States.  As Henry Monaghan has explained, however, the States surrendered their right 
individually to veto constitutional amendments “only on the premise that Article V’s requirements would make it 
very difficult to change the terms according to which the states came together.”  Henry Paul Monaghan, We the 
People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 129 (1996).  
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 In sum, the Constitution did not use the term “State” in a new or 
unknown sense.  By continuing to use the term “States,” the Constitution 
referred to the sovereign and independent American States described in the 
Declaration of Independence and the Articles of Confederation.  Such States 
could alienate their rights under the law of nations only if a they 
surrendered them in a binding legal instrument through clear and express 
terms. 
B. Residual State Sovereignty 
Of course, the law of nations allowed free and independent States to 
surrender parts of their sovereignty voluntarily, and the American States did 
so in the Constitution.  Thus, following ratification, the “States” referred to 
in the Constitution possessed full sovereignty minus those specific rights 
they clearly and expressly surrendered in the document. 
Not surprisingly, the predominant understanding of the Constitution 
during its drafting and ratification was that all powers not delegated to the 
federal government were necessarily reserved to the States.  Initially at 
least, this understanding was not the product of the Tenth Amendment.  
Rather, this understanding pre-dated the Amendment and stemmed from a 
relatively straightforward application of principles drawn from the law of 
nations.  As discussed, sovereign states could alienate aspects of their 
sovereignty only by making clear and express surrenders in an appropriate 
instrument.  Accordingly, the States necessarily retained all aspects of their 
sovereignty that they did not expressly surrender in the Constitution.  The 
Tenth Amendment merely confirmed—rather than created—this 
understanding of state sovereignty.142   
George Washington’s letter of September 17, 1787, transmitting the 
Constitution to Congress, reflects this understanding.  He described the new 
charter as an allocation of particular sovereign rights to the United States 
 
Accordingly, Professor Monaghan rejected the claim, made by Akhil Amar, that a national majority of “We the 
People” can amend the Constitution outside of the requirements of Article V.  See Akhil R. Amar, The Consent of 
the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994) 
142 As many commentators have observed, the Tenth Amendment differed from a comparable provision of 
the Articles of Confederation by omitting the word “expressly.”  The Articles provided that “[e]ach state retains 
its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this 
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
OF 1777, art. II.  By contrast, the Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  
U.S. CONST. amend. X.  In our view, the omission of the word “expressly” was a conscious and significant change 
by the founders, but it does not alter the meaning of the term “States” in the Constitution.  The primary effect of 
this omission was to allow Congress to employ incidental means to execute its enumerated powers under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  The precise scope of Congress’s incidental powers remains contested, but here 
again the law of nations provides some guidance.  See infra Part III.D.4. 
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government, and a reservation of the remaining “rights of independent 
sovereignty” to the States: 
It is obviously impracticable, in the federal government of 
these states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to 
each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all.  
Individuals entering into society must give up a share of 
liberty to preserve the rest.  The magnitude of the sacrifice 
must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the 
object to be obtained.  It is at all times difficult to draw with 
precision the line between those rights which must be 
surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and, on the 
present occasion, this difficulty was increased by a 
difference among the several states as to their situation, 
extent, habits, and particular interests . . . .143  
 Hamilton and Madison based their defense of the Constitution in 
The Federalist on the same understanding of divided sovereignty.  They 
sought to allay the fears of Anti-Federalists that the Constitution could lead 
to a consolidated government because it did not provide sufficient 
safeguards for maintaining the reserved powers of the States against 
overreaching by the federal government.144  As Madison famously 
explained in The Federalist No. 45: 
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the 
federal government are few and defined. Those which are to 
remain in the State governments are numerous and 
indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on 
external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign 
commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the 
most part, be connected.  The powers reserved to the several 
States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary 
course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties 
of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and 
prosperity of the State.145 
 
143 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 96, at 17. 
144 As Jack Rakove has explained, “[i]f Anti-Federalists could be polled, then, as to whether they thought 
that the original Constitution of 1787 adequately secured the reserved powers of the states, the logic of their 
position would have compelled them to answer in the negative.  Their original understanding of the Constitution 
was that it was a formula for consolidation, perhaps immediately, certainly over time.”  Rakove, supra note 96, at 
122.  . 
145 THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 112, at 313 (James Madison).  Madison repeated this description of 
the federal structure in others papers.  For example, Madison explained in The Federalist No. 14: 
[I]t is to be remembered, that the general government is not to be charged with the whole 
power of making and administering laws.  Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated 
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Hamilton provided a similar description of residual state sovereignty in the 
course of rejecting claims that Article III would permit individuals to sue 
States: 
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.  
This is the general sense, and the general practice of 
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of 
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every 
State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of 
this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain 
with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely 
ideal.146 
Hamilton denied that the Constitution contained such a surrender of 
sovereign immunity by recalling “[t]he circumstances which are necessary 
to produce an alienation of State sovereignty.”147  He directed the reader to 
an earlier essay in which he described “the rule that all authorities, of which 
the States are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with 
them in full vigor.”148  Applying this rule, he concluded:  “A recurrence to 
the principles there established will satisfy us, that there is no color to 
pretend that the State governments would, by the adoption of that plan, be 
divested of the privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free 
from every constraint but that which flows from the obligations of good 
faith.”149 
In explaining the Constitution in these terms, Hamilton and Madison 
relied on background rules drawn from the law of nations governing the 
interpretation of legal instruments claimed to divest sovereign rights.  
Specifically, they invoked the principles, described by Vattel, that a legal 
instrument should not be interpreted to divest sovereign powers or violate 
sovereign rights unless the legal instrument did so clearly and expressly.  In 
accordance with these principles, they explained that the federal 
 
objects, which concern all the members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by 
the separate provisions of any.  The subordinate governments which can extend their care to 
all those other objects, which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority 
and activity.  Were it proposed by the plan of the Convention to abolish the governments of 
the particular States, its adversaries would have some ground for their objections, though it 
would not be difficult to shew that if they were abolished, the general government would be 
compelled by the principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper 
jurisdiction.  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, supra note 112, at 86 (James Madison). 
146 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 112, at 548-49 (Alexander Hamilton) . 
147 Id. at 549 
148 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 112, at 203 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
149 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 112, at 549 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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government would possess only those sovereign powers the States clearly 
and expressly surrendered in the Constitution, and the States would 
necessarily retain all other rights and powers not surrendered.  In The 
Federalist No. 32, Hamilton invoked this principle in describing the effect 
of the delegation of powers to the federal government upon the sovereign 
powers of the States.  He explained that the Constitution’s allocation of 
powers to the federal government did not divest the States of any pre-
existing sovereign rights except where its language did so in express terms.  
It is worth quoting Hamilton at length on this point: 
But as the plan of the convention aims only at a 
partial union or consolidation, the State governments would 
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before 
had, and which were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to 
the United States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this 
alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three 
cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an 
exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one 
instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited 
the States from exercising the like authority; and where it 
granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar 
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally 
contradictory and repugnant. . . .  
It is not, however a mere possibility of inconvenience 
in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional 
repugnancy that can by implication alienate and extinguish a 
pre-existing right of sovereignty. 
The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain 
cases results from the division of the sovereign power; and 
the rule that all authorities, of which the States are not 
explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them 
in full vigor, is not a theoretical consequence of that division, 
but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument 
which contains the articles of the proposed Constitution.150 
In this passage, Hamilton understood the Constitution not to divest the 
States of sovereign power except (1) where it did so in express terms, or (2) 
where a state power “would be absolutely and totally repugnant” to the 
powers expressly granted to the federal government by the Constitution.151  
 
150 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 112, at 200, 202-03 (Alexander Hamilton) (first emphasis added). 
151 As Kurt Lash has observed, it was advocates of the Constitution, seeking to allay Anti-Federalist 
concerns, who insisted that the federal government could exercise only those powers expressly delegated to it.  
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This understanding tracks Vattel’s approach to the interpretation of legal 
instruments that sought to alter sovereign rights and powers.152 
A threshold inquiry at the Constitution Convention was whether the 
Constitution should follow the Articles of Confederation and authorize 
Congress to commandeer the States, and—if so—whether the Constitution 
should grant Congress additional power to use military force to coerce state 
compliance with such commands.  At the outset of the Convention, James 
Madison favored giving Congress power both to commandeer and to coerce 
the States, as evidenced by the Virginia Plan.  The Plan initially proposed 
that that “the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the 
Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to 
legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in 
which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise 
of individual Legislation.”153  In addition, to make Congress’s power to 
commandeer States effective, the Virginia Plan also proposed that the 
National Legislature be empowered “to call forth the force of the Union 
agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles 
thereof.”154 
The proposal to allow Congress to use military force against States 
raised alarms among the delegates.  For example, George Mason argued 
that coercion and punishment could not be used against the States 
collectively.155  For these reasons, Mason argued that “such a Govt. was 
necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those 
only whose guilt required it.”156  In response to these remarks, Madison 
“observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he 
doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to 
people collectively and not individually.”157  Thus, Madison moved to 
postpone the initial proposal to give Congress power to coerce States, and 
expressed the hope “that such a system would be framed as might render 
this recourse unnecessary.”158  Ultimately, the Convention decided to 
abandon Congress’s power to command States in favor of giving Congress 
 
Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict 
Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1577, 1593-97 (2009). 
152 See id. at 1639-40 (discussing the relationship between early arguments over constitutional interpretation 
and rules of interpretation under the law of nations). 
153 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 21. 
154 Id.  
155  James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 30, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 33, 34. 
156 Id.  
157 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 47, 54 (brackets in original) (footnote omitted). 
158 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 47, 54 (brackets in original) (footnote omitted). 
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power to regulate individuals instead.  By withholding power from 
Congress to command the States, the Convention eliminated the need to 
give Congress power to enforce such commands.  As Mason explained: 
“Under the existing Confederacy, Congs. represent the States not the 
people of the States: their acts operate on the States not on the individuals.  
The case will be changed in the new plan of Govt.”159  In the end, 
Madison agreed that regulation of individuals was superior to trying 
to perfect congressional regulation of States: “Any Govt. for the U. 
States formed on the supposed practicability of using force agst. the 
<unconstitutional proceedings> of the States, wd. prove as visionary & 
fallacious as the Govt. of Congs. [under the Articles of Confederation].”160 
The delegates at the Convention viewed the question of how the 
federal government could most effectively exercise its powers as a binary 
choice: either authorize Congress to command States and use military force 
to coerce their compliance with such commands, or adopt an entirely new 
Constitution in which Congress would regulate individuals instead of 
States.  In choosing the latter course, the founders chose not to grant 
Congress power to command or coerce the States in the new Constitution.  
As discussed in Part IV, by failing to authorize Congress to command or 
coerce States, the States surrendered less of their sovereignty than they had 
under the Articles of Confederation.  On the other hand, the States 
surrendered—for the first time—a fundamental aspect of their sovereignty 
by authorizing Congress to regulate the individuals within the territorial 
limits of the States. 
C. The Powers Delegated to the Federal Government 
The Articles of Confederation delegated important powers to “the 
United States, in Congress assembled,” but required Congress to rely on the 
States to carry out its commands.  As discussed, the Constitution took an 
entirely different approach.  The Constitution gave Congress power to 
regulate individuals directly rather than power to regulate through 
commands issued to the States.  In this way, the States expressly 
surrendered a significant aspect of their sovereignty in the Constitution that 
they had not surrendered in the Articles of Confederation, while 
simultaneously withholding congressional power to command and coerce 
States.  Thus, the Constitution divested the States of their pre-existing 
sovereign rights in two important ways: (1) by granting the federal 
 
159 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 132, 133. 
160 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 8, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 164, 165 (footnote omitted).  This debate is described in greater detail in Part IV.B. 
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government new and important regulatory and foreign relations powers; and 
(2) by authorizing the federal government to exercise its regulatory powers 
directly upon individuals within the territorial jurisdiction of the States. 
First, the Constitution not only transferred many of the powers of 
the Confederation Congress under the Articles to the new federal 
government, but also conferred new and important powers on the federal 
government.  Most of the federal powers that the Constitution continued 
from the Articles concerned the external relations of the United States.  As 
Hamilton explained in The Federalist No. 23, “[t]he principal purposes to 
be answered by Union are these—The common defence of the members—
the preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as 
external attacks—the regulation of commerce with other nations and 
between States—the superintendence of our intercourse, political and 
commercial, with foreign countries.”161  In this realm, the Constitution 
granted the federal government roughly the same powers to conduct foreign 
relations and decide matters of war and peace that the Articles had granted 
to the Confederation Congress.162   
Specifically, the Constitution gave Congress and the President 
powers to conduct diplomatic relations with other nations, including power 
to the President to “to make Treaties” subject to concurrence of two-thirds 
of the Senate,163 to “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls” subject consent of a majority of the Senate,164 and power to 
“receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”165  The Constitution also 
empowered Congress “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,”166 and 
“[t]o raise and support Armies . . . and [t]o provide and maintain a 
Navy”167; and assigned responsibility to the President to serve as 
“Commander in Chief” of the armed forces.168  In addition, the Constitution 
gave Congress some of the same powers over internal matters that the 
Articles had given the Confederation Congress, such as power “[t]o coin 
Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the 
Standard of Weights and Measures.”169 
 
161 THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 112, at 146-47 (Alexander Hamilton).  
162 For more extensive discussions of these powers, see ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R. CLARK, 
THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE CONSTITUTION 50-67 (2017); Bellia & Clark, The Law of Nations as 
Constitutional Law, supra note 95, at 764-779. 
163 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
164 Id. 
165 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
166 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
167 Id. 
168 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
169 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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But the Constitution also granted the federal government new 
express powers to regulate various matters that the Articles had not 
entrusted to the Confederation Congress.  For example, the Constitution 
enabled the federal government to redress U.S. violations of the law of 
nations and treaties in more effective ways, including by creating federal 
courts and empowering Congress “[t]o define and punish Piracies and 
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of 
Nations.”170  The Constitution also granted Congress the power “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”171  Perhaps most importantly, the Constitution 
granted Congress power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and 
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”172  In granting the 
federal government these new powers, the States ceded more sovereignty 
than they had in the Articles of Confederation. 
The second respect in which the states transferred more sovereignty 
under the Constitution than they had under the Articles was by giving 
Congress novel power to regulate individuals within the territory of the 
States.  The Articles of Confederation contained no such surrender of this 
aspect of state sovereignty.  Under the law of nations, a free and 
independent state had exclusive territorial sovereignty to govern individuals 
within its territory, and any attempt by another sovereign to regulate such 
individuals would have violated its sovereignty and given it just cause for 
war.  By expressly authorizing the federal government to regulate 
individuals within their borders, the States compromised this aspect of their 
sovereignty.  Given its novelty and importance to the success of the 
Constitution, the States’ decision to share their exclusive power to regulate 
individuals within their territories was arguably their most significant 
surrender of sovereignty in the Constitution. 
Once the Constitutional Convention made the fundamental decision 
to shift from congressional regulation of States to congressional regulation 
of individuals, the delegates had to design a federal government capable of 
enforcing such regulations on its own (lest they again leave the federal 
government dependent on the States with no effective means of 
enforcement).  Under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government 
consisted primarily of a Congress of the States, with no real executive or 
 
170 Id. 
171 Id.  Vattel had described both of these powers as sovereign powers belonging to states under the law of 
nations.  See supra note 64, and accompanying text. 
172 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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judicial powers of its own.173  Within this structure, Congress had to rely on 
state legislative, executive, and judicial officers to carry out its commands.  
Under the new Constitution, the federal government would have its own 
legislative, executive, and judicial branches to implement the exercise of 
federal powers.  Of course, this arrangement would permit the federal 
government and the States to exercise concurrent authority over the same 
individuals in certain circumstances.  The States amplified the significance 
of this concession by adopting the Supremacy Clause, which provided that 
the Constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof, and treaties constituted 
the supreme law of the land, notwithstanding contrary state law.  When 
conflicts arose, the Supremacy Clause required state courts to apply valid 
federal laws over state law.  And the Constitution gave federal courts 
corresponding power to uphold the supremacy of federal law pursuant to the 
Arising Under Clause of Article III.  
D. The Powers Surrendered by the States 
In allocating powers to the federal government in the Constitution, 
the States surrendered or compromised portions of their sovereignty by 
making four kinds of delegations of power to the federal government: (1) 
express delegations of exclusive power to the federal government; (2) 
express delegations of power to the federal government coupled with 
express prohibitions on the States’ exercise of the same power; (3) express 
delegations of power to the federal government not accompanied by express 
prohibitions on the States; and (4) delegation of incidental powers to the 
federal government.  The fourth category is the most controversial and is 
the one that has given rise to many of the Supreme Court’s most prominent 
federalism decisions.  This section will briefly describe each of these four 
ways in which the States surrendered portions of their sovereignty in the 
Constitution.  Part IV will discuss three important federalism doctrines that 
relate to the fourth category. 
As explained, Alexander Hamilton discussed in The Federalist No. 
32 the first three ways in which states surrendered sovereignty in the 
Constitution.  In his discussion, he relied on the principle drawn from the 
law of nations that legal instruments should not be interpreted to alienate 
sovereign rights and powers unless the text of the instrument did so clearly 
and expressly.174  Some surrenders were complete in that they granted the 
federal government exclusive power to regulate certain matters.  Other 
 
173 The Articles of Confederation did establish a federal tribunal with limited jurisdiction to hear “the trial of 
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas; and . . . appeals in all cases of captures.”  ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION OF 1777 art. IX, § 1. 
174 See supra note 150, and accompanying text. 
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surrenders were partial in that they granted the federal government 
concurrent power to regulate certain matters.  In either case, Hamilton 
assured opponents of ratification that the Constitution would not divest the 
States of any aspect of their pre-existing sovereignty except when it did so 
(1) “in express terms,” or (2) when a state power “would be absolutely and 
totally repugnant” to powers that Constitution expressly allocated to the 
United States government.175  This understanding accords with the 
principles Vattel described to govern the interpretation of legal instruments 
altering sovereign rights and powers.176 
1. Express Delegations of Exclusive Federal Power 
The first category—express delegations of exclusive power to the 
federal government—provides a clear example of the surrender of sovereign 
rights by the States.  The Constitution makes certain express allocations of 
exclusive power to the federal government.  For example, the Constitution 
gives Congress exclusive authority to govern certain territorial enclaves of 
importance to the federal government.  Specifically, the Constitution grants 
Congress power “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases 
whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by 
Cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the 
 
175 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 112, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton). 
176 It is important to note that this approach to interpretation differs from a “strict construction” approach.  
The rules of interpretation that Vattel described were more nuanced.  The conventional account is that strict 
constructionists, such as Thomas Jefferson and St. George Tucker, believed that the words of the Constitution 
should be strictly construed against federal power, see The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in 30 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 536 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2003) (arguing that the powers delegated to Congress in the 
Constitution should be strictly construed to avoid the federal government from assuming unlimited powers); 1 
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA app. Note D at 155 
(St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) (arguing that the powers 
delegated to the federal government should be strictly construed); while others, such as John Marshall, believed 
that the words of the Constitution should be given their ordinary or natural import.  See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 187-88 (1824) (rejecting strict construction and arguing instead that the Constitution should be 
interpreted in accord with the natural sense of its words); see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, at § 411 (Lawbook Exch. 2001) (1833) (also rejecting and refuting the 
theory of strict construction).  Over time, the conventional account goes, the ordinary meaning approach prevailed 
over strict constructionism.  See Kurt Lash, Tucker’s Rule: St. George Tucker and the Limited Construction of 
Federal Power, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1344-45 (2006) (describing this account). 
 The lines of debate, however, in early constitutional interpretations were more nuanced than this story 
suggests.  Vattel’s principles of interpretation for legal instruments allocating sovereign powers—whether they be 
treaties, compacts, conventions, constitutions, legislative acts, or other legal instruments—included elements of 
both ordinary meaning and strict construction.  First, he explained that the clear and express terms of a legal 
instrument should be given their ordinary or natural meaning.  See supra notes 75-82, and accompanying text.  
Second, he explained that terms of a legal instrument that were vague or indeterminate should be interpreted 
against divesting a sovereign state of its preexisting rights.  See supra notes 83-92, and accompanying text.  As we 
explain in this Article, early explanations of the Constitution and judicial practice more closely align with Vattel’s 
approach than with any categorical acceptance of either a strict construction or an ordinary meaning approach to 
constitutional interpretation. 
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Seat of the Government of the United States.”177  The same clause gives 
Congress power “to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the 
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the 
Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful 
Buildings.”178  Through these clauses, the States gave Congress complete 
power—exclusive of state authority—to govern places of special 
significance to the federal government. 
2. Express Delegations with Express Prohibitions 
In the second category, the Constitution includes several express 
delegations of power to the federal government accompanied by express 
prohibitions on the exercise of the same powers by the States.  Taken 
together, these provisions necessarily give the federal government exclusive 
power to regulate the matters in question.  As explained, in the realm of 
“external relations,” the Constitution grants the federal political branches 
several express powers to conduct foreign relations and decide matters of 
war and peace.179  In addition to allocating these powers to the federal 
government, Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution expressly prohibits the 
States from exercising almost all of these powers.  For example, the 
Constitution gives the President power “to make Treaties” with other 
nations subject to concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate,180 and elsewhere 
expressly provides that “[n]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation,” or “enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a 
foreign Power.”181  Likewise, the Constitution gives Congress power to 
“[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules 
concerning Captures on Land and Water,”182 and “[t]o raise and support 
Armies . . . and [t]o provide and maintain a Navy”183; and assigns 
responsibility to the President to serve as “Commander in Chief” of the 
armed forces.184  Elsewhere, the Constitution expressly provides that the 
States may not “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal” or “keep Troops, or 
Ships of War in time of Peace, . . . or engage in War, unless actually 
invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.”185 
The Constitution also grants the federal government express 
authority over certain “internal” matters while expressly prohibiting the 
 
177 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (emphasis added). 
178 Id.  
179 See supra notes 161-170, and accompanying text. 
180 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
181 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
182 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
183 Id. 
184 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
185 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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States from exercising the same authority.  For example, the Constitution 
gives Congress the power “[t]o coin Money,”186 but expressly forbids the 
States to do so.187  Similarly, the Constitution grants Congress “power to lay 
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises,188 while simultaneously 
prohibiting the States from exercising the same powers in limited 
circumstances.  Specifically, the Constitution provides that a State may not, 
“without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports 
or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its 
inspection Laws.”189   
In all cases in which the Constitution delegates an express power to 
the federal government and imposes an express prohibition on the States, 
the States have clearly and expressly surrendered complete sovereignty to 
the federal government over the matters in question.  Because they are clear 
and explicit, these surrenders have generated few controversies in the 
Supreme Court.190 
3. Express Delegations Without Express Prohibitions 
The third category consists of instances in which the Constitution 
expressly delegates powers to the federal government but does not 
expressly prohibit them to the States.  The Supreme Court has not treated 
these instances in a uniform manner.  On some occasions, the Court treats 
such delegations to the federal government as exclusive of state authority, 
effectively interpreting the States’ surrender of sovereignty as complete.  In 
these cases, the Court regards the States’ exercise of the power in question 
to be irreconcilable with its exercise by the federal government.  On other 
occasions, the Court treats such delegations to the federal government as 
non-exclusive, allowing States to continue to exercise concurrent authority 
over the same matters.  This category of federal power presents difficult 
 
186 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
187 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
188 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
189 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
190 As the next section explains, controversies have arisen when litigants seek to oust state authority on the 
basis of provisions that do not do so expressly.  For example, in 1833 the Court considered whether the Bill of 
Rights operated as a limitation on state power.  In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833), the Court held 
that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the States because the Constitution limits state power only where it does so 
expressly: 
Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers 
of the State governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, 
and have expressed that intention. Had Congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation 
of improving the Constitutions of the several States by affording the people additional 
protection from the exercise of power by their own governments in matters which 
concerned themselves alone, they would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible 
language. 
Id. at 250.  Thus, in accordance with well-established rules governing the surrender of sovereign rights under the 
law of nations, the Court held that the restrictions in Bill of Rights do not apply to the States. 
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interpretive questions, and we do not attempt to resolve them here.  Rather, 
for present purposes, we simply describe this category and how it has been 
understood historically. 
 
a. Exclusive Federal Authority by Unavoidable Implication 
 
Some delegations of power to the federal government are regarded 
as necessarily exclusive of state authority even though the Constitution does 
not say they are exclusive or expressly prohibit the States from exercising 
the same power.  For instance, Article IV grants Congress the power “to 
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the 
Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.”191  Nothing in 
the Constitution expressly prohibits the States from regulating the territories 
or property of the United States.  By necessary implication, however, this 
congressional power is generally thought to be exclusive because the 
exercise of concurrent state authority in such cases is thought to be 
incompatible with federal authority.  Similarly, Article II provides that the 
President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the 
Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers 
of the United States.”192  The Constitution does not expressly prohibit the 
States from appointing federal officers and judges, but almost no one would 
suggest that the Constitution leaves the States free to do so. 
The same provision of Article II that grants the President  power to 
appoint judges and other officers of the United States grants the President 
power to “appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,” 
subject to the consent of the Senate.193  Article II also gives the President 
the power to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”194 
Although the Constitution does not expressly prohibit States from 
appointing and receiving ambassadors, there is good reason to believe that 
the Supreme Court would find these federal powers to be exclusive of state 
authority.   
First, the States have little need to send and receive ambassadors.  
Ambassadors represent sovereign states and enable them to conduct 
diplomatic relations and negotiations.  The Constitution expressly disables 
States from making treaties, waging war, and exercising other diplomatic 
prerogatives, such as laying imposts or duties, issuing letters or marque and 
reprisal, forming alliances, or making any agreement or compact 
whatsoever with a foreign nation.  Because all of these diplomatic 
 
191 U.S. CONST. art. IV. 
192 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
193 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
194 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
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prerogatives are allocated exclusively to the United States, the States have 
little need to exchange ambassadors with foreign nations. 
Second, sending and receiving ambassadors is one of the primary 
ways in which nations have historically recognized each other’s separate 
sovereignty and independence under the law of nations.  The Supreme 
Court has long held that the power to recognize foreign nations is an 
exclusive federal power.  Recognition, as the Supreme Court recently 
explained, “is a ‘formal acknowledgment’ that a particular ‘entity possesses 
the qualifications for statehood’ or ‘that a particular regime is the effective 
government of a state,’” and “may also involve the determination of a 
state’s territorial bounds.”195  States have no power to recognize foreign 
nations because, in the Court’s view, such power would be incompatible 
with the Constitution’s allocation of the recognition power to the federal 
government.196   
Regardless of the merits of such examples, they illustrate that the 
Court sometimes finds a specific allocation of power to the federal 
government to be exclusive of the exercise of the same power by the States 
even though the Constitution contains no express prohibition on the States.  
The Court appears to have rested such decisions on the assumption that the 
States’ exercise of the same powers assigned to federal officials would be 
fundamentally inconsistent—or irreconcilable—with their exercise by the 
federal government.   
b. Concurrent Federal and State Authority 
In other instances, the Supreme Court has understood express 
delegations of power to the federal government to allow concurrent exercise 
of the same powers by the States.  In these instances, the Constitution does 
not prevent the federal government and the States from regulating the same 
matters at the same time in the same territory.  For example, under Article I, 
Congress has power “To lay and collect Taxes,” to spend for “the general 
welfare,” and “to borrow Money.”197  The Constitution does not expressly 
or by unavoidable implication prohibit States from exercising these same 
powers within their respective jurisdictions, and indeed the States have 
 
195 Zivitofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 cmt. a, p. 84 (Am. Law Inst. 1986)). 
196 See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) (“The action of New York in this case amounts in 
substance to a rejection of a part of the policy underlying recognition by this nation of the Soviet Union.  Such 
power is not accorded a State in our constitutional system.”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 203, 332 (1937) 
(reasoning that no state power “can be interposed as an obstacle to the effective operation of federal constitutional 
power” to recognize the Soviet Union).  The Supreme Court went a step further in Zivitofsky when it held that the 
President has the sole power under the Constitution to recognize foreign nations, exclusive not only of States but 
also of Congress.  See Zivitofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2094 (holding that “the power to recognize or decline to recognize 
a foreign state and its territorial bounds resides in the President alone”). 
197 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1, 2. 
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continuously exercised these powers since the Constitution was adopted.  
Unlike the recognition power described above, the exercise of taxing and 
spending powers by a State is not incompatible with the exercise of the 
same powers by the federal government.  As Hamilton explained in The 
Federalist No. 32, the power to tax (except imports and exports) “is 
manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority in the United States and in 
the individual States.”198   
Hamilton gave two reasons for this conclusion that accorded with 
the rules supplied by the law of nations for ascertaining when a state had 
surrendered a sovereign right.  First, Hamilton explained that no provision 
of the Constitution expressly divested the States of the general power to tax.  
“There is plainly no expression in the granting clause which makes that 
power EXCLUSIVE in the Union. There is no independent clause or sentence 
which prohibits the States from exercising it.”199  Second, Hamilton 
explained that the Constitution’s express provisions empowering Congress 
to tax and spend do not give rise to an unavoidable implication of 
exclusivity that divests the States of their sovereign power to exercise the 
same powers.  True, he explained, a state tax on a particular power might be 
“inexpedient” for the Union, but that was not enough for the Constitution to 
divest a State of power by implication.  For a legal instrument to divest a 
State of power by implication, there must be a “direct contradiction of 
power” or an “immediate constitutional repugnancy” between an express 
federal power and the exercise of the same power by the States: “It is not, 
however a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but 
an immediate constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and 
extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.”200  
 
198 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 112, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton). 
199 Id. 
200 Id.  In United States v. Nicholls, 4 Yeates 251 (1805), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania invoked The 
Federalist No. 32 to conclude that Congress’s authority to give itself priority as a tax creditor was not exclusive of 
a State’s authority to give itself such priority.  The question Nichols was whether a 1797 Act of Congress 
providing that “debts due to the United States, shall be first satisfied” extended to cases where a State held a prior 
lien.  Id. at 251. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania addressed both whether the Act of Congress should be read 
to extend to cases where a State held a lien and whether Congress had power under the Constitution to take 
priority over a State as creditor.  On the constitutional question, Justice Yeates applied the same method of 
analysis as the Justices had in Chisholm, explaining the Constitution should not be read to divest States of their 
antecedent sovereign rights absent express language to that effect: 
[I]t is a maxim of political law, that sovereign states cannot be deprived of any of their 
rights by implication, nor in any manner whatever, but by their own voluntary consent, or 
by submission to a conqueror.  It would certainly require strong, clear, marked expressions, 
to satisfy a reasonable mind, that the constituted authorities of the union contemplated by 
any public law, the devesting of any pre-existing right or interest in a state; or that the 
representatives of any state would have agreed thereto, even supposing the legitimate 
powers of congress in such particular, to be perfectly ascertained and settled. . . . Hence it 
results that congress have the concurrent right of passing laws to protect the interest of the 
United States arising from the public revenue; but in so doing, they cannot detract from the 
uncontroulable power of individual states to raise their own revenue, nor infringe on, or 
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John Marshall endorsed Hamilton’s understanding in Gibbons v. 
Ogden: 
The power of taxation is indispensable to their existence, and 
is a power which, in its own nature, is capable of residing in, 
and being exercised by, different authorities at the same 
time. We are accustomed to see it placed, for different 
purposes, in different hands. Taxation is the simple operation 
of taking small portions from a perpetually accumulating 
mass, susceptible of almost infinite division, and a power in 
one to take what is necessary for certain purposes is not, in 
its nature, incompatible with a power in another to take what 
is necessary for other purposes. Congress is authorized to lay 
and collect taxes, &c. to pay the debts and provide for the 
common defence and general welfare of the United States. 
This does not interfere with the power of the States to tax for 
the support of their own governments, nor is the exercise of 
that power by the States an exercise of any portion of the 
power that is granted to the United States. In imposing taxes 
for State purposes, they are not doing what Congress is 
empowered to do. Congress is not empowered to tax for 
those purposes which are within the exclusive province of 
the States.201  
 Applying these principles, the Supreme Court has sometimes held 
that certain constitutional allocations of power to the federal government are 
exclusive even though the Constitution does not expressly make them 
exclusive or expressly prohibit States from exercising them (such as the 
power to recognize foreign nations).  On other occasions, however, the 
Court has determined that certain constitutional allocations of power to the 
federal government (such as the power to tax) are not exclusive of state 
authority because concurrent authority is not incompatible with the 
allocation of the power in question to the federal government.  
4. Delegation of Incidental Federal Power 
The fourth category of federal power involves the States’ delegation 
of incidental powers to the federal government.  As discussed, the States 
surrendered important aspects of their sovereignty in the Constitution, 
 
derogate from the sovereignty of any independent state.  Federalist Letters, No. 32, 33.  The 
consequences of a contrary doctrine are too obvious to be insisted upon.  
Id. at 258-59 (Opinion of Yeates, J.).   
201 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824). 
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perhaps most significantly by granting Congress various enumerated 
powers to tax and regulate individuals within the territory of the States.  
Rather than attempting to spell out all of the means by which Congress 
could exercise these powers, the Constitution included the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, which gives Congress catch-all authority to make “all laws 
which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into execution the 
foregoing powers, and all others powers vested by this constitution, in the 
government of the United States, or in any department thereof.”202  In 
McCulloch v. Maryland,203 the Supreme Court interpreted the Clause to 
permit Congress to incorporate a bank as an incidental means of carrying 
into execution its “great powers, to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; 
to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and to raise and 
support armies and navies.”204  In the course of its opinion, the Court 
explained that Congress has broad discretion to select the means by which 
the federal government pursues the ends entrusted to it by the Constitution. 
Critics of the Supreme Court’s modern federalism doctrines 
maintain that the Court has unduly restricted Congress’s choice of means 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause by invalidating federal statutes that 
violate certain aspects of state sovereignty.  For example, in an important 
article, John Manning argues that the text, history, and structure of the 
Constitution suggest that “the Court should defer to Congress’s reasonable 
judgments under the Necessary and Proper Clause.”205  He maintains that in 
recent federalism decisions, the Court has taken it upon itself to judge the 
propriety of Congress’s chosen means by reference to its own conceptions 
of federalism unmoored from the constitutional text.  Manning points to the 
Court’s anti-commandeering decision in Printz v. United States as the 
“archetype of the Court’s new structuralism.”206  He notes that the issue 
involved in the case was not whether “Congress had the power to regulate 
the purchase and sale of firearms,”207 but rather “whether Congress could 
do so by means of commandeering state officials to implement the law.”208  
Manning argues that the Court should have deferred to Congress’s preferred 
choice of means in Printz because “the Constitution says nothing” one way 
or the other about commandeering.209 
 
202 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
203 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
204 Id. at 407. 
205 John F. Manning, Foreword: The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
206 Id. at 34. 
207 Id. 
208 Id.  
209 See id. at 36.  Although Dean Manning has argued in favor of broad deference to Congress’s choice of 
means under the Necessary and Proper Clause, he does acknowledge the possibility that “support for some of the 
Court’s [federalism] holdings [may] remain[] to be found in parts of the historical record it has yet to explore.”  
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As discussed, however, mere constitutional silence gives Congress 
no authority to override the pre-existing sovereign rights of the States.  
Rather, under principles of the law of nations well known to the founders, 
“States” could alienate their sovereign rights only by expressly surrendering 
them in a formal legal instrument.  Proponents of broad federal power might 
respond that the Necessary and Proper Clause should be considered just 
such a surrender.  The difficulty with this claim, however, is that all 
surrenders of sovereign rights had to be clear and express, and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause is notoriously indeterminate. 
Courts and commentators have long debated the meaning of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.  For example, Gary Lawson and Patricia 
Granger have argued that “the word ‘proper’ serves a critical, although 
previously largely unacknowledged, constitutional purpose by requiring 
executory laws to be peculiarly within Congress's domain or jurisdiction—
that is, by requiring that such laws not usurp or expand the constitutional 
powers of any federal institutions or infringe on the retained rights of the 
states or of individuals.”210  Other scholars, however, have rejected such 
restrictions.  For example, Randy Beck has argued that the “propriety” 
limitation of the Clause is best understood as requiring an appropriate 
relationship between congressional ends and means but does not support a 
state sovereignty restriction of the kind imposed in Printz.211     
More recently, several scholars have published a book attempting to 
recover lost usages and meanings of the phrase “necessary and proper.”212  
Robert Natelson suggests that the phrase incorporates fiduciary obligations 
derived from trust law, including reasonableness, impartiality, good faith, 
and due care.213  Gary Lawson and Guy Seidman conclude that the Clause 
reflects standards of “reasonableness” imported from English administrative 
law, including fairness, proportionality, and respect for pre-existing 
rights.214  Finally, Geoffrey Miller observes that the language of the Clause 
has ties to the language of eighteenth-century corporate charters, and 
suggests that the Clause requires a “reasonably close connection” between 
means and ends and seeks to avoid discrimination among stakeholders.215 
 
See id. at 80 & n.454 (citing Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123  
HARV. L. REV. 1817 (2010), and Rappaport, supra note 18.). 
210 Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional 
Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). 
211 See J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
581. 
212 See GARY LAWSON, GEOFFREY P. MILLER, ROBERT G. NATELSON, AND GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE ORIGINS 
OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (Cambridge, 2010). 
213 Id. at 119.  See also Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243 (2004). 
214 Id. at 121-43. 
215 Id. at 160-74.  Sam Bray has argued that the phrase “necessary and proper” “can be read as [an] instance[] 
of an old but now largely forgotten figure of speech” known as hendiadys.  Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and 
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Building on this work, Will Baude has argued that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to exercise “minor” or “incidental” 
powers, but not “great” powers.216  In his view, “some powers are so great, 
so important, or so substantive, that we should not assume that they were 
granted by implication, even if they might help effectuate an enumerated 
power.”217  Baude draws support for this approach from McCulloch itself, 
which distinguished between great and incidental powers: “The power of 
creating a corporation, though appertaining to sovereignty, is not, like the 
power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating commerce, a great 
substantive and independent power, which cannot be implied as incidental 
to other powers, or used as a means of executing them.”218   
Although some of these theories have gained adherents on the 
Supreme Court,219 skeptics like John Manning remain unconvinced.  In his 
view, judicial doctrines that restrict Congress’s choice of means improperly 
transfer power from Congress to the judiciary.  He believes that restrictive 
approaches to the Necessary and Proper Clause necessarily employ 
“discretionary standards that inevitably delegate lawmaking power to 
someone.”220  In his view, the Constitution vests this lawmaking power in 
“Congress rather than the judiciary.”221 
Whatever meaning one ascribes to the Necessary and Proper Clause, 
the fact that there are so many plausible interpretations confirms that the 
Clause does not qualify as a clear and express surrender of any and all 
sovereign rights Congress might seek to override as a means of 
implementing its other powers.  Under background principles of the law of 
nations, the scope of an indefinite provision turned on whether its 
application was considered to be “favorable” or “odious.”  A favorable 
application was one that furthered the common interest of both parties.  
With respect to favorable applications, indefinite terms were to be 
 
Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687, 688 (2016).  Hendiadys 
involve “two terms separated by a conjunction [that] work together as a single complex expression.”  Id.  Bray 
argues that understanding “necessary and proper” as this kind of expression makes sense of the historical debate 
over the meaning of the phrase and suggests that the Clause “invoked a general principle of incidental powers, 
drawing a line for congressional action that is on the leeway side of a strict word.”  Id. at 692. 
216 William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1749 (2013). 
217 Id.  
218 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 411. 
219 See Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 879 (2014) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the 
judgment); United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. 387, 402 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment); 
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 732-33 (1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 924 (1997) (stating that a law 
is not “proper” under the Necessary and Proper Clause if it “violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in 
. . . various constitutional provisions”) (citing Lawson & Granger, supra  note 210, at  297-326, 330-33). 
220 Manning, supra note 205, at 60. 
221 Id.  John Harrison has also acknowledged the indeterminacy of distinguishing between great powers and 
incidental powers.  Although sympathetic to that distinction in principle, he conceded that “filling in the substance 
is famously difficult.”  John Harrison, Enumerated Federal Power and the Necessary and Proper Clause, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1101, 1125 (2011). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471860 
53 
 
interpreted “to give [them] all the extent they are capable of in common 
use.”222  By contrast, an odious application was one that benefitted one 
party at the expense of another.  In particular, the application of a legal 
provision would be considered odious if it purported to change the status 
quo by divesting a state of its pre-existing rights.  If a provision divesting a 
state of sovereign rights was clear, then the instrument would be given its 
natural meaning even though its application was odious.  On the other hand, 
if a provision was vague or ambiguous as to whether it divested a sovereign 
right, then, as Vattel explained, “we should . . . take the term in the most 
confined sense . . ., without going directly contrary to the tenour of the 
writing, and without doing violence to the terms.”223 
These rules of interpretation suggest that the Necessary and Proper 
Clause should not be read to divest the States of rights that they did not 
clearly and expressly surrender.  As discussed, the States compromised their 
exclusive sovereign right to regulate their own citizens within their own 
territory by giving Congress express powers to tax and regulate these 
individuals.  To be sure, these surrenders were “odious” in Vattel’s 
taxonomy.  But because they were clear and express, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause empowered Congress to enact incidental legislation in 
regulating individuals as far as the natural meaning of “necessary and 
proper” allowed.  Although the natural meaning of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is disputed,224 it clearly authorizes Congress to exercise some 
incidental powers to carry into execution its Article I, Section 8 powers over 
individuals.  When Congress uses the Clause to regulate individuals in 
furtherance of its enumerated powers, it is exercising a form of sovereign 
power already clearly surrendered.  On the other hand, when Congress 
attempts to use the Clause to regulate States rather than individuals, it is 
claiming a power to override the States’ distinct sovereign right against 
being commandeered by another sovereign.  Because the States never 
clearly and expressly surrendered this right either in the Necessary and 
Proper Clause or in any other provision of the original Constitution, the 
Clause must be taken in this context “in the most confined sense.”  This rule 
 
222 1 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, supra note 38, bk. II, § 307, at 234 (emphasis omitted). 
223 Id., bk. II, § 308, at 235.   
224  In McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), the Supreme Court held that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause empowers Congress to enact “all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted” to 
carrying into execution its enumerated powers.  Id. at 421.  The Justices still dispute what “plainly adapted” 
means.  The Court has held in recent times that the Clause empowers Congress to enact means that are “rationally 
related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”  United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 
134 (2010).  Justice Thomas has argued, however, that “plainly adapted” means not a law have a mere “rational 
relation” to an enumerated power, but instead that it have an “obvious, simple, and direct relation” to an 
enumerated power.  Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 613 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Justice Alito has 
suggested that for a law to be “necessary and proper,” it must have “a substantial link to Congress’ enumerated 
powers.”  Comstock, 560 U.S. at 158 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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of interpretation was designed to prevent the inadvertent surrender of 
sovereign rights. 
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly invoke these 
background principles of interpretation in McCulloch v. Maryland, they are 
reflected in its analysis of the Necessary and Proper Clause.  In McCulloch, 
the Court upheld Congress’s regulation of individuals to charter a bank, 
rejecting restrictive interpretations of the Clause based on its use of the term 
“necessary”: 
If reference be had to its use in the common affairs of the 
world or in approved authors, we find that it frequently 
imports no more than that one thing is convenient, or useful, 
or essential to another.  To employ the means necessary to an 
end is generally understood as employing any means 
calculated to produce the end, and not as being confined to 
those single means without which the end would be entirely 
unattainable.225 
The Court observed in its analysis that the people of the States, in adopting 
the Constitution, authorized the federal government to exercise its powers 
directly upon them: 
But when, ‘in order to form a more perfect union,’ it was 
deemed necessary to change this alliance into an effective 
government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and 
acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to 
the people, and of deriving its powers directly from them, 
was felt and acknowledged by all. The government of the 
Union, then (whatever may be the influence of this fact on 
the case), is, emphatically and truly, a government of the 
people. In form, and in substance, it emanates from them. Its 
powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly 
on them, and for their benefit.226 
Accordingly, to the extent that the States surrendered their exclusive right to 
govern their own citizens by adopting the Constitution, the Court’s decision 
to construe the Necessary and Proper Clause according to the ordinary and 
natural meaning of the word “necessary” was fully consistent with the rules 
governing surrender of sovereign rights prescribed by the law of nations. 
Significantly, the McCulloch Court made clear in the course of its 
decision that Congress could not achieve its ends by using the Necessary 
 
225 Id. at 413-14. 
226 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404-05.  
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and Proper Clause to command the States to create or tailor the operations 
of state-chartered banks.  Opponents of the Bank of the United States 
argued that it was not necessary for Congress to create the Bank because 
Congress could rely on state banks to support the operations of the federal 
government.  Significantly, Chief Justice Marshall rejected this argument on 
the ground that Congress had no constitutional power to control the 
legislative powers of the States:  “To impose on [the federal government] 
the necessity of resorting to means which it cannot control, which another 
Government may furnish or withhold, would render its course precarious, 
the result of its measures uncertain, and create a dependence on other 
Governments which might disappoint its most important designs, and is 
incompatible with the language of the Constitution.”227  In other words, 
foreshadowing Justice O’Connor’s analysis in New York v. United States, 
Marshall reasoned that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the 
power to charter a bank; it does not give Congress the power to require the 
States to charter a bank.228   
 
227 Id. at 424. 
228 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“The allocation of power contained in the 
Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate interstate commerce directly; it does not 
authorize Congress to regulate state governments’ regulation of interstate commerce.”).    This method of analysis 
is consistent with other opinions of the Marshall Court.  In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), 
Marshall, after first observing that under the Articles of Confederation “were sovereign, were completely 
independent, and were connected with each other only by a league,” contended that under the Constitution “the 
whole character in which the States appear underwent a change.”  Id. at 187.  But his analysis did not convey that 
the word “State” meant something different under the Constitution than it had meant under the Articles.  Under 
rules derived from the law of nations, a State could only change its character, i.e. surrender sovereign rights, in 
clear and express terms.  Accordingly, Marshall wrote that “the extent” of any change in the character of the 
States “must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected.”  Id.  The 
rules that he proceeded to apply to determine the scope of federal power aligned with Vattel’s rules of 
interpretation.  Marshall wrote in Gibbons that the Constitution “contains an enumeration of powers expressly 
granted by the people to their government.”  Id. (emphasis added).  He explained that when the Constitution 
expressly confers a power, the Court should not strictly construe it, but instead should understand the framers and 
the people “to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said.” Id. at 188.   
Justice Story applied the same rules of interpretation in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 
(1816): 
The government, then, of the United States can claim no powers which are not 
granted to it by the Constitution, and the powers actually granted, must be such as are 
expressly given, or given by necessary implication. On the other hand, this instrument, like 
every other grant, is to have a reasonable construction, according to the import of its terms, 
and where a power is expressly given in general terms, it is not to be restrained to particular 
cases unless that construction grow out of the context expressly or by necessary 
implication. The words are to be taken in their natural and obvious sense, and not in a sense 
unreasonably restricted or enlarged. 
Id. at 326.  Both Marshall and Story explained that express grants of power to the federal government should be 
interpreted in light of their ordinary or natural meaning.  But neither read the Constitution to divest the States of 
sovereign rights absent an express surrender of the right in question.  For example, as explained, in interpreting 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, Marshall took as given that Congress could not force States to create state 
banks.  See supra notes 227-228, and accompanying text.  Similarly, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 
(1842), Story found that the federal government lacked power to force state magistrates to enforce a federal law.  
Id. at 621-22.  If, as Marshall believed, the Articles of Confederation used the term “State” to refer to a free and 
independent sovereign, then the Constitution could divest them of their sovereign rights, and thus change their 
character, only by virtue of express terms or unavoidable implication. 
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Nearly two centuries later, in Printz v. United States, the Supreme 
Court explicitly rejected Congress’s use of the Necessary and Proper Clause 
to commandeer the States.  In striking down Congress’s attempt to 
commandeer state executive officers to enforce federal law, the Court 
dismissed the argument that Congress could rely on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to support such action.  According to the Court: 
When a “La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution” the 
Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty 
reflected in the various constitutional provisions we 
mentioned earlier, it is not a “La[w] . . . proper for carrying 
into Execution the Commerce Clause,” and is thus, in the 
words of The Federalist, “merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation” 
which “deserve[s] to be treated as such.”229 
Dean Manning has criticized the Court’s reasoning in Printz on the 
ground that it “authorized the Court to derive and enforce a zone of 
inviolable state sovereignty from its own reading of the constitutional 
structure as a whole.”230  As discussed in Part IV, however, the Court’s anti-
commandeering doctrine (including its restrictive interpretation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause) should not be dismissed as mere judicial 
activism.  Rather, properly understood, the doctrine results from the 
Constitution’s use of the term “States” read in light of background 
principles of the law of nations.  Manning’s reading of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause would give Congress virtually unlimited power to override 
the sovereign rights of the States—not only by commandeering state 
officers, but also (to take a real example) by dictating the locations of the 
States’ capitals.231  This conclusion would be flatly inconsistent with the 
historical meaning of the term “States” and the rules of interpretation 
governing their surrender of sovereign rights.  In short, because the “States” 
did not expressly surrender these rights in the Constitution, they necessarily 
retained them under well recognized principles of the law of nations. 
Reading the Necessary and Proper Clause in light of background 
principles of the law of nations suggests that the Marshall Court correctly 
applied the Clause to uphold broad congressional discretion to regulate 
individuals as a means of implementing Congress’s enumerated powers.  At 
the same time, read in light of the law of nations, the Clause cannot be taken 
as an independent surrender of the States’ residual sovereignty not to be 
commandeered by the federal government.  As the next Part explains, in at 
 
229 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997). 
230 Manning, supra note 205, at 39. 
231 See Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911) (invalidating Congress’s attempt to limit Oklahoma’s ability to 
move its state capital as a condition of admission to the Union). 
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least three contexts, the Supreme Court has rejected congressional efforts to 
override the sovereign rights of the States in the absence of express 
constitutional provisions surrendering such rights.  Understanding the 
Constitution—and American federalism—in light of the law of nations 
places all three doctrines on a firmer foundation.  
IV.  IMPLICATIONS 
In resolving important federalism questions, the Supreme Court has 
relied less on the constitutional text and more on historical understandings 
of the structure of government created by the Constitution.  Textualists have 
criticized the Court’s decisions restraining federal power and upholding 
state sovereignty on the ground that the Constitution contains no specific 
text justifying these decisions. 
There are at least two problems with this critique.  First, as we argue 
in this Article, it overlooks the term “States” in the Constitution.  At the 
founding, “State” was a term of art drawn from the law of nations and 
referred to a sovereign nation entitled to a well-recognized set of rights 
under such law.  To be sure, “States” could surrender or compromise their 
sovereign rights, but only by doing so expressly in a binding legal 
document.  Second, the textualist critique has things backwards by insisting 
that courts should only uphold the sovereign rights of the States if they can 
point to a specific constitutional provision protecting those rights.  At the 
founding, a “State” was entitled to all of the rights recognized by the law of 
nations minus those it expressly surrendered.  Thus, the relevant question is 
not whether the constitutional text expressly confers sovereign rights on the 
States, but whether the constitutional text expressly takes them away.  
This Part discusses three important Supreme Court doctrines that 
comport with this understanding of state sovereignty at the founding—state 
sovereign immunity, the anti-commandeering doctrine, and the equal 
sovereignty of the States.  Each of these doctrines upholds a traditional 
sovereign right of the States against federal interference unauthorized by the 
express terms of the Constitution.232   
First, the Supreme Court has long held that the States enjoy 
sovereign immunity under the Constitution from suits brought by 
individuals without a State’s consent.  Critics charge that this immunity 
lacks an adequate basis in the text of the original Constitution, and that the 
Eleventh Amendment provides only limited support for the Court’s 
 
232 Reading the Constitution against the backdrop of the law of nations undoubtedly has implications for 
other provisions of the Constitution as well.  See, e.g., Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. 
REV. 602 (2018) (arguing that the language of the Guarantee Clause should be viewed through the lens of 
eighteenth century international law). 
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recognition of state sovereign immunity.  As discussed, this critique has 
things backwards.  The question is not whether the text of the Constitution 
affirmatively grants the States sovereign immunity; rather the question is 
whether the text expressly withdraws the sovereign immunity traditionally 
enjoyed by sovereign “States” under the law of nations.  Taking into 
account the Eleventh Amendment’s authoritative gloss on Article III, the 
original Constitution contains no express provisions purporting to override 
the States’ sovereign immunity.  Thus, the Court’s broad doctrine of state 
sovereign immunity is not only consistent with, but affirmatively required 
by, the constitutional text.   
Second, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress may not 
commandeer the States by requiring state legislatures to adopt state law or 
state executive officials to enforce federal law.  Again, critics charge that 
this doctrine lacks an adequate basis in the Constitution because the 
constitutional text contains no provisions affirmatively granting the States a 
right to be free from commandeering by the federal government.  And 
again, the critics are posing the wrong question.  The question is not 
whether the text of the Constitution expressly gives the States a right not to 
be commandeered; rather, the question is whether the Constitution 
expressly divested the “States” of their pre-existing right to conduct their 
governmental operations free from the control of another sovereign.  
Because the Constitution contains no provision of this kind, the Court’s 
anti-commandeering decisions are fully consistent with textualism.   
Third, at the founding, independent “States” were entitled to 
absolute equality under the law of nations.  This background context 
suggests that the Court has correctly recognized the equal sovereignty of the 
States under the original Constitution.  Because the original Constitution 
contains no provisions expressly surrendering equal sovereignty, the States 
necessarily retained it.  To be sure, the Civil War Amendments altered the 
constitutional equality of the States, but only to the extent expressly set 
forth in the Amendments.  
A. State Sovereign Immunity 
Although the Supreme Court initially rejected state sovereign 
immunity in the early case of Chisholm v. Georgia,233 the Court broadly 
embraced the doctrine following the States’ ratification of the Eleventh 
Amendment.234  The precise terms of the Amendment support some—but 
 
233 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
234 See Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1817 
(2010). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471860 
59 
 
not all—of the Court’s decisions.235  For this reason, the Court has struggled 
to provide a textual basis for its broader doctrine of state sovereign 
immunity,236 relying instead on the expectations of the founders,237 the 
“dignity” of the States,238 and the “fundamental postulates implicit in the 
constitutional design.”239  The Court’s failure to articulate a persuasive 
rationale grounded in the text of either the original Constitution or the 
Eleventh Amendment has left its broad doctrine of state sovereign 
immunity open to charges of illegitimacy.240 
Understanding state sovereign immunity as part of the original 
public meaning of the term “States” in the Constitution resolves the 
apparent conflict between textualism and federalism in this context.  As 
discussed in Part I, a “State” possessed a broad range of sovereign rights—
including sovereign immunity—under the law of nations.  A state could 
surrender its rights, but only if it did so clearly and expressly in a binding 
legal instrument.  Accordingly, the “States” mentioned in the Constitution 
possessed sovereign immunity from suit except to the extent they expressly 
surrendered it in the document.  As the ratification debates show, the 
Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III were the only provisions in 
the original Constitution that even arguably constituted an express surrender 
of the States’ sovereign immunity from suit by individuals.  The founders—
and the early Supreme Court—debated sovereign immunity in precisely 
these terms.   
In considering the proposed Constitution, Anti-Federalists feared 
that U.S. courts would read the Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article 
III as an express surrender of state sovereign immunity in the controversies 
they described.  Federalists responded that these provisions were ambiguous 
at best, and thus could not be construed as an express surrender of the 
States’ immunity from suit.  Notwithstanding these assurances, the Supreme 
 
235 Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from hearing suits against States “by 
Citizens of another State,” U.S. CONST. amend. XI, the Supreme Court has long held that the States enjoy 
immunity from suits brought by their own citizens.  See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  The Court has also 
held that States enjoy sovereign immunity in their own courts, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), even 
though the Eleventh Amendment is written as a restriction on “[t]he Judicial power of the United States.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XI. 
236 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69 (1996) (stating that “we long have recognized that 
blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amendment is ‘to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction 
never imagined or dreamed of’”) (quoting Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 326 (1934)). 
237 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (““Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment 
was adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State to sue their own state in the federal courts, 
whilst the idea of suits by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly repelled?”). 
238 See Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) 
(“The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with their 
status as sovereign entities.”). 
239 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999). 
240 See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 
98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a Theory, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011 (2000); Young, supra note 28, at 1664–75. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471860 
60 
 
Court ruled in Chisholm v. Georgia that the plain language of the Citizen-
State diversity provisions authorized suits against States.  In response, 
Congress and the States quickly and overwhelmingly adopted the Eleventh 
Amendment to counteract the Supreme Court’s ruling and reinstate their 
preferred construction of Article III.  By foreclosing further reliance on the 
only provisions of the Constitution that even arguably divested the States’ 
of sovereign immunity from suit by individuals, the Eleventh Amendment 
removed any argument that the States had surrendered their pre-existing 
sovereign immunity in the Constitution.  As explained below, this account 
best explains both the initial controversy surrounding Article III and why 
the Eleventh Amendment constituted a complete revocation of any 
surrender of state sovereign immunity in the original Constitution. 
1. Immunity Under the Proposed Constitution 
The Constitutional Convention did not discuss whether the 
Constitution included a surrender of the States’ sovereign immunity from 
suit by individuals, but the issue quickly arose as a potential roadblock to 
ratification.  Anti-Federalists objected that the Citizen-State diversity 
provisions of Article III could be construed to authorize suits against States.  
These provisions extended federal judicial power to controversies “between 
a State and Citizens of another State” and “between a State . . . and foreign . 
. . Citizens or Subjects.”241  Anti-Federalists feared that courts would 
construe the word “between” to refer to suits by and against a State, and 
thus treat those provisions as an express surrender of state sovereign 
immunity.242   
As discussed in Part I, the law of nations supplied background rules 
to govern the interpretation of instruments purporting to surrender or divest 
sovereign rights.  Under these rules, a clear and express surrender was to be 
interpreted according to its ordinary and natural meaning.  On the other 
hand, courts would interpret vague or ambiguous provisions to avoid an 
“odious” reading, including one that would divest a state of its sovereign 
rights under the law of nations.  This background provides crucial context 
for understanding the ratification debates over the effect of Article III on 
state sovereign immunity.  Anti-Federalists thought that courts would treat 
the Citizen-State diversity provisions as a clear and express surrender of 
state sovereign immunity, whereas Federalists insisted that these provisions 
were at best ambiguous and therefore would have no such effect. 
 
241 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
242 See, e.g., Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican III (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 14 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 30, 41-42 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. 
Saladino eds., 1883) [hereinafter 14 DHRC]. 
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For example, Brutus objected that “it is humiliating and degrading to 
a government” to subject “a state to answer in a court of law, to the suit of 
an individual.”243  Similarly, George Mason objected that the Citizen-State 
diversity provisions were inconsistent with State sovereignty:  
Is this State to be brought to the bar of justice like a 
delinquent individual? — Is the sovereignty of the State to 
be arraigned like a culprit, or private offender? — Will the 
States undergo this mortification? — I think this power 
perfectly unnecessary.244 
Leading supporters of the Constitution, including Madison, 
Hamilton, and Marshall, responded by assuring critics that the Citizen-State 
diversity provisions would not be construed to authorize suits against States 
because these provisions did not constitute a sufficiently clear and express 
surrender of the States’ preexisting immunity.  In his response, Madison 
first acknowledged that “this part” of the Constitution “might be better 
expressed.”245  He maintained, however, that “a fair and liberal 
interpretation upon the words” would not authorize the federal government 
“to commit the oppressions [Mason] dreads.”246  Instead, Madison insisted 
that “[i]t is not in the power of individuals to call any State into Court.”247  
Accordingly, he stressed that “[t]he only operation [the provisions] can 
have, is, that if a State should wish to bring suit against a citizen [of another 
State or of a foreign State], it must be brought before the Federal Court.”248   
Patrick Henry dismissed Madison’s construction of Article III as 
“perfectly incomprehensible,” and argued that ‘[i]f Gentlemen pervert the 
most clear expressions, and the usual meaning of the language of the 
 
243 Brutus, Letter XIII, N.Y. J., Feb. 21, 1788, reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 795, 796 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 2004) [hereinafter 
20 DHRC]. 
244 George Mason, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1403, 1406 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1993) 
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter 10 DHRC]. 
245 James Madison, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 19, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at 
1409, 1409. 
246 Id. 
247 James Madison, Address to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at 
1412, 1414. 
248 Id.  Similarly, John Marshall also argued that the Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III should 
be construed narrowly to avoid authorizing federal courts to hear suits against States.  In his view, “[i]t is not 
rational to suppose, that the sovereign power shall be dragged before a Court.”  John Marshall, Address to the 
Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at 1430, 1433.  He contended that “this 
construction is warranted by the words,” but also stressed that this partiality in favor of the States “cannot be 
avoided” because “I see a difficulty in making a State a defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff.”  Id.  
Anti-Federalists remained unconvinced by these assurances.  Patrick Henry remarked that Madison’s construction 
was “perfectly incomprehensible,” and objected that “[i]f Gentlemen pervert the most clear expressions, and the 
usual meaning of the language of the people, there is an end of all argument.”  Patrick Henry, Address to the 
Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at 1419, 1422. 
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people, there is an end of all argument.”249  In response, John Marshall 
insisted that the Citizen-State diversity provisions would not authorize “the 
sovereign power” to “be dragged before a Court.”  Rather, in his view, 
“[t]he intent is, to enable States to recover claims of individuals residing in 
other States.”250 
Alexander Hamilton explicitly invoked principles drawn from the 
law of nations to allay the Anti-Federalists’ fears.  In The Federalist No. 81, 
he sought to refute “a supposition which has excited some alarm upon very 
mistaken grounds.”251  Rejecting the Anti-Federalists’ claim that the 
Citizen-State diversity provisions would permit suits against States, he 
explained: 
It has been suggested that an assignment of the public 
securities of one State to the citizens of another, would 
enable them to prosecute that State in the federal courts for 
the amount of those securities; a suggestion which the 
following considerations prove to be without foundation. 
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be 
amenable to the suit of an individual WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.  
This is the general sense, and the general practice of 
mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of 
sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every 
State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of 
this immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain 
with the States, and the danger intimated must be merely 
ideal.  The circumstances which are necessary to produce an 
alienation of State sovereignty were discussed in considering 
the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here.  A 
recurrence to the principles there established will satisfy us, 
that there is no color to pretend that the State governments 
would, by the adoption of that plan, be divested of the 
privilege of paying their own debts in their own way, free 
from every constraint but that which flows from the 
obligations of good faith.  The contracts between a nation 
and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the 
sovereign, and have no pretensions to a compulsive force.  
They confer no right of action, independent of the sovereign 
 
249 Patrick Henry, Address to the Virginia Convention, (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at 
1419, 1422. 
250 John Marshall, Address to the Virginia Convention, (June 20, 1788), in 10 DHRC, supra note 244, at 
1430, 1433. 
251 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 112, at 548 (Alexander Hamilton) (emphasis added). 
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will.  To what purpose would it be to authorize suits against 
States for the debts they owe?  How could recoveries be 
enforced?  It is evident, it could not be done without waging 
war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to the 
federal courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a 
pre-existing right of the State governments, a power which 
would involve such a consequence, would be altogether 
forced and unwarrantable.252 
Hamilton’s discussion reflects several important principles drawn 
from the law of nations about the nature of state sovereignty and the steps 
necessary for a State to alienate its sovereignty.  Hamilton observed that 
“the government of every State in the Union” now enjoys “the attributes of 
sovereignty,” including the right “not to be amenable to the suit of an 
individual without its consent.”253  Hamilton explained that “[t]his is the 
general sense, and the general practice of mankind”—a clear reference to 
the law of nations.254  Given the States’ preexisting sovereignty, he asserted 
that immunity from suit by individuals “will remain with the States” unless 
“there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention.”255  
This approach precisely tracks Vattel’s discussion of state sovereignty and 
the means by which a state may surrender sovereign rights under the law of 
nations.256 
To support his conclusion that the States would not surrender their 
right to sovereign immunity by adopting the Constitution, Hamilton 
directed the reader to his earlier explanation of the “circumstances which 
are necessary to produce an alienation of State sovereignty.”  In the relevant 
portion of The Federalist No. 32, Hamilton explained that “the State 
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they 
before had” minus only those rights expressly delegated to the United States 
in the Constitution: 
An intire consolidation of the States into one 
complete national sovereignty would imply an entire 
subordination of the parts; and whatever powers might 
remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the 
general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at a 
 
252 Id. at 548-49. 
253 Id. at 548. 
254 Id. at 549. 
255 Id.  
256 Hamilton’s discussion also undoubtedly reflected his experience at the Constitutional Convention, where 
he strongly opposed any proposals to authorize Congress to regulate States and enforce such regulations by force.  
See infra notes 358-361, and accompanying text.  This explains his observation at the end of his discussion:  “To 
what purpose would it be to authorize suits against States for the debts they owe?  How could recoveries be 
enforced?  It is evident, it could not be done without waging war against the contracting State . . . .” 
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partial union or consolidation, the State governments would 
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before 
had, and which were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated 
to the United States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this 
alienation, of State sovereignty, would only exist in three 
cases: where the Constitution in express terms granted an 
exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in one 
instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited 
the States from exercising the like authority; and where it 
granted an authority to the Union, to which a similar 
authority in the States would be absolutely and totally 
CONTRADICTORY and REPUGNANT.257 
Applying these principles in The Federalist No. 81 to determine the 
effect of the Constitution on state sovereign immunity, Hamilton concluded 
that “there is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by the 
adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts 
in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows from the 
obligations of good faith.”258  In his view, reading Article III to destroy “a 
pre-existing right” of the States “by mere implication . . . would be 
altogether forced and unwarrantable.”259 
Hamilton’s analysis relied on a central principle of the law of 
nations.  At the time, a sovereign state could abrogate its sovereign rights 
only through an express surrender.  Like Madison and Marshall, Hamilton 
did not regard the Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III (or any 
other part of the proposed Constitution) as an adequate surrender of the 
State’s pre-existing right to sovereign immunity.  Thus, all three leading 
Federalists argued that the States retained all sovereignty they did not 
expressly surrender in the proposed Constitution, and that the proposed 
Constitution did not contain a clear surrender of the States’ immunity from 
suits brought by individuals. 
Significantly, the Anti-Federalists did not disagree with Hamilton’s 
framework for evaluating extent to which the States surrendered their 
sovereignty under the Constitution.  Like Hamilton, they started from the 
assumption that the States retained all sovereignty not clearly and expressly 
surrendered in the Constitution.  Unlike Hamilton, however, they 
considered the Citizen-State diversity provisions (especially their use of the 
term “between”) to be a clear and express surrender of state sovereign 
immunity with respect to suits brought by the citizens specified by these 
 
257 THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, supra note 112, at 199-200 (Alexander Hamilton). 
258 THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, supra note 112, at 549 (Alexander Hamilton). 
259 Id.  
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provisions.  The important point for present purposes is not whether one 
side or the other had the better argument on the merits, but rather that all 
sides in the debate assumed that the States could only surrender their pre-
existing sovereign rights by clearly and expressly surrendering them in the 
Constitution.  Based in part on the Federalists’ assurances that Article III 
would be construed narrowly, the States ultimately ratified the Constitution 
despite the Anti-Federalists’ concerns.  
2. Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment 
Notwithstanding the Federalists’ assurances during ratification, a 
majority of the Supreme Court ruled in Chisholm v. Georgia260 that the 
States had in fact surrendered part of their sovereign immunity by adopting 
the Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III.  Chisholm considered 
whether a citizen of South Carolina could sue Georgia in federal court to 
recover a debt.  The Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III extend 
the federal judicial power “to Controversies . . . between a State and 
Citizens of another State.”261  The question before the Court was whether 
this provision constituted an express surrender of the States’ sovereign 
immunity from suit.  Although each Justice issued a separate opinion, in 
keeping with the Court’s practice at the time, all five Justices analyzed the 
question in accordance with the rules of interpretation set forth in Vattel’s 
treatise.  Four Justices concluded that the text of the Citizen-State diversity 
provisions qualified as an express surrender.  Justice Iredell, the lone 
dissenter, applied the same interpretive principles, but concluded that these 
provisions did not constitute an adequate surrender of state sovereign 
immunity. 
Justice Blair characterized the constitutional question as whether the 
States surrendered their right of sovereign immunity when they adopted the 
Constitution.  “[I]f sovereignty be an exemption from suit in any other than 
the sovereign’s own Courts,” Justice Blair wrote, “it follows that when a 
State, by adopting the Constitution, has agreed to be amenable to the 
judicial power of the United States, she has, in that respect, given up her 
right of sovereignty.”262  Justice Blair stressed that the States gave up this 
right expressly in Article III: 
What then do we find there requiring the submission of 
individual states to the judicial authority of the United 
States?  This is expressly extended, among other things, to 
 
260 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
261 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
262 Id. at 452 (Opinion of Blair, J.) 
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controversies between a State and citizens of another State.  
Is then the case before us one of that description?  
Undoubtedly it is.263 
Justice Blair saw no basis to distinguish between cases in which a state 
was the plaintiff as opposed to the defendant.  “Both cases,” he 
concluded, “were intended.”264  Accordingly, he determined that the Court 
could hear a suit by a citizen of South Carolina against Georgia because 
“clear and positive directions . . .  of the Constitution” authorized it to do 
so.265   
Even Justice Wilson, who wrote the most nationalist opinion, 
applied the same rules of interpretation.  Justice Wilson did not believe that 
the law of nations was directly applicable because the States and the federal 
government comprised one nation, formed by sovereign act of the people.266  
Thus, in his view, the question was: “could the people of those [American] 
States, among whom were those of Georgia, bind those States, and Georgia 
among the others, by the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial power so 
vested?”267  This question, he thought, “must unavoidably receive an 
affirmative answer.”268  He thus proceeded to consider whether the people 
divested the States of sovereign immunity by adopting the Constitution.269  
Undertaking essentially the same inquiry as Blair, Wilson wrote that 
“[t]hese questions may be resolved, either by fair and conclusive 
deductions, or by direct and explicit declarations.”270  Like Blair, Wilson 
concluded that the express words of the Constitution divested the States of 
their right to sovereign immunity in this case: 
But, in my opinion, this [conclusion] rests not upon the 
legitimate result of fair and conclusive deduction from the 
Constitution: it is confirmed, beyond all doubt, but the direct 
and explicit declaration of the Constitution itself. . . . ‘The 
judicial power of the United States shall extend to 
controversies, between a State and citizens of another State.’  
Could the strictest legal language; could even that language, 
which is peculiarly appropriated to an art, deemed, by a great 
 
263 Id. at 450 (emphasis added). 
264 Id.  
265 Id. at 451 (emphasis added). 
266 Id. at 453 (Opinion of Wilson, J.) (“From the law of nations little or no illustration of this subject can be 
expected.  By that law the several States and Governments spread over the globe, are considered as forming a 
society, not a NATION.”). 
267 Id. at 463. 
268 Id. 
269 Id. at 464 (“The next question . . . is, Has the Constitution done so?  Did those people mean to exercise 
this their undoubted power?”). 
270 Id. (emphasis added). 
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master, to be one of the most honorable, laudable, and 
profitable things in our law; could this strict and appropriated 
language, describe, with more precise accuracy, the cause 
now depending before the tribunal?271 
Justice Cushing likewise concluded that the Constitution expressly 
divested the States of sovereign immunity.  Justice Cushing explained that 
“[w]hatever power is deposited with the Union by the people for their own 
necessary security, is so far a curtailing of the power and prerogatives of 
States.”272  He found that the people had given the federal courts power to 
hear cases against States, notwithstanding the States’ pre-existing sovereign 
immunity, because “[t]he judicial power . . . is expressly extended to 
‘controversies between a State and citizens of another State.’”273  He 
concluded that “[t]he case, then, seems clearly to fall within the letter of the 
Constitution.”274 
Finally, after observing that the Constitution transferred “many 
prerogatives . . . to the national government,”275 Chief Justice Jay proceeded 
“to enquire whether Georgia has not, by being a party to the national 
compact, consented to be suable by individual citizens of another State.”276  
For Jay, “[t]his enquiry naturally leads our attention, 1st. To the design of 
the Constitution. 2nd. To the letter and express declaration in it.”277  Jay 
explained that “the Constitution (to which Georgia is a party) 
authorises . . . an action against her” by a citizen of another State278 
because Article III extends the judicial power to “controversies between a 
State and citizens of another State.”279  Jay applied the “ordinary rules for 
construction” and rejected the suggestion “that this [provision] ought to 
be construed to reach none of these controversies, excepting those in 
which a State may be Plaintiff.”280  In Jay’s view, “[i]f we attend to the 
words, we find them to be express, positive, and free from ambiguity.”281 
Only Justice Iredell dissented in Chisholm.  Although he was 
prepared to decide the case on the ground that the Judiciary Act of 1789 had 
not authorized the Supreme Court to hear it, he proceeded—like his 
colleagues—to address whether “upon a fair construction of the 
 
271 Id. (emphasis added). 
272 Id. at 468 (Opinion of Cushing, J.). 
273 Id. at 467. 
274 Id. (emphasis added). 
275 Id. at 470 (Opinion of Jay, J.). 
276 Id. at 474. 
277 Id. (emphasis added). 
278 Id. at 470 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
279 Id.  
280 Id. at 476. 
281 Id. at 476 (emphasis added). 
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Constitution of the United States, the power contended for really exists.”282  
Justice Iredell explained that the States possessed all sovereign powers not 
delegated to the United States: 
Every State in the Union in every instance where its 
sovereignty has not been delegated to the United States, I 
consider to be as completely sovereign, as the United States 
are in respect to the powers surrendered.  The United States 
are sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually 
surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all 
the powers reserved.  It must necessarily be so, because the 
United States have no claim to any authority but such as the 
States have surrendered to them: Of course the part not 
surrendered must remain as it did before.283 
Although Justice Iredell did not believe that the law of nations 
applied directly to the case,284 he described the law of nations as “furnishing 
rules of interpretation” applicable to the question presented.285  Applying 
those rules, he explained that his “present opinion is strong against any 
construction of [the Constitution], which will admit, under any 
circumstances, a compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of 
money.”286  Echoing Hamilton’s and Madison’s arguments during the 
ratification debates, Justice Iredell thought that “every word in the 
Constitution may have its full effect without involving this consequence, 
and that nothing but express words, or an insurmountable implication 
(neither of which I consider, can be found in this case) would authorise the 
deduction of so high a power.”287 
Significantly, although the Justices disagreed over whether Article 
III clearly authorized suits against States by citizens of other States, they all 
approached the constitutional question the same way—namely, by asking 
whether the States had expressly surrendered their sovereign immunity from 
such suits in the Constitution.  This approach was drawn directly from the 
law of nations.  All five Justices started with the assumption that the States 
retained all of their pre-existing sovereign rights—including sovereign 
immunity—unless they clearly surrendered them in the constitutional text.  
Their disagreement was over whether the Citizen-State diversity provisions 
constituted an adequate surrender.  The Chisholm majority ascribed the 
 
282 Id. at 449 (Opinion of Iredell, J.). 
283 Id. at 435. 
284 Id. at 449 (explaining that “unquestionably the people of the United States had a right to form what kind 
of union, and upon what terms they pleased, without reference to any former examples”). 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 450. 
287 Id. (emphasis added). 
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ordinary meaning to the term “between” in the Citizen-State diversity 
provisions (rather than reading it to mean “by” but not “against”).  On this 
understanding, the majority concluded that the States had clearly and 
expressly surrendered their sovereign immunity in these provisions.  Justice 
Iredell disagreed and endorsed the narrow construction of the text favored 
by Madison, Marshall, and Hamilton during the ratification debates.  
Although Justice Iredell’s construction coincided with the assurances given 
during the ratification debates, it was at least in tension with the ordinary 
meaning of the term “between.” 
Regardless of the merits of the Chisholm decision, efforts began 
immediately to override it.  Within days, Representative Theodore 
Sedgwick and Senator Caleb Strong (both of Massachusetts) introduced 
constitutional amendments in the House and the Senate to restore the States’ 
sovereign immunity.  Massachusetts was keenly interested in the issue 
because it faced a pending suit by a British subject for confiscating his 
property in violation of the Treaty of Peace.288  During Congress’s 
scheduled recess, Massachusetts took the lead in urging other States to 
demand that Congress amend the Constitution to overturn Chisholm.  On 
September 27, 1793, the Massachusetts General Court resolved broadly 
that the “power claimed . . . of compelling a State to be made defendant 
. . . at the suit of an individual . . . is . . . unnecessary and inexpedient, and 
in its exercise dangerous to the peace, safety and independence of the 
several States.”289  The General Court further resolved: 
That the Senators from this State in the Congress of the 
United States be, and they hereby are instructed, and the 
Representatives requested to adopt the most speedy and 
effectual measures in their power, to obtain such 
amendments in the Constitution of the United States as will 
remove any clause or article of the said Constitution which 
can be construed to imply or justify a decision that a State 
is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or 
individuals in any Court of the United States.290 
 
288 See Vassall v. Massachusetts, discussed in 5 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 352-61 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994). 
289 RESOLUTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL COURT (Sept. 27, 1793), reprinted in 5 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 440 (Maeva 
Marcus ed., 1994) [hereinafter 5 DHSC]. 
290 RESOLUTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL COURT (Sept. 27, 1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, 
supra note 289, at 440. 
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The General Court directed the Governor to send this resolution to all 
other States.291  As a consequence, four States quickly adopted very 
similar resolutions,292 and three additional States were in the process of 
doing so when Congress approved the Eleventh Amendment on March 4, 
1794.293  Although these state resolutions differed slightly, all urged the 
adoption of an amendment to remove or explain any provision of the 
Constitution that could be construed to authorize any suit by an individual 
against a State in federal court.294 
At the start of the next session of Congress, Senator Strong 
introduced a slightly revised version of his original proposal to accomplish 
the States’ request.295  This version added language to make clear that it was 
an “explanatory” amendment designed to correct the Supreme Court’s 
erroneous construction of the Constitution retroactively.296  As written (and 
ultimately adopted), the amendment provided: “The Judicial power of the 
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of 
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”297  This 
Amendment reinstated the Federalists’ preferred construction of the 
Constitution by forbidding courts from construing Article III to authorize 
 
291 See Letter from Samuel Adams to the Governors of the States (Oct. 9, 1793), in 5 DHSC, supra note 
289, at 442, 442.  On Oct. 8, 1793, Governor Hancock died and Samuel Adams assumed his duties.  Id. at 443–
44. 
292 See 5 PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, 1792–1797 reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra 
note 289, at 609; JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA: OCT. 
1793, at 99 (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 338–39; Resolution of North Carolina General 
Assembly (Jan. 11, 1794), in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 615, 615; JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
HON. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE, OF THE STATE OF NEW-HAMPSHIRE: DEC. 1793, at 111 (1794), 
reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 618, 618. 
293 See JOURNAL OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SENATE (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 
610–11; VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND: NOV. 
1793, at 115–16 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 611; Proceedings of the Georgia House of 
Representatives, Nov. 19, 1793, AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Nov. 23, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, 
at 236.  In addition, Pennsylvania and Delaware appointed special committees, but took no action before 
Congress acted.  See JOURNAL OF THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FOURTH HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF 
THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 61–62 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 612–13; 
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE: JAN. 1794, at 9 (1794), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra 
note 289, at 614, 615. 
294 See, e.g., JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA: OCT. 
1793, at 99 (1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra note 289, at 338 (calling on Virginia’s Senators and 
Representatives “to obtain such amendments in the constitution of the United States, as will remove or explain 
any clause or article of the said constitution, which can be construed to imply or justify a decision, that a state is 
compellable to answer in any suit, by an individual or individuals, in any court of the United States”). 
295 Representative Sedgwick’s proposal was abandoned presumably because it went well beyond the terms of 
the States’ resolutions by proposing to bar all suits against States not only by individuals, but also by “any body 
politic or corporate, whether within or without the United States.”  Proceedings of the United States House of 
Representatives (Feb. 19, 1793), GAZETTE OF THE UNITED STATES, Feb. 20, 1793, reprinted in 5 DHSC, supra 
note 289, at 605–06.  Antifederalists generally accepted the need for jurisdiction over suits between States, and 
perhaps even suits between States and foreign States.  See Clark, supra note 234, at 1891 n.441. 
296 See James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1304–13 (1998). 
297 U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
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any suits against States by individuals.  The Supreme Court subsequently 
interpreted the Amendment to apply retroactively to require dismissal of all 
pending suits against States.298 
3. Immunity After the Eleventh Amendment 
The Eleventh Amendment has been something of a mystery to 
modern readers.  Depending on one’s view of sovereign immunity, the 
Amendment seems to be arbitrarily too narrow or too broad.299  For this 
reason, both on and off the Court, “the [E]leventh [A]mendment is 
universally taken not to mean what it says.”300  The Supreme Court has 
generally understood the Amendment to mean more than it says, and has 
upheld broad sovereign immunity beyond the precise terms of the 
Amendment.  On the other hand, many academics read the Amendment to 
recognize less immunity than the text provides.  Not surprisingly, textualists 
have criticized both approaches and urged the Court to enforce “the 
Eleventh Amendment as written.”301   
Reading the Eleventh Amendment against background principles of 
the law of nations makes sense of the text in historical context.  In 
accordance with the law of nations, the founders understood the “States” to 
retain all of their traditional sovereign rights—including sovereign 
immunity—unless they clearly and expressly surrendered them in the 
Constitution.302  The Citizen-State diversity provisions of Article III were 
the only provisions of the original Constitution that even arguably 
surrendered the States’ immunity from suits by individuals.  As discussed, 
the founders were sharply divided over whether these provisions constituted 
a clear and express surrender of state sovereign immunity.  After 
ratification, the Chisholm Court found them to qualify as such a surrender.  
The Eleventh Amendment was drafted as an explanatory amendment to 
correct this reading.  By specifying that the judicial power of the United 
States “shall not be construed” to permit suits against States by the parties 
specified in the Citizen-State diversity provisions, the Amendment 
eliminated the only text in the original Constitution that could have been 
 
298 See Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).  Because the Eleventh Amendment only 
addresses suits by individuals against States, it does not by its terms affect suits between States or suits against 
States by the United States or foreign States.  Thus, whether States are subject to such suits turns on whether the 
States clearly authorized them in the text of the original Constitution. 
299 See Clark, supra note 234, at 1825-32. 
300 Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. 
PA. L. REV. 515, 516 (1977). 
301 John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional Texts, 1153 YALE 
L.J. 1663, 1720 (2004); see Lawrence C. Marshall, Commentary, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1342 (1989). 
302 See supra Part III. 
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construed as an express surrender of state sovereign immunity from such 
suits.  On this understanding, the pre-existing sovereign immunity of the 
States was not limited—but merely restored—by the Eleventh Amendment. 
The modern controversy regarding the scope of state sovereign 
immunity began with Hans v. Louisiana,303 a decision that recognized broad 
immunity beyond the cases covered by the Eleventh Amendment.  Hans 
was a suit brought by a citizen of Louisiana against Louisiana alleging that 
the State’s repudiation of its bonds violated the Contracts Clause.  The 
plaintiff argued that he was “not embarrassed by the obstacle of the 
Eleventh Amendment, inasmuch as that amendment only prohibits suits 
against a State which are brought by the citizens of another State.”304  The 
Supreme Court acknowledged that “the amendment does so read,”305 but 
treated the Amendment as merely indicative of a broader unwritten 
principle.  According to the Court, the Amendment “shows that, on this 
question of the suability of the States by individuals, the highest authority 
of this country was in accord rather with the minority than with the 
majority of the court in the decision of the case of Chisholm v. 
Georgia.”306  Invoking the remarks by Hamilton, Madison, and Marshall 
during the ratification debates, the Court concluded that “the cognizance of 
suits and actions unknown to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not 
contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of 
the United States.”307  In the Court’s view, the Eleventh Amendment 
confirmed that the States retained their pre-existing immunity from 
suit by individuals (regardless of citizenship).  The Court regarded 
as “almost an absurdity on its face”308 the suggestion that those who 
drafted and ratified the Eleventh Amendment would have authorized 
suits against States by their own citizens. 
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed and even 
extended Hans.  For example, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,309 
the Court reaffirmed the States’ sovereign immunity from suits in federal 
court by their own citizens, and also held that Congress cannot abrogate 
such immunity pursuant to its Article I, Section 8 powers.  In Alden v. 
Maine,310 the Court held that Congress also cannot use these powers to 
abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity in state court.  In the Court’s view, 
a literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment to prohibit only suits by 
 
303 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
304 Id. at 10. 
305 Id.  
306 Id. at 12. 
307 Id. at 15. 
308 Id.  
309 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
310 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
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citizens of other States in federal court would be unacceptably under-
inclusive and inconsistent with the expectations of those who ratified both 
the original Constitution and the Eleventh Amendment.  The Court thus 
embraced a broad theory of state sovereign immunity under which States 
enjoy immunity regardless of the citizenship of the individual plaintiff and 
regardless of whether the suit is brought in federal or state court. 
Academic critics have been quick to charge that the Supreme 
Court’s decisions lack any discernable basis in the constitutional text.  In 
place of the Court’s broad approach, many would adopt the so-called 
diversity theory of the Eleventh Amendment.311  This theory would permit 
individuals to sue States using any provision of Article III other than the 
Citizen-State diversity provisions even if the suit falls within the literal 
prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment.  On this reading, the Amendment 
simply prevents federal courts from hearing suits against States when the 
only available basis for jurisdiction is Citizen-State diversity.  The 
diversity theory itself contradicts the constitutional text, however, because 
the Eleventh Amendment withdraws federal judicial power to hear “any 
suit” commenced or prosecuted by a prohibited plaintiff.312 
Like proponents of broad sovereign immunity, diversity theorists 
depart from the text of the Eleventh Amendment to avoid what they 
perceive to be its anomalous distinction between in- and out-of-state 
citizens.  Applying the Amendment “literally” to bar “any suit” with the 
prohibited party alignment, they contend, would lead to the “unlikely 
result” that “[a]ll suits brought against a state by an out-of-state citizen are 
prohibited regardless of the existence of a federal question, but at the same 
time any suit brought against a state by a citizen of that state is permitted, 
provided a federal question exists.”313  In their view, the founders could 
not have intended this distinction, so courts should narrow the scope of 
the Amendment to avoid this result. 
One need not choose between these two flawed readings of the 
Eleventh Amendment.  Instead, it is possible to reconcile state sovereign 
immunity with the constitutional text by using background principles drawn 
from the law of nations.  As Hamilton and other founders recognized, the 
“States” adopted the Constitution as equal and independent sovereign 
 
311 See, e.g., William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow 
Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. 
REV. 1033 (1983); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A 
Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983). 
312 See Marshall, supra note 301, at 1347 (observing that “the diversity theory goes on completely to ignore 
the operative words of the amendment”); but see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 
1425, 1481 (1987) (arguing that the diversity theory “makes perfect sense of all the words of the Amendment 
itself”). 
313 Fletcher, supra note 311, at 1060–61. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3471860 
74 
 
States, with all of the rights that accompanied that status.  Under the law of 
nations, the States could alienate their sovereign rights only by clearly and 
expressly surrendering them in the Constitution.  These principles help to 
explain not only why state sovereign immunity was a close question under 
Article III, but also why the founders understood the Eleventh Amendment 
to restore to the States full sovereign immunity. 
No one during the drafting or ratification process ever suggested that 
any provision of the Constitution other than the Citizen-State diversity 
provisions could be construed to permit individuals to sue States.314  
Modern observers anachronistically maintain that other provisions of 
Article III—including those conferring federal question and admiralty 
jurisdiction—authorized individuals to sue States.  But, unlike the Citizen-
State diversity provisions, these provisions make no mention—clear or 
ambiguous—of suits against States.  For this reason, the founders—
operating against the backdrop of the law of nations—would not have 
understood any of these provisions to constitute a plausible surrender of the 
States’ preexisting right to sovereign immunity.315  Rather, the founders 
identified the Citizen-State diversity clauses as the only provisions of 
Article III that could have authorized individuals to sue States under the 
prevailing rules governing the surrender of sovereign rights. 
In light of this background, the Eleventh Amendment was perfectly 
tailored to satisfy Massachusetts’ demand (echoed by other States) that the 
Constitution be amended to “remove any clause or article of the said 
Constitution which can be construed to imply or justify a decision that a 
State is compellable to answer in any suit by an individual or individuals 
in any Court of the United States.”316  By clarifying that the Citizen-State 
diversity provisions of Article III did not permit suits against States, the 
Eleventh Amendment neutralized the only provisions of the Constitution 
that could have been construed as an express surrender of the States’ 
immunity from suit by individuals.  After the adoption of the Eleventh 
Amendment, the States’ right to sovereign immunity—like all of their 
sovereign rights—depended not on whether the Constitution expressly 
granted the right, but on whether the States expressly surrendered it.   
From this perspective, the Supreme Court’s broad conception of 
state sovereign immunity is consistent with the original public meaning of 
 
314 See Clark, supra note 234, at 1870-73. 
315 Indeed, two acknowledged misstatements made during the ratification debates confirm that the Citizen-
State diversity provisions were the only portions of Article III that anyone thought could authorize individuals to 
sue States without their consent.  Two participants, one a Federalist and one an Anti-Federalist, mistakenly 
asserted that Article III would permit citizens of a State to sue their own State in federal court.  Both 
acknowledged, and apologized for, the mistake when it was pointed out.  See id. at 1871-73. 
316 RESOLUTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL COURT (Sept. 27, 1793), reprinted in 5 DHSC, 
supra note 289, at 440. 
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the constitutional text.317  Under background principles drawn from the law 
of nations, the States retained their sovereign rights—including sovereign 
immunity—unless they clearly and expressly surrendered them in the 
Constitution.  Although the States arguably surrendered their right to 
sovereign immunity by adopting the Citizen-State diversity provisions in 
Article III, the Eleventh Amendment instructs that Article III “shall not be 
construed” to contain any such surrender .318 
These principles support the Court’s distinction between 
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity pursuant to Article I, 
Section 8 and abrogation pursuant to the Civil War Amendments.  With one 
exception, the Court has rejected congressional power to abrogate under 
Article I, Section 8 because its provisions do no expressly authorize 
Congress to override the States’ sovereign immunity.319  By contrast, the 
Court generally upholds abrogation under the enforcement powers of the 
Civil War Amendments because they were designed to regulate the States 
and expressly authorize Congress to enforce such regulations by appropriate 
legislation.320 
4. Immunity in Other States’ Courts 
Understanding state sovereign immunity through the lens of the law 
of nations also sheds light on a related issue—the immunity of States in the 
courts of other States.  Under the law of nations, free and independent 
States enjoyed sovereign immunity from suit in the courts of other 
sovereigns.  Thus, unless the American States clearly surrendered this 
aspect of sovereign immunity in the Constitution, they retained it.  The only 
provisions of the Constitution that arguably authorize suits against States in 
the courts of another sovereign are found in Article III, Section 2, and none 
of them authorizes suits in state courts.  Article III permits federal courts to 
 
317 Will Baude has reached a similar conclusion, albeit on somewhat different grounds.  See William Baude, 
Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional Text, 103 VA. L. REV. 1 (2017).  Building on Steve Sach’s theory of 
“constitutional backdrops,” Baude argues that sovereign immunity is a common law backdrop that “can’t be 
changed [by Congress] because of the properly limited nature of Articles I and III.”  Id. at 8.  In his view, this 
approach “makes sense of both the text and the Court’s sovereign immunity cases.”  Id. at 9. 
318 The fact that the original Constitution, as amended by the Eleventh Amendment, did not authorize 
individuals to sue States did not leave individuals with no redress for a State’s misconduct.  As Henry Monaghan 
has explained, “[i]n suits for prospective relief, states are still accountable in federal court—through their 
officers—for the violation of federal law.”  Henry P. Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110 
HARV. L. REV. 102, 103 (1996); see also Clark, supra note 234, at 1903-07. 
319 See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (invalidating abrogation of state sovereign 
immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause).  But see Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 
356 (2006) (upholding congressional power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause). 
320 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding abrogation of state sovereign immunity under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).  For an argument that the scope of Congress’s power to enforce the 
Civil War Amendments against States is analogous to the scope of its power to regulate individuals under the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, see Bradford Russell Clark, Note, Judicial Review of Congressional Section 5 
Power: The Fallacy of Reverse Incorporation, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1969, 1983-90 (1984). 
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hear “Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and 
Citizens of another State; . . . and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.”  In addition, as just discussed, the 
Citizen-State diversity provisions arguably authorized federal courts to hear 
suits against States by citizens of another State (or of a foreign State), but 
jurisdiction under these provisions was withdrawn by the Eleventh 
Amendment.  Finally, Article III expressly grants the Supreme Court power 
to hear controversies between two or more States.  This grant undoubtedly 
constitutes a specific surrender of sovereign immunity but was 
uncontroversial and widely seen as a necessity at the founding.321 
Notably, the Constitution contains no provisions purporting to 
surrender the immunity of States in the courts of another State.  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court denied this immunity in Nevada v. Hall,322 
a case brought by California residents against Nevada in California state 
court.  The Court based its decision to deny Nevada’s claim of sovereign 
immunity in large part on the lack of any constitutional text affirmatively 
granting States such immunity.323  As explained in this Article, however, 
this approach has things backwards.  A constitutional provision granting the 
States immunity in the courts of another State would have been superfluous 
because, under the law of nations, the “States” already possessed sovereign 
immunity from suit in the courts of another State.  Thus, the relevant 
question in Hall was whether the States affirmatively surrendered this 
immunity in the Constitution.  Because the Constitution contains no such 
surrender, the States necessarily retained sovereign immunity in cases of 
this kind. 
The Supreme Court overruled Hall in Franchise Tax Board of 
California v. Hyatt,324 a suit brought by a Nevada resident against a 
California State agency in Nevada state court.  The Nevada Supreme Court 
rejected the agency’s claim of immunity, but the Supreme Court upheld it.  
The Court’s rationale closely tracks the approach offered by this Article and 
has implications far beyond the question of state immunity in sister-state 
courts.  The Court began by observing that “[a]fter independence, the States 
considered themselves fully independent nations” pursuant to the 
 
321 Article III also grants federal courts power to hear controversies “between” a State and foreign States, but 
the Supreme Court has declined read this grant as a surrender of the States’ sovereign immunity from suit.  See 
Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (finding Mississippi immune from suit by a foreign 
State). 
322 440 U.S. 410 (1979). 
323 See id. at 426 (“Nothing in the Federal Constitution authorizes or obligates this Court to frustrate 
[California’s] policy [of exercising jurisdiction] out of enforced respect for the sovereignty of Nevada.”).  As Ann 
Woolhandler pointed out, Hall was something of an outlier because its analysis differed from the Court’s general 
approach to state sovereign immunity.  See Ann Woolhandler, Interstate Sovereign Immunity, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 
249, 250-51. 
324139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019). 
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Declaration of Independence.325  The Court then quoted Vattel for the 
proposition that “‘[i]t does not . . . belong to any foreign power to take 
cognisance of the administration of [another] sovereign, to set himself up 
for a judge of his conduct, and to oblige him to alter it.’”326  Accordingly, 
the Court explained, “[t]he sovereign is “‘exemp[t] . . . from all [foreign] 
jurisdiction.’”327   
After surveying the founding history, the Hyatt Court concluded that 
“Federalists and Antifederalists alike agreed in their preratification debates 
that States could not be sued in the courts of other States”328 and enjoyed 
immunity “under both the common law and the law of nations.”329  The 
Court reasoned that the States retained this immunity unless they 
affirmatively surrendered it: “The Constitution’s use of the term ‘States’ 
reflects both of these kinds of traditional immunity.  And the States retained 
these aspects of sovereignty, ‘except as altered by the plan of the 
Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.’”330  The Court 
acknowledged that Article III contains several provisions that altered the 
States’ immunity from suit in federal court, but stressed that the 
Constitution contains no provisions that altered the States’ pre-existing 
immunity from suit in the courts of another State.  Accordingly, the Court 
held that the States did not surrender this immunity by adopting the 
Constitution. 
The Hyatt Court also addressed and rejected the argument that the 
States retained a distinct sovereign right to reject sister States’ claims of 
immunity from suit in their courts.  Hyatt argued that “before the 
Constitution was ratified, the States had the power of fully independent 
nations to deny immunity to fellow sovereigns; thus, the States must retain 
that power today with respect to each other because ‘nothing in the 
Constitution or formation of the Union altered that balance among the still-
sovereign states.’”331  The Court rejected this argument because, in the 
Court’s view, “the Constitution affirmatively altered the relationships 
between the States, so that they no longer relate to each other solely as 
foreign sovereigns.”332  Traditionally, disputes of this kind between 
 
325 Id. at 1493. 
326 Id.  
327 Id. at 1494. 
328 Id.  
329 Id.  
330 Id. at 1494-95 (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 713). 
331 Id. at 1496.  Will Baude has made a similar argument.  He argues that no provision of the Constitution 
limits one State’s authority to abrogate the immunity of another State in its courts.  See Baude, supra note 317, at 
24 (concluding States have no immunity from suit in another State’s courts because “[t]he Constitution doesn’t 
limit states to enumerated powers and imposes relatively few constraints on their treatment of one another”).  
Notably, Professor Baude’s argument agrees with the premise of this Article—namely, that the States retained all 
sovereign authority they did not expressly surrender in the Constitution. 
332 Hyatt, 139 Sup. Ct. at 1497. 
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sovereigns were not settled in the courts of either party, but through 
negotiation or, if necessary, armed conflict.  Because the Constitution 
deprived the States of these tools, the Hyatt Court concluded that the States 
surrendered any power they had to override the immunity of sister States in 
their courts.333 
For our purposes, the framework adopted by the Hyatt Court is more 
important than its specific application.  The Court started with the 
proposition that, in adopting the Constitution, the States retained their pre-
existing sovereignty except to the extent they affirmatively surrendered it.  
The Court found no indication in the Constitution that the States 
surrendered their pre-existing immunity from suit in the courts of sister 
States.  At the same time, the Court identified several constitutional 
provisions that—in the Court’s view—deprived the States of any power to 
override another State’s immunity in their courts.334  The important point 
for present purposes is that the Court sought to ascertain the sovereign 
rights of the States by examining the extent to which they affirmatively 
surrendered them in the Constitution. 
B. The Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
The original public meaning of the term “States”—and the rules 
governing their surrender of sovereign rights—also support the Supreme 
Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine.  The doctrine prohibits Congress 
from requiring States to use their legislative and executive powers to 
implement federal regulatory programs.  Although commentators have 
disparaged the doctrine as an example of “freestanding federalism,”335 this 
characterization overlooks the significance of the term “States” in the 
Constitution and associated rules drawn from the law of nations.  At the 
founding, a sovereign state enjoyed complete independence from other 
states, and no state could command another state to exercise its legislative 
or executive powers.  Such “commandeering” by an outside state would 
have contradicted the other state’s independence.  Under the law of nations, 
a state could relinquish this aspect of sovereignty only by an express 
surrender.  Accordingly, the true original basis for the anti-commandeering 
doctrine is that the American “States” retained all of their pre-existing 
sovereign rights that they did not expressly surrender in the Constitution.  
 
333 Id. at 1498 (“Some subjects that were decided by pure ‘political power’ before ratification now turn on 
federal ‘rules of law.’”). 
334 See id. 
335 See Manning, supra note 205, at 34. 
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1. Commandeering Under the Articles of Confederation 
To understand why the States authorized Congress to commandeer 
them in the Articles of Confederation but withheld this power from 
Congress in the Constitution, one must first appreciate the difficulties 
associated with commandeering during the Confederation era.  Under the 
Articles, the States expressly authorized Congress to command them to 
provide money, supplies, and personnel for the armed forces.336  
Specifically, Article IX gave “the united states in congress assembled” 
authority “to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the 
service of the united states,” and “to make requisitions from each state for 
its quota” of land forces.337  Article XIII made such requisitions binding 
on the States by providing that “Every state shall abide by the 
determinations of the united states in congress assembled, on all questions 
which by this confederation are submitted to them.”338  Although the 
Articles obligated the States to comply with Congress’s commands, the 
States often disobeyed them with impunity.339  The Articles gave Congress 
no means of enforcing its commands against States, and thus the United 
States had no reliable means of raising revenue or supplying the armed 
forces. 
Congress tasked several Committees with crafting amendments to 
make the Articles of Confederation more effective.  James Madison served 
on these Committees and favored authorizing Congress to use military force 
to coerce compliance with its commands.  A 1781 report written largely by 
Madison initially suggested that Congress might have implied power to 
coerce States under the Articles,340 but rejected this conclusion on the 
ground that it is “most consonant to the spirit of a free constitution that on 
the one hand all exercise of power should be explicitly and precisely 
warranted, and on the other that the penal consequences of a violation of 
 
336 Article VIII provided that federal expenses “shall be defrayed out of a common treasury, which shall be 
supplied by the several states, in proportion to the value of all land within each state.”  ARTICLES OF 
CONFEDERATION OF 1777, art. VIII.  Article VIII also specified that the “taxes for paying that proportion shall be 
laid and levied by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several states within the time agreed upon 
by the united states in congress assembled.”  Id. 
337 Id. art. IX. 
338 Id. art. XIII. 
339 As George Washington explained in 1780: “One State will comply with a requisition of Congress; 
another neglects to do it; a third executes it by halves; and all differ either in the manner, the matter, or so much 
in point of time, that we are always working up hill, and ever shall be. . . .”  Letter from George Washington to 
Fielding Lewis (July 6, 1780), in WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 154, 157 n.1 (Lawrence B. Evans ed., 
1908) (quoting Letter from George Washington to Joseph Jones, in Congress (May 31, 1780)). 
340 Amendment to Give Congress Coercive Power Over the States and Their Citizens (Mar. 16, 1781), 
reprinted in 1 DHRC, supra note 114, at 141, 142 (stating that Article XIII of the Articles vests “a general and 
implied power . . . in the United States in Congress assembled to enforce and carry into effect all the Articles of 
the said Confederation against any of the States which shall refuse or neglect to abide by such their 
determinations, or shall otherwise violate any of the said Articles, but no determinate and particular provision is 
made for that purpose”). 
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duty should be clearly promulgated and understood.”341  This language 
applied the well-established rule of interpretation that indefinite legal 
provisions should not be given odious readings, which included readings 
that would impose penal consequences.  Because the Articles did not 
expressly give Congress express power to use military force against the 
States to coerce compliance with federal commands, the report urged 
amending the Articles to give Congress that power expressly.342 
Congress never acted on Madison’s proposal perhaps because of 
concerns identified by Alexander Hamilton.  In 1782, Hamilton warned 
that giving Congress coercive power over the States could trigger a civil 
war (just as he later warned that abrogating state sovereign immunity could 
do the same): 
A mere regard to the interests of the confederacy will never 
be a principle sufficiently active to curb the ambition and 
intrigues of different members.  Force cannot effect it: A 
contest of arms will seldom be between the common 
sovereign and a single refractory member; but between 
distinct combinations of the several parts against each 
other.343 
Leading up to the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Madison 
continued to favor coercive force against States and to lament the 
ineffectiveness of the Articles of Confederation.  For example, before the 
Convention, Madison wrote to George Washington to share the “outlines 
of a new system.”344  In addition to proposing various new federal 
powers, Madison stated that “the right of coercion should be expressly 
declared” and could be exerted “either by sea or land.”345  He also 
acknowledged, however, the potential dangers of giving Congress 
coercive power over States.  Specifically, he observed that “the difficulty 
& awkwardness of operating by force on the collective will of a State, 
render it particularly desirable that the necessity of it might be precluded” 
by other means ensuring the effective enforcement of federal law.346  
 
341 Id.  
342 See id. at 142-43; JACK N. RAKOVE, JAMES MADISON AND THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC 25 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining that Madison’s proposal would have amended the Articles of 
Confederation to “give the Union the power literally to coerce delinquent states into doing their duty, either by 
marching the Continental army within their borders or by stationing armed ships outside their harbors”). 
343 Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist No. VI (July 4, 1782), reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 1779-1781, at 105 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961). 
344 Letter from James Madison to George Washington (Apr. 16, 1787), in 2 MADISON WRITINGS, supra 
note 111, at 344, 344. 
345 Id. at 348. 
346 Id.  
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2. Rejecting Commandeering Under the Constitution 
At the outset of the Constitutional Convention, Edmond Randolph 
introduced the Virginia Plan (prepared with Madison’s input).  The Plan 
proposed that that “the National Legislature ought to be impowered to 
enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & 
moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are 
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be 
interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation.”347  Madison thought 
that continuing Congress’s power to commandeer the States would 
necessitate giving the National Legislature a new express power to 
coerce compliance.  Accordingly, as initially introduced, the Virginia 
Plan included a provision empowering the National Legislature “to call 
forth the force of the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to 
fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.”348 
The delegates strongly objected to this aspect of the Virginia Plan 
and it was quickly set aside in favor of crafting a less dangerous alternative.  
George Mason admitted that the present Confederation was “deficient in 
not providing for coercion & punishment agst. delinquent States; but he 
argued very cogently that punishment could not <in the nature of things be 
executed on> the States collectively, and therefore that such a Govt. was 
necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those 
only whose guilt required it.”349   
Moved by these objections, Madison acknowledged that giving 
Congress power to coerce States could lead to the destruction of the 
Union and expressed the hope that the Convention could devise a 
plan that avoided this feature: 
Mr.  M<adison>, observed that the more he reflected on the 
use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the 
justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people 
collectively and not individually.  — , A Union of States 
<containing such an ingredient> seemed to provide for its 
own destruction.  The use of force agst. a State, would look 
more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of 
 
347 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 29, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 17, 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). 
348 Id.  The Pinckney Plan also endorsed coercive power over the States.  See Charles Pinckney, 
Observations on the Plan of Government submitted to the Federal Convention, in Philadelphia (May 28, 1787), 
in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 108, at 106, 119.  Pinckney observed that “the present Confederation” 
lacked such power, id., and warned that “[u]nless this power of coercion is infused, and exercised when 
necessary, the States will most assuredly neglect their duties.”  Id. 
349 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 30, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 33, 34 (brackets in original). 
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punishment, and would probably be considered by the party 
attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which 
it might be bound.  He hoped that such a system would be 
framed as might render this recourse unnecessary, and 
moved that the clause be postponed.350 
The solution ultimately embraced by the Convention was to 
withhold power from Congress to command States and instead empower it 
to regulate individuals directly.  This fundamental shift eliminated any need 
to empower Congress to enforce its commands against States because 
Congress would be given no power to command them.  Rather, under this 
alternative approach, the federal government would enforce its commands 
through ordinary law enforcement against individuals. 
As George Mason explained at the Convention: “Under the 
existing Confederacy, Congs. represent the States not the people of the 
States: their acts operate on the States not on the individuals.  The case 
will be changed in the new plan of Govt.”351  Following these early 
discussions, a consensus emerged that the “national government had to 
be reconstituted with power to enact, execute, and adjudicate its own laws, 
acting directly on the American people, without having to rely on the 
cooperation of the states.”352  Madison himself went from favoring 
congressional power to command and coerce the States to strongly 
opposing this approach:  “Any Govt. for the U. States formed on the 
supposed practicability of using force agst. the <unconstitutional 
proceedings> of the States, wd. prove as visionary & fallacious as the 
Govt. of Congs. [under the Articles of Confederation].”353 
The ensuing debate over the New Jersey Plan illustrates the stark 
choice the Convention faced: either revise and expand the Articles of 
Confederation (by authorizing Congress to command and coerce States) 
or abandon the Articles entirely in favor of a new system (under which 
Congress would command and coerce individuals rather than States).  
Dissatisfied with the Virginia Plan, William Paterson offered the New 
Jersey Plan as complete substitute.354  Paterson’s Plan would have merely 
“revised, corrected & enlarged” the Articles of Confederation rather than 
 
350 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (May 31, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 47, 54 (brackets in original) (footnote omitted). 
351 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 6, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 132, 133. 
352 RAKOVE, supra note 144, at 53. 
353 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 8, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 164, 165 (footnote omitted). 
354 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 15, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 242, 242–245. 
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replace them with an entirely new system.355  The Plan would have 
retained and expanded Congress’s power to command States, and 
would have augmented it by expressly authorizing the federal 
government to coerce the States’ compliance through military force.356 
The delegates strongly objected to the New Jersey’s Plan’s 
reliance on coercion against States.  Edmund Randolph pronounced 
coercion “to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals.”357  
Alexander Hamilton conceded that the Virginia Plan “departs itself from 
the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on 
individuals.”358  Nonetheless, he agreed with Randolph “that we owed it to 
our Country, to do on this emergency whatever we should deem essential 
to its happiness.”359  Hamilton distinguished between “coertion of laws” 
and “coertion of arms,”360 and denied that force could ever be used against 
States: “But how can this force be exerted on the States collectively.  It is 
impossible.  It amounts to a war between the parties.  Foreign powers also 
will not be idle spectators.  They will interpose, the confusion will 
increase, and a dissolution of the Union ensue.”361  Madison offered a 
similar critique.  He asked the smaller states most attached to the New 
Jersey Plan “to consider the situation in which it would leave them.”362  
Madison explained: “The coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan 
depends, can never be exerted but on themselves.  The larger States will be 
impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it.”363  Following 
Madison’s speech, the Convention rejected the New Jersey Plan and re-
reported the Virginia Plan.364 
Despite this vote, John Lansing again urged the Convention to 
adhere to “the foundation of the present Confederacy”365 rather than 
depart so completely.  Mason responded by elaborating on his 
objections to the introduction of coercive power: 
It was acknowledged by (Mr.  Patterson) that his plan could 
not be enforced without military coertion.  Does he consider 
 
355 Id. at 242. 
356 Id. at 245. 
357 Id. at 255-56. 
358 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 18, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 282, 283. 
359 Id.  
360 Id. at 284. 
361 Id. at 285; see also id. (“[The Amphyctionic Council] had in particular the power of fining and using 
force agst. delinquent members.  What was the consequence.  Their decrees were mere signals of war.”). 
362 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 19, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 313, 319. 
363 Id. at 320. 
364 Id. at 322. 
365 James Madison, Notes on the Constitutional Convention (June 20, 1787), in 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, 
supra note 108, at 335, 336. 
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the force of this concession.  The most jarring elements of 
nature; fire & water themselves are not more incompatible 
tha[n] such a mixture of civil liberty and military execution.  
Will the militia march from one State to another, in order to 
collect the arrears of taxes from the delinquent members of 
the Republic?  Will they maintain an army for this purpose?  
Will not the citizens of the invaded State assist one another 
till they rise as one Man, and shake off the Union 
altogether?366 
Following Mason’s remarks, the Convention rejected Lansing’s motion and 
entertained no further proposals to grant Congress power to command or 
coerce the States.367  
Once the Convention ended, Madison sent Thomas Jefferson a copy 
of the proposed Constitution and explained why the Convention chose to 
empower Congress to regulate individuals rather than States: 
It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union 
could not be secured by any system founded on the principle 
of a confederation of Sovereign States.  A voluntary 
observance of the federal law by all the members could 
never be hoped for.  A compulsive one could evidently never 
be reduced to practice, and if it could, involved equal 
calamities to the innocent & the guilty, the necessity of a 
military force both obnoxious & dangerous, and in general a 
scene resembling much more a civil war than the 
administration of a regular Government. 
Hence was embraced the alternative of a Government 
which instead of operating, on the States, should operate 
without their intervention on the individuals composing 
them; and hence the change in the principle and proportion 
of representation.368  
Madison was not alone in his efforts to explain why the Convention 
decided to abandon regulation of States under the Articles of Confederation 
in favor of regulation of individuals under the Constitution.  Prominent 
Federalists echoed his views during the state ratifying debates.  For 
example, in The Federalist No. 15, Alexander Hamilton explained that 
“the present Confederation” could not be retained because there were 
 
366 Id. at 339–40 (footnote omitted). 
367 Id. at 344. 
368 Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 3 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra 
note 108, at 131, 131–32. 
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“fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which cannot be 
amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first principles and main 
pillars of the fabric.”369  Hamilton maintained that this alteration 
consisted of abandoning legislation for States (under the Articles) in 
favor of authorizing legislation for individuals (under the proposed 
Constitution).  In his view, “[t]he great and radical vice in the 
construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of legislation 
for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE 
CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of whom 
they consist.”370  Hamilton stressed that if we wished to avoid the 
possibility of civil war, “we must extend the authority of the Union to the 
persons of the citizens—the only proper objects of government.”371 
Hamilton continued these themes in The Federalist No. 16.  There, 
he argued that in order to avoid a civil war and “dissolution of the 
Union,”372 the federal government “must be founded, as to the objects 
committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by 
the opponents of the proposed Constitution.  It must carry the agency to 
the persons of the citizens.”373  The “principle contended for by the 
opponents of the proposed Constitution” was the “exceptionable principle” 
of “legislation for States.”374  Thus, Hamilton made clear that the proposed 
Constitution would forgo legislation for States and rely exclusively on 
legislation for individuals.  Hamilton’s arguments were repeated by 
Federalists in numerous state ratifying conventions.375 
As adopted, the Constitution departed sharply from the Articles of 
Confederation by giving Congress no power to command States to take 
legislative or executive action.  Because of this omission, the Constitution 
had no need to empower Congress to use military force to coerce the States’ 
compliance with such commands.  The States’ failure to authorize these 
actions in the Constitution meant that they did not surrender these aspects of 
their sovereignty.  Under the law of nations, only an express surrender of 
 
369 THE FEDERALIST NO. 15 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 112, at 105, 108. 
370 Id. at 108. 
371 Id. at 109. 
372 THE FEDERALIST NO. 16 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 112, at 114. 
373 Id. at 116. 
374 Id. at 113. 
375 See Clark, supra note 234, at 1856-62.  Critics of the anti-commandeering doctrine sometimes point to 
other statements in the Federalist Papers as evidence that the founders authorized and endorsed federal 
commandeering of the States.  For example, Jeff Powell points to The Federalist Nos. 27, 36, 45, and 81 for the 
proposition that “the proposed federal government would have the authority to use state officers to carry out 
federal activities.”  See H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 661, 
662-63 (1993).  Nothing in these essays contradicts the much more precise discussions at the Convention and in 
The Federalist Nos. 15 and 16 rejecting federal power to command and coerce the States.  At most, the essays 
Powell cites stand for the proposition that Congress has the option of enlisting the voluntary assistance of state 
revenue collectors and state courts to accomplish federal goals.   
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their rights would have sufficed to alienate their sovereignty on these 
matters.  To be sure, the Articles of Confederation contained a partial 
surrender of this kind, but this power was not included in the new 
Constitution.  Instead, the Constitution abandoned reliance on 
commandeering the States in favor of regulating and coercing individuals.  
Because the Constitution proposed by the Convention contained no 
provisions giving Congress power to command or coerce States, the 
“States” necessarily retained these aspects of their sovereignty under well-
known rules supplied by the law of nations.  
Although the Constitution does not empower Congress to command 
or coerce States, it does impose certain restrictions and obligations on the 
States and their officials.  As discussed, Article I, Section 10 prohibits the 
States from taking certain actions deemed detrimental to the nation as a 
whole.376  In addition, Article VI provides that all state and federal 
legislative, executive, and judicial officers “shall be bound by oath or 
affirmation, to support this Constitution.”377  Article VI also declares the 
Constitution, Laws, and Treaties of the United States to be “the supreme 
Law of the Land,” and provides that “the judges in every state shall be 
bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the 
contrary notwithstanding.”378  Noting these provisions, The Federalist No. 
27 observed that “the Legislatures, Courts, and Magistrates of the respective 
members will be incorporated into the operations of the national 
government, as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will 
be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.”379  Taken in historical 
context, these observations conveyed that state institutions and officials 
would be bound by both the Supremacy Clause and the Oath or Affirmation 
Clause to follow valid federal law in the performance of their duties under 
state law.  They say nothing, however, about federal power to command and 
coerce the States, as some have argued.380  The Convention quite 
 
376 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
377 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
378 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
379 THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 112, at 175. 
380 Professor Powell’s critique of the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine appears to have made this 
mistake by conflating these distinct modes of enforcement.  He points to The Federalist’s discussion of the 
Supremacy Clause for the proposition that “the federal government’s proposed powers would extend to the states 
as subordinate institutions as well as to individuals.”  Powell, supra note 375, at 659.  But this confuses a rule of 
decision to resolve conflicts between state and federal law with authorization to enforce federal law directly 
against States.  The Constitution contains a clear and express provision—the Supremacy Clause—establishing a 
rule of decision, but contains no provision clearly and expressly authorizing enforcement of federal commands 
against States.  Indeed, in The Federalist No. 27, Hamilton was arguing against the Anti-Federalist contention that 
the proposed federal government under the Constitution would have to rely on “military force to execute its laws.”  
THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 112, at 171.  Rather, because Hamilton recognized 
that States might prefer to enforce federal law in some circumstances, he assured Anti-Federalists that the 
Constitution would permit States to employ their ordinary means of government for this purpose.  Likewise, in 
The Federalist No. 45, James Madison dispelled fears over federal collection of internal taxes by pointing out that 
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consciously withheld this authority after extensive debate381 because the 
founders were convinced that the federal government could accomplish all 
its ends by relying exclusively on “legislation for individuals” while 
forgoing “legislation for States.”382  However one reads The Federalist, 
nothing but an express surrender in the constitutional text would suffice 
under the law of nations to authorize the federal government to conscript 
state legislatures or executives into carrying federal laws into execution. 
3. Reassessing the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine 
This background provides a straightforward rationale for the 
Supreme Court’s recent anti-commandeering decisions grounded in the 
original public meaning of the term “States.”  By using a term of art drawn 
from the law of nations, the Constitution signified that the States retained all 
of the sovereign rights they secured by issuing the Declaration of 
Independence and winning the War of Independence minus only those 
rights that they clearly and expressly surrendered in the Constitution.  
Because the original Constitution gave Congress no express power to 
commandeer the States, the States did not surrender—but necessarily 
retained—their traditional sovereignty to control their own legislative and 
executive powers free from interference by another sovereign. 
This rationale supports each of the Supreme Court’s anti-
commandeering decisions.  The Court’s modern anti-commandeering 
decisions began with New York v. United States,383 which held that 
Congress lacks constitutional power to compel state legislatures to enact 
laws implementing a federal regulatory program.  Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion for the Court acknowledged that “Congress has substantial powers 
to govern the Nation directly,” but stressed that “the Constitution has never 
been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to 
govern according to Congress’ instructions.”384  As she recognized, the shift 
from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution “‘substitut[ed] a 
national government, acting, with ample power, directly upon the citizens, 
instead of the Confederate government, which acted with powers, greatly 
 
if the federal government chose not to collect such taxes directly “an option will then be given to the States to 
supply their quotas by previous collections of their own.”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 112, at 312-13 
(James Madison).  Giving States the option to participate in the enforcement of federal law is not the same thing 
as giving Congress authority to command or coerce them to do so—authority that was explicitly and repeatedly 
denied in The Federalist Nos. 15 and 16.  See supra notes 369-375, and accompanying text. 
381 See supra notes 153-160, and accompanying text. 
382 See Clark, supra note 234, at 1903-04 (explaining that “all of the prohibitions placed on the states in the 
original Constitution could be enforced through ordinary litigation between individuals or suits brought by 
states”). 
383 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
384 Id. at 162. 
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restricted, only upon the States.’”385  Review of the founding-era debates 
convinced the Court that “the Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that 
confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.”386 
In Printz v. United States,387 the Supreme Court applied these 
principles to hold that Congress also lacks constitutional authority to 
compel state executive officers to enforce a federal regulatory scheme.  
Although Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court relied on many of the same 
sources cited in New York v. United States, his opinion acknowledged that 
“there is no constitutional text speaking to the precise question whether 
congressional action compelling state officers to execute federal laws is 
unconstitutional.”388  The Court stated that “the answer . . . must be sought 
in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, 
and in the jurisprudence of this Court.”389  The Court’s review of these 
sources led it to conclude that Congress’s attempt to command state 
executive officers to enforce federal law was unconstitutional. 
Critics of the Supreme Court’s decision in Printz have seized upon 
Justice Scalia’s concession that “there is no constitutional text” addressing 
commandeering to argue that the doctrine is made up or illegitimate.390  As 
discussed, however, this critique misunderstands the role of the 
constitutional text—and its absence—in determining the residual 
sovereignty of the States.  Under background principles of the law of 
nations, Congress could commandeer the “States” only if they clearly and 
expressly authorized such action in the Constitution.  The absence of any 
constitutional text addressing commandeering thus does not contradict but 
affirmatively supports the anti-commandeering doctrine. 
Critics also have suggested that the Supreme Court’s position on 
federal commandeering of state courts is inconsistent with its broader anti-
commandeering doctrine.  In New York, for example, Justice O’Connor 
recognized “the well established power of Congress to pass laws 
enforceable in state courts.”391  If Congress may rely on state courts to 
enforce federal law, then why may it not rely on state legislatures and 
executive officials for this purpose as well?  According to the Court, the 
constitutional text provides the answer.  As Justice Scalia explained in 
Printz, “the proposition that state courts cannot refuse to apply federal law . 
. . [is] mandated by the terms of the Supremacy Clause (‘the Judges in every 
 
385 Id. (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869)). 
386 Id. at 166. 
387 532 U.S. 898 (1997). 
388 Id. at 905. 
389 Id.  
390 Manning, supra note 11, at 2031.  Cf. Powell, supra note 380, at 674 (arguing that the “state immunities 
approach [endorsed in New York v. United States] . . . is entirely unguided by constitutional text”). 
391 505 U.S. at 178 (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947)); see Printz, 521 U.S. at 928. 
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State shall be bound [by federal law]’).”392  In other words, rightly or 
wrongly, the Court appears to regard the text of the Supremacy Clause as a 
clear and express surrender of this portion of state sovereignty.393 
Most recently, in Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic 
Association,394 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and applied the anti-
commandeering doctrine to invalidate the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act (“PASPA”), which made it unlawful for States to enact laws 
authorizing gambling on competitive sports events.  The Act contained a 
grandfather provision excepting Nevada and gave New Jersey a limited 
period to opt into this exception.  After the time expired, New Jersey voters 
approved a constitutional amendment permitting the state legislature to 
authorize sports gambling.  The Court first found that the legislature had 
authorized sports gambling within the meaning of PASPA by repealing 
state laws prohibiting such conduct, and then held that the Act violated the 
anti-commandeering doctrine.  The Court explained its decision in terms 
that echo principles drawn from the law of nations.  According to the Court, 
the Constitution grants Congress enumerated powers, but “conspicuously 
absent from the list of powers given to Congress is the power to issue direct 
orders to the governments of the States.”395  As the Court put it, “[t]he 
anticommandeering doctrine simply represents the recognition of this limit 
on congressional authority.”396 
 
392 521 U.S. at 928-29. 
393 If one were to conclude that the Supremacy Clause is not a clear and express surrender of this aspect of 
state sovereignty, then the States would retain the same degree of sovereignty over their courts as they do over 
their legislative and executive functions.  For example, dissenting in Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 751 
(2009), Justice Thomas concluded that “[a]s a textual matter, . . . the Supremacy Clause does not address whether 
a state court must entertain a federal cause of action; it provides only a rule of decision that the state court must 
follow if it adjudicates the claim.”  Id. at 751 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Because, in his view, no provision of the 
Constitution divests the States of their pre-existing sovereignty over their own courts, Justice Thomas determined 
that “[u]nder our federal system, . . . the States have unfettered authority to determine whether their local courts 
may entertain a federal cause of action.”  Id. at 749 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
For a discussion of how early debates over congressional regulation of state courts drew upon rules of the 
law of nations setting the bounds of jurisdiction between sovereigns, and how arguments that diverged from these 
rules relied on specific constitutional provisions interpreted to override them, see Anthony J. Bellia Jr., 
Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L. J. 949 (2006); see also Anthony J. Bellia Jr., 
Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE L. J. 947 (2001) (arguing that under the traditional rules 
of the law of nations that defined the bounds of state sovereignty, Congress lacks power to regulate state court 
procedures in state law cases). 
394 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
395 Id. at 1476. 
396 Id.  Vik Amar questions whether Murphy went too far in its language, if not its result.  As he put it, “[a]t 
times Murphy defined unconstitutional commandeering in incredibly broad terms—to include federal laws ‘that 
direct[] . . . the States . . . from enacting a regulation of the conduct of activities occurring within their borders.’”  
Vikram David Amar, “Clarifying” Murphy’s Law: Did Something Go Wrong in Reconciling Commandeering and 
Conditional Preemption Doctrines?, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 299, 300.  In his view, this formulation is at least in 
tension with the conditional preemption doctrine.  He argues that “the best reading of Murphy is one under which 
Congress’s conditional preemption powers remain intact but can be exercised only when Congress lays out its 
conditions with clarity.”  Id. at 301. 
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Commentators have criticized the anti-commandeering doctrine on 
the ground that the Constitution does not expressly deny Congress the 
power to commandeer States.  But the Constitution does not give Congress 
all powers except those expressly withheld.  Rather, under well-known 
principles drawn from the law of nations, the Constitution gives Congress 
only those powers expressly granted in the document.  This understanding 
of congressional power is a necessary consequence of background 
principles of the law of nations governing the surrender of sovereign rights.  
Under those principle, the “States” mentioned in the Constitution retained 
all aspects of their pre-existing sovereignty that they did not expressly 
surrender in the Constitution.  Accordingly, Congress lacks power to 
commandeer the States in violation of their residual sovereignty unless the 
Constitution expressly authorizes such action.  From this perspective, 
constitutional silence on the matter does not support—but conclusively 
refutes—congressional power to commandeer the States. 
C. The Equal Sovereignty Doctrine 
Finally, understanding the Constitution’s use of the term “State” by 
reference to the law of nations supports the Supreme Court’s long-standing 
recognition that the States possess equal sovereignty under the Constitution.  
The constitutional equality of the States is not the product of freestanding 
federalism or judicial activism, as some commentators have suggested.  
When the Constitution was adopted, the founders understood independent 
states to possess equal sovereignty under the law of nations.  By employing 
the term “States” in the Constitution, the founders adopted this background 
understanding.  Under principles drawn from the law of nations, the States 
retained their equal sovereignty except to the extent that they expressly 
surrendered it in the Constitution. 
There has been renewed interest in the equal sovereignty doctrine 
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder.397  The 
decision invalidated Congress’s 2006 renewal of the preclearance 
requirements of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 on the ground that the 
statute’s outdated coverage formula violated the equal sovereignty of the 
States.  The Court endorsed the proposition that “[n]ot only do States retain 
sovereignty under the Constitution,” but “there is also a ‘fundamental 
principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States.”398  Applying this 
principle, the Court invalidated the statute’s unequal treatment of the States.   
 
397 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
398 Id. at 544. 
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Congress originally enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 pursuant 
to its power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment as a short-term, five-year 
measure to remedy well-documented voting discrimination in certain States 
and localities.  Congress reenacted the statute without alteration several 
times over the years, and most recently reauthorized it in 2006 for an 
additional twenty-five years.  Shortly after the Act’s original adoption in 
1965, the Supreme Court upheld the statute as a proper exercise of 
Congress’s power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.  By 2006, however, 
minority voting rates in the covered jurisdictions met or exceeded majority 
voting rates.  Rather than make new findings, Congress “instead reenacted a 
formula based on 40–year–old facts having no logical relation to the present 
day.”399  For this reason, the Shelby County Court found Congress’s 2006 
extension of the coverage provisions to violate the States’ equal 
sovereignty.400 
Critics of Shelby County charge that the equal sovereignty doctrine 
is simply made up and unsupported by the constitutional text.401  For 
example, Leah Litman has charged that “[t]here is little basis in the 
constitutional text or the drafting history for any constitutional rule that 
requires Congress to treat the states equally.” 402  She argues that “the 
textual arguments for the equal sovereignty principle are not particularly 
compelling,”403 and that “an analysis of the original meaning of the 
Constitution reveals no clear understanding or expectation that the 
Constitution prohibits Congress from distinguishing among the states.”404  
Similarly, Richard Hasen has characterized the equal sovereignty doctrine 
as “made up” and “unjustified.”405  Overall, as Neil Katyal and Thomas 
Schmidt have observed, “[t]he legal commentariat generally viewed the 
doctrine as an invention.”406 
A few scholars have defended the legitimacy of the equal 
sovereignty doctrine, at least in certain circumstances.  Writing before 
Shelby County, Gillian Metzger concluded (on the basis of on various 
 
399 Id. at 554. 
400 See id. at 557. 
401 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent did not go this far, but argued that the doctrine should be limited to the 
admission of new States.  See id. at 587-88.  Some scholars have criticized the decision on other grounds, 
including the claim that the Court’s use of the doctrine undermines the availability of constitutional remedies.  See 
Seth Davis, Equal Sovereignty as a Rights Against a Remedy, 76 LA. L. REV. 83 (2015). 
402 Leah M. Litman, Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207, 1229 (2016). 
403 Id. at 1230. 
404 Id. at 1233. 
405 Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 
714, 733 (2014). 
406 Neil Kumar Katyal and Thomas P. Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal 
Change, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2109, 2133 n. 103 (2015).  Accord Jeffrey M. Schmitt, In Defense of Shleby 
County’s Principle of Equal Sovereignty, 68 OK. L. REV. 209, 210 (2016) (“Scholars have attacked the equal 
sovereignty principle with a surprising degree of unanimity and contempt.”). 
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features of the constitutional design) that “the intuition that states must be 
admitted on equal terms” “appears correct.”407  Similarly, Douglas Laycock 
observed that “[t]he Constitution assumes, without ever quite saying so, that 
the several states are of equal authority.”408  These scholars did not consider 
whether the Supreme Court properly applied the equal sovereignty doctrine 
in Shelby County, but two scholars have subsequently defended the Court’s 
use of the doctrine in that case. 
More recently, Thomas Colby has concluded that “there is a deep 
structural principle of equal sovereignty that runs through the 
Constitution.”409  Although the Supreme Court had applied the principle 
most prominently to ensure the equal footing of newly admitted States, 
Colby argues that “the equal footing doctrine is just a particular, concrete 
aspect of a broader and deeper principle.”410  He agrees that this broader 
principle of equal sovereignty lacks “a clear textual mandate,”411 but argues 
that it draws “powerful support” from the history, caselaw, and “underlying 
structure of our constitutional system.”412  Although “[t]hat equality was not 
spelled out in so many words in the Constitution,” Colby concludes that it 
was “a background assumption on which the Constitution was drafted.”413 
Similarly, Thomas Schmitt has argued that the principle of equal 
sovereignty “is entirely consistent with, and perhaps even supported by,” 
constitutional text and precedent.414  In his view, “[b]ecause the states 
existed prior to Ratification, it is not surprising that the framers omitted any 
mention of equal state sovereignty [in the text].”415  In addition, he 
maintains that “the Court’s reasoning [in longstanding precedent] clearly 
applies beyond the context of the admission of new states.”416  Finally, he 
concludes that “[t]he idea of equal state sovereignty has been a fundamental 
assumption of our constitutional order throughout United States history.”417 
We agree that the concept of equal sovereignty was an important 
background assumption against which the Constitution was drafted and 
ratified.  But both critics and supporters of the doctrine have paid too little 
attention to the constitutional term used by the founders—“States”—to 
embody that assumption.  As discussed, the original Thirteen Colonies 
 
407 Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1518 (2007). 
408 Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of 
Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 288 (1992). 
409 Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Equal Sovereignty, 65 DUKE L. J. 1087, 1091 (2016). 
410 Id. at 1108. 
411 Id. at 1102. 
412 Id. at 1102. 
413 Id. at 1140. 
414 Schmitt, supra note 406, at 222. 
415 Id. at 223. 
416 Id. at 229. 
417 Id. at 238. 
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declared themselves to be “Free and Independent States” in the Declaration 
of Independence.418  Under the law of nations, “Free and Independent 
States” were entitled to the “perfect equality and absolute independence of 
sovereigns.”419  The notion of a “State” with fewer sovereign rights than 
another “State” was unknown to the law of nations.  By using the term 
“States,” the Constitution recognized the traditional sovereign rights of the 
States minus only those rights that they expressly surrendered in the 
document.  Accordingly, “[a]lthough the states necessarily compromised 
their ‘absolute independence’ by uniting under the Constitution, it does not 
follow that they forfeited their ‘absolute equality.’”420  Thus, in order to 
restrict the sovereign rights of some States but not others, Congress would 
have to point to an express constitutional provision authorizing it to do 
so.421  Although the original Constitution contains no such provisions, the 
Civil War Amendments empower Congress to take such action when 
necessary to enforce their guarantees. 
The original Constitution contains no provisions expressly 
authorizing Congress to override the equal sovereignty of the States.  
Indeed, as explained, in drafting and ratifying the Constitution, the founders 
decided not to give Congress any authority to regulate the States.422 
Although the original Constitution was designed to forgo federal 
regulation of the States, the Civil War Amendments were designed to do 
just the opposite.  In the aftermath of the Civil War, the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments imposed important restrictions on 
the governance prerogatives of the States by prohibiting slavery, defining 
citizenship, and guaranteeing equal protection, due process, and the right to 
vote without regard to race.  In addition, all three Amendments gave 
Congress express power to enforce their prohibitions “by appropriate 
legislation.”423  Thus, by adopting these Amendments, the States expressly 
surrendered part of their traditional immunity from regulation by another 
sovereign and compromised their right to equal sovereignty.  The Supreme 
Court confirmed this surrender in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,424 which held that 
“the Eleventh Amendment, and the principle of state sovereignty which it 
 
418 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776). 
419 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812). 
420 Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1328 
(1996). 
421 We agree with Thomas Colby that “unequal or discriminatory federal laws implicate the equal 
sovereignty principle only when they grant more regulatory authority or capacity for self-government to some 
states than to others (or allow some states a greater role than others in the federal government).”  Colby, supra 
note , at 1150.  Accordingly, “federal laws that are drafted in general, nongeographic terms, but have a disparate 
impact on some states,” do not violate the equal sovereignty of the States under the Constitution.  Id.  
422 See Clark, supra note 234, at 1838-62 (describing the debates surrounding the founders’ decision to grant 
Congress power to regulate individuals rather than States). 
423 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2. 
424 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
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embodies, are necessarily limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”425 
Thus, in analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, 
the proper question is not whether the States have equal sovereignty under 
the original Constitution (they do).  Nor is the proper question whether the 
States surrendered aspects of their equal sovereignty in the Civil War 
Amendments (they did).  Rather, the proper question is whether Congress’s 
2006 extension of the Voting Rights Act was a valid exercise of its power to 
enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.  Congress undoubtedly has enforcement 
power to treat States who violate the Fifteenth Amendment (by denying 
their citizens the right to vote on account of race) differently than States 
who comply with the Amendment.  Although such disparate treatment 
overrides the equal sovereignty of the States, it is expressly authorized by 
the Civil War Amendments and thus rests on an express surrender of the 
States’ right to sovereign equality in this context.  Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court had little difficulty upholding the original coverage 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.426  As the Court explained at 
the time, Congress’s decision to impose stricter conditions on some States 
than others was based on “evidence of actual voting discrimination” in 
violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.427   
Shelby County presented a different question—namely, whether 
Congress’s 2006 extension of the 1965 restrictions without any new 
findings of current discrimination was a valid exercise of Congress’s power 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.428  If the Fifteenth Amendment 
authorized the extension (as the dissent believed), then there was no 
violation of the States’ equal sovereignty because they had surrendered it to 
this extent.  On the other hand, if the Fifteenth Amendment did not 
authorize the extension (as the Court held), then Congress violated the equal 
sovereignty retained by the States.  Thus, the equal sovereignty issue in 
Shelby County turned on the proper interpretation of the Fifteenth 
 
425 Id. at 456 (citation omitted).  By contrast, the Court has long held that Congress generally lacks power 
under its Article I, Section 8 powers to override the States’ sovereign immunity.  See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. 
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).  The only exception the Court has recognized is when Congress acts pursuant to its 
bankruptcy power.  See Central Va. Comm. College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006). 
426 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
427 Id. at 330.  In particular, Congress imposed restrictions on jurisdictions with two characteristics: “the use 
of tests and devices for voter registration, and a voting rate in the 1964 presidential election at least 12 points 
below the national average.”  Id.  
428 We express no view here on the validity of Congress’s 2006 extension of the Voting Rights Act under its 
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.  This question is beyond the scope of this Article and turns on the 
proper scope of Congress’s power to enforce the Civil War Amendments.  The Supreme Court has recognized 
broad congressional power to enforce these Amendments, see South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 
(1966) (comparing Congress’s enforcement power to that conferred by the Necessary and Proper Clause), but has 
also made clear that congressional enforcement legislation must be “congruen[t] and proportiona[l]” to judicially 
recognized violations of the prohibitions set forth in the Amendments, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 
520 (1997). 
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Amendment.  The latter question is beyond the scope of this Article.  The 
important point for present purposes is that States retained their equal 
sovereignty under the original Constitution, and Congress can only override 
such equality pursuant to an express surrender by the States in a subsequent 
Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Commentators have charged that the Supreme Court’s most 
prominent federalism doctrines lack an adequate basis in the constitutional 
text, and thus are inconsistent with the Court’s commitment to textualism.  
This charge overlooks the original public meaning of the term “States.”  
Read against the backdrop of the law of nations, the Constitution’s use of 
the term “States” provides a textual basis for many of the Court’s most 
significant doctrines.  At the founding, a “State” was a term of art drawn 
from the law of nations and referred to an independent state entitled to a 
well-known set of sovereign rights.  Moreover, under the law of nations, a 
State could alienate its sovereign rights only by a clear and express 
surrender.  In ratifying the Constitution, the American States surrendered 
some, but not all, of their sovereign rights.  The rights they did not 
surrender, they necessarily retained.  There was no need for the 
constitutional text to “confer” these rights on the States because they were 
never surrendered.  This background context provides a firm textual basis 
for the Supreme Court’s decisions upholding state sovereign immunity, 
prohibiting federal commandeering of the States’ legislative and executive 
functions, and recognizing the sovereign equality of the States. 
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